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Abstract
This thesis is a defence of naive realism about colour, the view that colours are sui 
generis mind-independent properties. The prevailing view, with its origins in early 
modem writers like Descartes, is that colour experience is systematically 
misrepresentative. I argue, in contrast, that colours are what we ordinarily think they 
are.
In the first part of thesis, I argue that colours are mind-independent they exist 
independent of our experiences of colour. Acknowledging the mind-independence 
of colour in the first place requires being able to distinguish between colours and 
our colour experiences, something that we are able to do by thinking abstractly 
about the internal relations of similarity and difference in which colours stand. 
Subsequently upholding the mind-independence of colour involves resisting the 
Argument from Perceptual Variation. A consequence of the mind-independence of 
colour is that there is a sharp distinction between the colours objects really are and 
the objects they merely appear. The Argument from Perceptual Variation represents 
an attempt to undermine this appearance-reality distinction.
In the second part of the thesis, I argue that colours are sui generis', they are 
distinct from the surface reflectance properties described in physical science. 
Consistent with the thought that our colour experiences ‘inherit’ their 
phenomenology from the properties they are experiences of, colours cannot be 
identical with physical reflectance properties because these properties do not stand 
in the internal similarity relations characteristic of the colours. Instead, I argue that 
colours are distinct properties that supervene of metaphysical necessity on the 
reflectance properties of objects. Securing sui generis mind-independent colours a 
location within the natural world addresses the problem that has led philosophers 
since Descartes to deny that our common sense conception of colour is of itself 
clear and distinct.
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Introduction
A Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath the Ideas o f White and Black, 
and other Colours, as clearly, perfecdy, and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps 
more distinctly, than the Philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their 
Natures.
Locke 1690: II.viii.3-
The bold claim of this thesis is that colours an what we ordinarily think they an.
Although this claim may not sound especially bold, the contrary view that 
our ordinary thought about colour is systematically mistaken has a very long, very 
distinguished history, and is by far the most widely held view amongst scientists and 
philosophers to this day.
Ordinary thought is generally believed to go wrong in one of three ways. 
According to eliminativists, the colours we ordinarily suppose material objects to 
instantiate do not correspond to any properties that material objects actually 
possess. Eliminativism is the most extreme form of error theory. Relationists at least 
think that material objects are coloured. But they generally claim that ordinary 
thought misclassifies colours, mistaking merely mind-dependent relations between 
subjects, objects and environmental conditions for non-relational mind-independent 
properties. Finally,physicalists claim that material objects are coloured, often that 
colours are non-relational mind-independent properties, but that our naive 
conception of colour is nevertheless deficient because it is essentially incomplete. 
According to the physicalist, colours are properties whose essential nature is hidden 
from view, and it is the physicist’s job to uncover what this nature consists in.
The view that common sense is systematically mistaken with respect to 
colour crystallises in the modem period in the work of Descartes. According to 
Descartes, when:
someone says he sees colour in a body.. .this amounts to saying that he sees.. .something 
there o f which he is wholly ignorant, or, in other words that he does not know what he is 
seeing.1
It is not always entirely clear quite which error thesis Descartes meant to endorse. 
Descartes’s considered opinion, at least in the most complete expression of his 
scientific system, the Principles of Philosophy, appears to be just that colours are
1 1644:1.68.
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physical properties whose essential nature is not revealed in sensory perception: they 
are, for example, certain configurations of particles. Whatever the details, though, 
the striking idea that subsequently became common place is that we might be 
systematically mistaken in our ordinary beliefs about colour: as Descartes himself 
would put it, that we ordinarily lack a clear and distinct conception of colour?
Since Descartes’s time, each of the three types of error theory has had its 
champions. The case for eliminativism, for instance, was initially taken up with 
vigour by the Cartesian Malebranche, who claimed that in judging of material 
objects that they are coloured, the soul “spread[s] itself onto the objects it considers 
by clothing them with what it has stripped from itself’.3 Something like this view 
tends to be the standard view amongst modem scientists: the renowned vision 
scientist Zeki is fairly representative when he claims that colour is “a property of the 
brain, a property with which it invests the surfaces outside”.4 Hardin’s cross­
pollination of scientific and philosophical ideas, however, has recently revived 
interest in this view in the philosophical community.5
Still, amongst philosophers, physicalism about colour tends to be a more 
popular view. Physicalists vary depending upon which physical properties they 
identify colours with. One version of physicalism identifies colours with the 
properties of objects to reflect, or otherwise modify, light in a characteristic manner. 
An alternative view, particularly popular in Australia, identifies colours instead with 
the microphysical properties of objects in virtue of which they modify light in this 
way.6
Partly as a result of this disagreement, physicalists differ in quite how 
incomplete they take our ordinary conception of colour to be. The view inspired by 
Descartes is that visual experience leaves the nature of colour wholly open. As Reid 
puts it, colour involves “an unknown cause, and a known effect.. .as the cause is 
unknown, we can form no distinct conception of it, but by its relation to the known
2 In Descartes’s lifetime, Galileo had already suggested that “tastes, odours, colours, and so on are no 
more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned.. .they reside only in 
consciousness”, 1623: 274. The general view is, o f course, much older, and stretches back to early Greek 
atomists such as Democritus.
3 1674-5: 58.
4 Zeki 1993: 236. Compare Hering 1920: 2-3, Kaiser and Boynton 1996: 33, Palmer 1999a: 95.
5 Hardin 1988. Recent eliminatdvists include Jackson 1977 and Boghossian and Velleman 1989.
6 Reflectance-physicalists include Hilbert 1987, Byrne and Hilbert 1997 and 2003, Hilbert and Kalderon 
2000, Tye 2000. Proponents o f the Australian ‘primary quality view of colour’ include Armstrong 1968, 
Smart 1975 and Jackson 1998. Physicalism is discussed in Chapter 6.
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effect”.7 According to this way of thinking, there is a very fine line between realism 
and eliminativism. If colours lack any intelligible relation to our colour experiences 
then it can seem like little more than a metaphysical nicety to call this view realist at 
all. As Malebranche notes, there may be a sense in which grass is green if by colour 
you mean:
such and such a movement o f insensible parts.. .But if by heat and the other qualities you 
mean what I feel near fire, what I see when I see grass, and so forth, then fire is not hot at 
all, nor is grass green.8
Accordingly, many contemporary physicalists prefer to localise the error they 
attribute to common sense, claiming that colours at least have those properties that 
we ordinarily perceive them to: for instance, that they stand in the relations of 
similarity and difference characteristic of the colours. Either way, physicalists agree 
at least that the essential nature of colour is hidden from view, and that to suppose 
otherwise is to commit what Hilbert has called “the fallacy of total information”.9
Probably the most popular view amongst philosophers, however, is still the 
secondary quality view of colour that comes via Locke. Whereas Descartes identifies 
colours with the properties that he thinks physical science will eventually tell us 
cause our colour experiences, Locke is generally more circumspect, identifying 
colours instead just with the dispositions, or powers, of objects to appear a certain 
way. Locke’s motivation for this is to secure the “adequacy” of our simple ideas — 
their agreement with “the reality of Things” -  even in the eventuality that there are 
no configurations of particles (‘corpuscular textures’) to which particular sensations 
of colour correspond.10 According to this view, the relevant dispositions are distinct 
from the corpuscular textures, or physical properties more generally, in virtue of 
which objects have these dispositions. In effect, dispositionalism about colour is 
therefore a version of what in the philosophy of mind is called ‘role-functionalism’. 
Role-functionalism identifies mental states with second-order properties defined by 
certain characteristic patterns of behaviour that their bearers exhibit. The traditional 
motivation for this view is also to avoid problems about multiple-realisation: cases in
7 1764: VI.4, p86.
8 1674-5: 441.
9 1987: 37.
10 Locke explains: “if Sugar produce in us the ldeasy which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure 
there is a power in Sugar to produce those Ideas in our Minds, or else they could not have been produced 
by it”, 1690: Il.xxxi.2.
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which there is no unique first-order physical property common to all the objects that 
exhibit the behaviour characteristic of the second-order functional property.11
Different dispositionalists and role-functionalists disagree depending upon 
precisely how they individuate colours. The standard view, following Locke, 
identifies colours as dispositions to produce in us certain kinds of experience; quite 
how you understand ‘experience’ itself depending on your general view of 
perception. Colours do not, however, need to be identified with dispositions to 
produce anything internal to the mind: appearances can instead be properties of 
material objects (‘appearance properties’).12 Indeed, objects can be disposed to 
appear a certain way without there being any ‘appearances’ at all. As Cook Wilson 
explains, to suppose otherwise may involve an illegitimate reification of 
‘appearance’:
for the true appearance (=appearing) to us o f the object is substituted, through the
‘objectification’ o f the appearing as appearance, the appearing to us o f an appearance.13
Whichever way colours are ultimately individuated, the umbrella term 
relationism brings out the intimate relationship that colours bear to perceiving 
subjects and conditions of perception according to this general way of thinking. To 
say that colours are the properties of objects to appear a certain way presupposes 
that there is a certain set of perceivers, and a certain set of viewing conditions, to 
which, and in which, they so appear: what appears one way to one perceiver in one 
set of conditions may appear different to different perceivers in the same conditions, 
or to the same perceiver in different conditions. This individuation of colours in 
terms of perceiving subjects and environmental conditions means that a difference 
in either entails a difference in colour. Colours, according to these views, are 
therefore mind-dependent properties.14
11 Putnam 1975. Recent dispositionalists about colour include Mackie 1976, Peacocke 1983, McGinn 
1983, Johnston 1992 and Wright 1992.
12 McDowell, for instance, identifies redness as an object’s disposition “to present a certain sort of 
perceptual appearance”, stressing that there is no general obstacle to taking at face value the appearance 
that secondary quality perception “presents itself as perceptual awareness of properties genuinely 
possessed by the objects that confront one”, 1985:112. A similar idea is implicit in Evans 1980.
13 1904: 796; compare Pritchard 1909: 73-6.
14 Relationism is in general also consistent with physicalism, if the disposition to appear a certain way (to a 
certain observer in certain circumstances) is identified with the physical grounds of this disposition, and 
not the disposition itself. See, for example, Jackson and Pargetter 1987, Averill 1992 and McLaughlin 
2003.
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This is not to say that according to the relationist there need be no sense in 
which colours can be thought to persist in the absence of their constituent relata. 
The relationist can allow that an object can be such as to appear yellow without 
actually appearing yellow on any particular occasion, because there are no suitably 
placed perceivers of the right kind or the necessary environmental conditions do not 
obtain. Indeed, if the relationist rigidities the description of the relevant perceivers 
and environmental conditions to normal perceivers and normal viewing conditions 
as they are in the actual world, then objects can be such as to appear yellow even if 
there are no perceivers of the right kind or the relevant viewing conditions never 
obtain.15
But it is important to be clear about exactly what this amounts to. All the 
relationist is saying is that in the absence of the necessary conditions obtaining 
certain counterfactual conditionals are true: yellow objects would appear a certain way 
were the relevant conditions satisfied. What they are not saying is that the truth of 
these counterfactuals is grounded in any further facts about the colours of objects. 
This is the idea that relationists variously express by saying that an object’s colour is 
‘nothing over and above’ its being such as to appear a certain way, that it ‘consists 
in’ being such as to appear a certain way, that is ‘just is’ its being such as to so 
appear.16 What grounds the disposition of an object to appear a certain way — that in 
virtue of which the associated counterfactual conditionals are true — is the object’s 
being a certain way physically; it is because the object has certain physical, non­
colour, properties that it is such as to appear, for example, yellow.
The important point is that according to relationists colours are not of 
themselves mind-independent properties. They are there to be perceived only in the 
derivative sense that the primary qualities on which they depend persist in the 
absence of their perception. The bottom line difference between relationist views 
according to which colours are relations that exist only in the actual presence of 
their relata, and relationist views according to which colours exist where the 
conditions necessary for their perception do not, is therefore minimal. If relational 
colours are genuinely distinct from their physical grounds, then there is a clear sense 
in which they do not really exist in the absence of their appearing a certain way at all.
15 See, for instance, Peacocke 1983, McDowell 1985, Wright 1992:113-4.
16 For examples o f these locutions, see Evans 1980: 272, fn. 27, McGinn 1983: 6, Cohen 2005.
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As Boyle points out, their manner of existence in these circumstances is 
fundamentally different to their manner of existence in the favourable circumstances 
in which object, subject and environmental conditions co-occur:
if there were no sensitive beings, those bodies that are now the objects o f our sense would 
be but dupotivety, if I may so speak, endowed with colours, tastes, and the like, and actually 
but only with those more catholic affections o f bodies -  figure, motion, texture, &c.17
Following Locke, relationism is usually presented as an error theory: the 
claim that colours are mind-dependent dispositions of objects to appear a certain 
way is offered as a corrective to the common sense view that colours are mind- 
independent properties. With the worries that motivate the ascription of error to 
ordinary thought in the background, however, an interesting variation on the 
relationist position presents relationism, not as an error theory, but as the view of 
colour implicit in common sense all along. According to this view, the conception of 
colour usually attributed to common sense isn’t even intelligible: we cannot even 
understand what it would be for colours to be of themselves mind-independent 
properties. It therefore represents, as McDowell puts it, a “gratuitous slur” on 
common sense to suppose that this is what we ordinarily take colours to be.18
All this leaves us in a rather unenviable position. On the one hand, it is 
widely believed that colours are not what we ordinarily think they are. On the other 
hand, there are those who question whether what is ordinarily thought to be the 
common sense view of colour is really what we ordinarily think colours are at all. 
How did we get into this mess? And more importantly, how do we get out of it?
In trying to answering these questions, the thesis is organised around two main 
contrasts: between mind-dependent and mind-independent views of colour in the 
first part, and between physicalist and sui generis views of colour thereafter. After 
setting out in more detail the Cartesian background to the problem in Chapter 1, 
Chapters 2-5 are concerned with the mind-independence of colour. In Chapter 2 ,1
17 1666: 25.
18 McDowell 1985:113; see Chapter 2. There are at least some writers who claim both that we ordinarily 
think of colours as mind-independent properties and that our common sense conception of colour is 
neither systematically mistaken nor essentially incomplete in this respect Campbell 1993 is perhaps the 
best recent example, although similar views can be found in Yablo 1995 and Watkins 2003. Intermediate 
between this position and that o f the physicalist are Westphal 1987 and Broackes 1992, who identify 
colours with ‘ways of changing the light’, but ways o f changing the light that make ineliminable reference 
to how the light they change looks. Sympathetic to the naive position is Stroud 2000, who argues that our 
common sense beliefs about colour are at least immune to critical scrutiny (see §3.1).
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argue that the view of colour implicit in common sense is that colours are mind- 
independent properties. The subsequent Chapters then defend the common sense 
view of colour in response to the Argument from Perceptual Variation. In Chapter 6 
I argue against the physicalist that colours are sui generis properties: they are distinct 
from the properties described in physical science. This leaves in Chapter 7 the 
problem which led Descartes to reject the mind-independence of colour in the first 
place: the problem of locating sui generis mind-independent colours within the natural 
world. I argue that colours supervene of metaphysical necessity on an object’s 
physical properties, and that this secures their genuine mind-independent existence. 
Insofar as colours are mind-independent sui generis properties, I suggest that our 
common sense conception of colour is after all clear and distinct.
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[1] Mechanism, Resemblance and Secondary
Qualities
The Democritick and Epicurean Atheists... acknowledge no other Modes ofMatter or Body, but 
only more or less Magnitude of Parts, Figure, Site, Motion, or Rest. And upon this very account 
do they explode Qualities, considered as Entities really distinct from these Modes; because, in 
the Generation and Alteration o f them, there would be Real Entities made Out of Nothing, or 
without a Cause, whereupon they Resolve these Qualities into Mechanism and Fancy.
Cudworth 1678: 755.
Although it is widely known that Descartes viewed the deliverances of colour 
experience with suspicion, the bearing of this on Locke’s famous distinction 
between primay qualities, like shape, size and texture, and secondary qualities, like 
colour, taste and sound, is not much discussed. To the near exclusion of all other 
seventeenth century mechanists, it is Boyle who dominates discussions of the 
background to Locke’s distinction. This is rather surprising. In the first place,
Boyle’s “corpuscularian theory of matter” is supposed to be neutral on the points of 
doctrine that differentiate broadly mechanistic theories of matter. Being “a person 
of a reconciling disposition”, Boyle prefers to regard theories which explicate natural 
phenomena mechanistically by way of minute bodies, or corpuscles, as “one 
philosophy”.1 Acknowledging Boyle’s influence on Locke is therefore consistent 
with recognising the influence on Locke of corpuscularians other than Boyle. 
Descartes’s influence is anyway well-documented. During his time as an 
undergraduate at Oxford, for instance, Locke made detailed notes on the most 
complete statement of Descartes’s mechanistic science, The Principles of Philosophy.2 
The experience was obviously beneficial, as in response to Edward Clarke’s request 
that Locke suggest reading for his son, Locke recommended Descartes’s scientific 
theory as “perhaps the most intelligible and most consistent with it self of any yet 
met with”.3
This Chapter sets Locke’s famous primary-secondary quality distinction 
against its Cartesian background. §1.1 reconstructs Descartes’s argument for the
1 1661: 356.
2 For details, see Milton 1994.
3 de Beer 1976 ii: no. 844. The letter, sent 5/15* March 1686, dates from around the period that Locke is 
thought to have completed the final draft of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding — Draft C  — 
suggesting that Descartes was fresh in Locke’s mind at the time. Locke repeated his recommendation, in a 
slightly revised form, subsequent to the publication of the Essay (1693b: §193).
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distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible qualities. §1.2 sets out 
Locke’s very similar argument for the very similar distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities. The comparison is used, in §1.3, to offer an interpretation of the 
claim that only our ideas of primary qualities “resemble” qualities of material bodies. 
§1.4 considers the response of two contemporary critics of mechanism, Margaret 
Cavendish and George Berkeley, whilst §1.5 assesses the relative strengths and 
weakness of the two versions of the argument. I argue that the Cartesian bifurcation 
of the mental into distinct sensory and intellectual faculties gives Descartes the 
resources to guarantee the validity of the argument for the primary-secondary quality 
distinction, but makes accounting for the phenomenology of sensory perception 
notoriously difficult. In rejecting this bifurcation, Locke’s version of the Cartesian 
argument is therefore both deductively invalid, and yet able to respect the 
phenomenology of secondary quality perception in a way that Descartes’s cannot.
1. Mechanism: Descartes
Descartes’s argument for the distinction between mechanical modifications like size, 
shape and motion, and sensible accidents like colour, taste and sound, is an 
essentially a priori argument, fundamental to which is our conception of material 
substance and the constraints on conceivable bodily interaction that our conception 
of material substance sets.
According to Descartes, the “principle property” of material substance, 
without which material substance is simply unintelligible, is extension.4 A substance’s 
principle property differs from its modifications to the extent that we can clearly 
conceive in general of the substance in which a mode inheres independently of that 
modification. Nevertheless, at least in the case of particular material substances the 
distinction between modification and principle attribute collapses, insofar as we 
could neither sensorily perceive, nor conceive of sensorily perceiving, a particular 
material body that lacked the various modifications of which extended substances
4 1644:1.53.
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are capable: determinate extensions, shapes and positions and motions of their 
parts.5
Modes contrast in this respect with a substance’s accidental qualities, which 
can be “removed” from corporeal matter “while the matter itself remains intact”.6 
Descartes gives two criteria by which to determine whether or not a quality is 
accidental. According to the empirical criterion, it is sufficient for a quality to be 
accidental that we have actually perceived a body that lacks it. Sensible qualities like 
colour are therefore merely accidental properties because we have actually seen, for 
example, stones “so transparent as to lack colour”. According to the more stringent 
conceptual criterion, a quality is accidental if we can merely conceive of a body lacking 
it. Hardness is therefore accidental because we can at least conceive of a melted or 
pulverised stone that lacks hardness.7 No less accidental by this criterion is 
impenetrability which, as Descartes explains elsewhere, “involve [s] a reference to 
parts and presuppose[s] a continuous body of division or limitation”: so, for 
example, we can conceive of an indefinite continuous body in which there is nothing 
except extension.8
This combination of empirical and conceptual consideration determines 
which modifications constitute our conception of particular material substance. In 
turn, our conception of particular material substance determines our conception of 
intelligible bodily interaction. Specifically, from the fact that we conceive of material 
substances as extended, shaped bodies whose parts have position and motion, it 
follows that the only way in which we can conceive of material substances acting 
upon each other is by affecting the extension, shape, position and motion of the 
parts of the material substances with which they come into contact.
This inference from our conception of bodily substance to our conception of 
bodily interaction is underwritten by a causal likeness principle, which imposes a 
‘proportionality’ constraint on the intelligibility of the causal relation: in general that
51644:1.64-5. Indeed, elsewhere modal distinctions, between modes and substances and different modes 
of the same substance, and conceptual distinctions, between a substance and its principle property, are 
simply treated as species of the same distinction; 1641, First Replies: 85-6 and Descartes to *** 1645/6, 
CSMK: 280.
6 1644: II.4.
71644:11.11. More prosaically, although less convincingly, we can conceive that, “[i]f, whenever our 
hands moved in a different direction, all the bodies in that area were to move away at the same speed as 
that of our approaching hands, we should never have any sensation of hardness”; 1644: II.4.
8 Descartes to More 5th February 1649, CSMK: 361.
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nothing comes from nothing, but more specifically, that what is more perfect is not 
produced by what is less perfect.9 In particular, this principle renders unintelligible 
Scholastic explanations of everything from transubstantiation to secondary quality 
perception in terms of “real” qualities. In contrast to inseparable modifications such 
as shape, real qualities are supposedly capable of being separated from, and existing 
independently of, material substances. Notwithstanding the conceptual confusion 
involved in predicating of qualities the exclusively substantial attribute of capacity 
for independent existence, to suppose that the inseparable mechanical modifications 
of bodies could ever produce a quality that is separable from material substance 
would be to suppose that something incapable of independent existence could have 
a causal influence on that which is capable of independent existence. In other words, 
it would be to suppose that what is less perfect could have a causal influence on 
what is more perfect. Because as this violates what Descartes regards as the 
intuitively (demonstratively) certain causal likeness principle, it follows that the 
Scholastics, who treat change in a body’s supposedly real qualities as a kind of 
motion, succeed only in “making the nature of motion less intelligible to 
themselves”. Instead, the only way in which we can intelligibly conceive of material 
substances acting upon each other is by virtue of “local motion”.10
Ironically, with exactly what Descartes intended to replace the unintelligible 
general Scholastic conception of motion is itself far from clear. Descartes’s official 
view is that motion and rest are modifications of material substance, and so cannot 
pass from one body to another: to suppose otherwise would require that rest and 
motion are precisely the kind of separable quality whose existence Descartes is at 
pains to deny. Nevertheless, there is a clear tension between Descartes’s essentially 
static official conception of motion and the view of motion that is apparently 
presupposed by his third law of nature. Governing bodily interaction, a very natural
9 1644:1.18.
10 1644:1.69. Descartes tells us that “the principal argument which induced philosophers to posit real 
accidents was that they thought that sense-perception could not be explained without them”; 1641, Sixth 
Replies: 293. Especially important, though by no means the sole motivation, is the explanation o f the 
sensory perception of the bread and wine that according to Catholic doctrine is literally transformed into 
the body and blood of Christ during the Eucharist; see 1641, Sixth Objections-. 281. Elsewhere, Descartes 
suggests that Scholastic philosophers also use real qualities to explain bodily motion; see Descartes to 
Mersenne, 26th April 1643, CSMK: 216. For helpful discussions of real qualities, see Anstey 2000: 94-9 
and Rozemond 1998: 102-38.
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interpretation of this law is that stronger bodies literally “lose” a quantity of motion 
equal to that which they “impart” to weaker bodies on collision.11
Whatever the correct interpretation of Descartes’s conception of motion, it is 
incumbent on Descartes to explain our sensory perception of material substances in 
a way consistent with the claim that our only intelligible conception of bodily 
interaction is ‘impulsive’. Central to Descartes’s explanation of sense-perception in 
the Principles — itself heavily reliant on his earlier account of sense-perception in the 
Dioptrics — is a corpuscular theory of light in which light is described by analogy with 
imperceptible tennis balls reflected and refracted by objects on collision.12 Taking 
this analogy at face value, sensory perception occurs when imperceptible spherical 
bodies travel between material bodies and the eye, pass through the fluids and 
transparent membranes of the eye, thereby strike the retina and form an image. 
These images subsequently set into motion optic-nerve fibres, different motions of 
which cause different sensations in the soul.13 The result is an idea in the mind that 
represents, by “resemblance”, the particular mechanical modifications of material 
objects:
as a result o f sensory stimulation, we have a clear and distinct perception of, some kind of 
matter, which is extended in length, breadth, depth, and has various differently shaped and 
variously moving parts.. .and we appear to see clearly that the idea of it comes to us from 
things located outside ourselves, which it wholly resembles.14
The claim that our ideas of the mechanical modifications of material substance 
“resemble” those modes draws a conceptual distinction between a body’s mechanical
11 1644:11.40. This criticism is made by Henry More; see Descartes to More, August 1649, CSMK: 382. 
Looking ahead, it is worth noting More’s influence on Locke. Locke’s library contained at least 6 of 
More’s own works (Harrison and Laslett 1965: 2043-2047a), and Locke was well acquainted with More’s 
criticisms of Cartesian philosophy. With specific reference to More’s Enchiridion Metaphysicum o f 1671, for 
example, Locke wrote in his journal for 22nd January 1687, that More “wrote subtly and knowledgeably 
against Descartes’s system” (for details, see Bonno 1955: 164).
12 1637: II, CSM i 156-64. In his unpublished work Descartes is less circumspect, avoiding the atomistic 
connotations of this analogy. In the posthumously published The World or Treatise on Tight, for instance, 
Descartes characterises light instead as the instantaneous communication of a tendency to motion 
through pressure exerted on globules of the second element by celestial matter. It is worth noting that in 
a letter to Vatier, Descartes claims that The World contains “the whole body” of his physical theory; 22nd 
February, 1638, CSMK: 87.
13 1644: IV.189-95; 1637: IV. As Descartes explains elsewhere, the motion in the optic nerve fibres causes 
sensations by way of images traced in the spirits on the surface of the pineal gland. See, for example, the 
Treatise on Man, posthumously published in 1664, CSM i: 106.
14 1644: II. 1, emphasis added. In a slightly earlier passage, Descartes expresses the same thought by saying 
that the mechanical modifications shape, size, position and motion of parts are “actually or at least 
possibly present in objects in a way exactly corresponding to our sensory perception or understanding”, 1644:
1.70, emphasis added.
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modifications and its supposedly sensible qualities. Descartes illustrates this contrast 
by analogy with the experience of pain. We do not assume that pain is a quality of 
the objects which cause painful sensations that in any way resembles those 
sensations: the sensation of pain that ensues from being struck by a sword, for 
example, “is completely different from the local motion of the sword or of the body 
that is cut”.15 But why suppose the situation is any different with respect to sensible 
qualities like colour, sound, smell and taste? According to Descartes, it is not. Setting 
aside preconceived opinions formed in early childhood as a result of the necessarily 
close tie between mind and body, Descartes argues that we can no more “find any 
intelligible resemblance” between qualities of objects and sensations of colour than 
we can between qualities of objects and sensations of pain.16
Suppose, for the purposes of reductio, that our sensations did resemble 
modifications of material substance. We would then first have to explain the 
production of these sensible qualities purely in terms of the action of an object’s 
mechanical modifications; we would have to explain, that is, how an object’s 
sensible qualities could be consequent upon its instantiating purely mechanical 
modifications. We would also have to explain how these sensible qualities could in 
turn cause alterations in the purely mechanical modifications of other bodies, given 
that the proximate causes of our secondary quality sensations are motions in the 
brain: something attested to, Descartes claims, by sensory experiences in which 
sparks of flashing light are experienced as a result of striking the retina and thereby 
communicating motion along the optic-nerve fibres to the brain. According to 
Descartes, however, neither would-be explanation is intelligible:
there is no way of understanding how.. .size, shape and motion can produce something 
else [jr. real qualities or Scholastic forms] whose nature is quite different from their 
own.. .and we cannot understand how these qualities or forms could have the power 
subsequently to produce local motions in other bodies.17
That is, we cannot understand secondary quality perception except in mechanistic 
terms. To suppose, for example, that colour perception is the result of real qualities 
literally separating themselves from material substances, ‘flitting’ through the air to 
the eye, and then being transmitted from eye to the mind, would violate the causal
15 1644: IV.197.
16 1644:1.66-71.
17 1644: IV.198.
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likeness principle which requires that causes be proportional to their effects. There is 
therefore a metaphysical distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible 
accidents. In contrast to shape, size and motion, sensible qualities like colour are not 
really qualities at all: they are “nothing else in the objects.. .but certain dispositions 
on size, shape and motion”.18
2. Mechanism: Locke
Before assessing the bearing of this on Locke’s argument for the more famous 
primary-secondary quality distinction, we first need to identify Locke’s argument. It 
is commonly assumed that Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality 
distinction is located primarily between Il.viii. 16-21, with the well-known 
discussions of the fire, manna, porphyry, almond and water. Indeed, in her 
comprehensive review of the secondary literature on this subject, Margaret Wilson 
describes sections Il.viii. 19-21 in particular as constituting “a sort of watershed in 
historical interpretation”.19
But this is not in fact where Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary 
quality distinction is primarily located. We can see this by considering just the 
structure of Locke’s discussion. According to the marginal summaries added to the 
Second Edition of the Essay in 1694, Il.viii. 15-23 (Il.viii. 15-22 in the Fourth Edition 
of 1700) form a unified whole. The most natural interpretation of this is that 16-21, 
the sections in which Locke’s arguments for the primary-secondary quality 
distinction are usually thought to lie, serve to elucidate the claim made at Il.viii. 15, 
that only our ideas of primary qualities are resemblances. Locke describes the 
resemblance claim of section 15, however, as an observation that is “easie to draw” 
from Il.viii. 14, itself a statement of the primary-secondary quality distinction drawn 
on the basis of the discussion of II.viii.9-13. The resemblance claim of section 15, 
which sections 16-21 serve to elucidate, is therefore most naturally understood as a 
corollary of the discussion of sections 9-14. In which case, sections 16-21 must serve 
merely to elucidate and clarify the conclusion that has already been established by
Il.viii. 15.
18 1644: IV.199.
19 1992: 212.
20
This appearance is borne out if we compare the discussion of the primary- 
secondary quality distinction in the Essay with the earlier discussions in the 
‘Epitome’, published two years before the Essay in 1688, and Draft C of the Essay, 
thought to be written around a further two years before that. Neither discussion 
contains anything that corresponds to the sections in which Locke’s argument for 
the primary-secondary quality distinction is traditionally thought to lie. Rather, that 
from which Locke draws the primary-secondary quality distinction follows very 
closely the text of II.viii.9-15 of the First Edition of the Essay.20
Matters are complicated at this point by revisions that Locke made to 
sections 9-15 for the Fourth Edition of the Essay, published in 1700, the text on 
which modern editions of the Essay are based. However, if we follow the text of the 
first three Editions of the Essay, in which the definition of secondary qualities at
Il.viii. 10 is absent and the interaction principle ofII.viii.il is stated in its unrevised 
form, it soon becomes apparent that Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary 
quality distinction is actually just an extremely succinct expression of Descartes’s a 
priori argument for the distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible 
qualities. Indeed, this would seem to be precisely the kind of “speculative Truth” the 
discovery of which Locke cites in the First Edition of the Essay as a paradigmatically 
pleasurable experience.21 Schematically, the argument of II.viii.9-15 in the first three 
Editions of the Essay runs as follows:
9. The primary qualities of bodies are solidity, extension, motion or rest, number and 
figure.
10. Such qualities are:
[1] “wholly inseparable from the Body”;
[2] “such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers.. .it constantly keeps”;
[3] “such as Sense constantly finds in every particle of Matter , which has bulk
enough to be perceived”;
[4] inseparable in thought “from every particle of matter, though less than to make
it self singly be perceived by our Senses”.
11. The only way in which we can conceive of bodies operating on each other is by impulse: 
it is “impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what it does not touch.. .or 
when it does not touch, operate any other way than by Motion”.
12. Since the objects of perception can only operate on contact and are not “united” to our 
minds, “’tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, 
and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion, which produces these Ideas we have o f them 
in us”.
20 For more details, see Hill Forthcoming and Walmsley 2003.
21 E II.xx.18. This example does not occur in any subsequent edition.
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13. By analogy with pain, we can conceive that the same is true o f secondary qualities:
“it being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such Ideas to such 
Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he should annex the Idea o f Pain to 
the motion of a piece o f Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no 
resemblance”.
14. Therefore, secondary qualities “are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but 
Powers to produce various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities.
15. “From whence I think it is easie to draw this Observation, That the Ideas of primary 
Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them.. .but the Ideas,produced in us by these Secondary 
Qualities, have no resemblance o f them at all”.
The argument works in exactly the same way as Descartes’s. Primary qualities 
are, by definition, [1] inseparable from bodies and — what may be understood as an 
explication of the technical term ‘inseparability’ — [2] in bodies regardless of what 
changes or alterations those bodies undergo. As such, the list of primary qualities 
includes solidity, extension, figure, number and motion or rest.22
There are two criteria by which to determine whether or not a determinable 
quality satisfies the characteristics definitional of primary qualities. Applying only to 
bodies big enough to be perceived, the empirical criterion [3] disqualifies a property 
from primary quality status if we have ever actually perceived a body that lacks it. 
Locke suggests elsewhere in the Essay that colours fail to satisfy this criterion for 
primary quality status as there are objects like diamonds, or, when viewed under a 
microscope, sand, pounded glass, and the liquor in which red globules found in the 
blood swim, that we know to be pellucid.23 However, even if we had never actually 
seen a body so pellucid as to lack colour, colours would still fail to qualify as primary 
qualities so long as they failed the second, conceptual criterion [4], for primary quality 
status. The conceptual criterion extends the empirical epistemic criterion first, to those 
macroscopic bodies that as a matter of fact we have never actually perceived, and 
more importandy, to the “good store of bodies” which are too small to perhaps ever 
be perceived, but which are fundamental to mechanistic explanations of the 
interaction of macroscopic material bodies.
Consider, by way of illustration, solidity, the inclusion of which on Locke’s list 
of primary qualities marks an important theoretical disagreement between Locke and
22 Number is not constant in Locke’s primary quality lists. Similarly variable is texture, which in the First 
Edition is first mentioned in Il.viii. 14, does not feature on the subsequent lists o f Il.viii. 15,16 or 17, and 
reappears again only in II.viii.18.
23 II.xxiii.ll.
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Descartes. Solidity satisfies the epistemic criterion for primary quality status because 
Locke thinks that we receive no idea more constandy from sensation than solidity.
At the same time, it also passes the conceptual test for primary qualities because if 
the mind, having got the idea of solidity from macroscopic bodies, “traces it 
further.. .to the minuest Particle of Matter”, it will find that solidity is “inseparably 
inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified”. In other words we cannot 
conceive of a body that lacks solidity.24
The qualities identified as primary in II.viii.9, via the procedure described in
II.viii.10, constitute our conception of material substance. As such, they ground the 
inference to the impulsive action principle ofII.viii.il, insofar as our conception of 
bodily interaction is determined by what we take bodies to be. For instance, from 
the fact that nothing in our conception of material substances explains how bodies 
could interact when not touching, it follows that we cannot conceive of bodily 
action at a distance. Instead, the only way in which we can conceive of solid, 
extended, figured, mobile material bodies operating on other such bodies is by 
impulse, something which we can intelligibly conceive of occurring only on the 
occasion of their contact; like when one billiard ball communicates its motion to 
another.
As for Descartes, Locke’s inference from bodily constitution to bodily 
interaction is underwritten by a commitment to intuitively (demonstratively) certain 
causal likeness principles-, first, that from nothing can come nothing, and second, the 
specific version of this principle, that there must be at least as much “perfection” in 
the cause as there is in the effect.25 These principles impose the constraint on the 
intelligibility of the causal relation that the cause be an entity of the right type to 
bring about the effect. As such, they rule out the possibility that the primary qualities 
of bodies produce qualities that differ fundamentally in kind to themselves; 
specifically, that primary qualities, which by definition [1] are inseparable from bodies, 
produce distinct separable qualities.26 To suppose, like the Scholastics, that the 
inseparable primary qualities of bodies could ever produce a quality that is separable
24 Il.iv.l.
25 See IV.x.3 and 10 respectively. That Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is 
supposed to be deductive is suggested by the analogy that he draws at IV.x.3 between the causal likeness 
principle — that nothing can come from nothing — and the proposition that nothing is not equal to two 
right angles, without which the paradigmatic deductive science, Euclidean geometry, would be impossible.
26 Note, however, that in a departure from Scholastic terminology, Locke reserves the term “real” for the 
inseparable primary qualities of bodies, II.viii.17.
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from material substance would be to suppose that what is less perfect could produce 
what is more perfect. It would also frustrate any pretensions that we might have of 
deducing a priori facts about the nature of bodily interaction from facts about bodily 
constitution. A  priori deducibility requires universality: that the effects of a body’s 
primary qualities be always and everywhere the same. To guarantee this, inseparable 
primary qualities need to only ever produce changes in inseparable primary qualities.
Consistent with the impulsive action claim ofII.viii.il, section 12 offers an 
account of how we perceive the primary qualities of material bodies. According to 
Locke, perception occurs when material bodies interact with the sense organs by 
way of imperceptible particles that communicate motion from these objects to 
perceiving subjects. This motion is subsequently transmitted from the sense organs 
to the brain, and thereby excites in our minds primary quality ideas. Although Locke 
is more circumspect than Descartes in explaining exactly how motions in the brain 
are able to excite in our minds these ideas, the general similarities of Locke’s account 
to the Cartesian theory of sense-perception are striking. Indeed, in one of the few 
explicit references to any other philosopher in the Essay, Locke elsewhere even 
parodies Descartes’s analogical explanation of the propagation of light, explaining 
light as “nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all day long 
struck with Rackets against some Men’s Fore-Heads, whilst they passed by others”.27
II.viii.13 extends the account of primary quality perception developed in 
section 12 to secondary quality perception. Using the same analogy between 
secondary quality sensations and pain sensations as Descartes, Locke argues that it is 
no more impossible to conceive that God should annex secondary quality sensations 
to corporeal motions with which they have no similitude than that he should annex 
pain sensations to the corporeal motion of “a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh”. In 
contrast, it is impossible to conceive that secondary quality sensations should be 
caused in any other way. In particular, it is inconceivable that the separable qualities 
that the Scholastics suppose denominate bodies could be transmitted from these 
bodies to perceiving subjects, thereby interact with their sense organs and produce 
in their minds the relevant experiences. There is therefore a metaphysical distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are not really qualities 
at all, but are merely powers (or dispositions) to produce in us ideas, powers that
27 III.iv.10.
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depend on the primary qualities of objects. The corollary of this metaphysical 
distinction is the conceptual distinction that whilst our ideas of primary qualities 
“resemble” those qualities as they are in bodies, our ideas of secondary qualities do 
not.
By way of illustration, Locke then — and only then — introduces the infamous 
examples of the fire, manna, porphyry, almond and water, at Il.viii. 16-21. Consider, 
for instance, Locke’s discussion of the porphyry. A piece of porphyry, which 
produces in us sensations of red and white in the light, has no colour in the dark: 
this much is just supposed to be plain.28 But what could possibly explain this 
alteration in the porphyry’s qualities? In virtue of what is it coloured in the light but 
colourless in the dark? We might think, for example, that colours are qualities that 
literally separate from material bodies in the dark; as Walter Charleton, an English 
follower of the atomist Gassendi, puts it, that colours are properties “cohaerent to 
those superficial particles [of compound bodies], so as...to be actually separated 
from them, upon the absence of Light”.29 But then the presence or absence of light 
would somehow have to explain this separation. Yet it follows from the argument of 
sections 9-15 that we cannot conceive of how the presence or absence of light could 
intelligibly explain this alteration. Given our conception of material substance, the 
only way in which we can intelligibly conceive of bodies interacting is by impulse. It 
is therefore only if colours are powers to produce in us sensations that depend on 
the primary qualities of an object’s insensible parts that we can understand how the 
porphyry undergoes the alteration that it does. Hence, colours are not qualities of 
objects, and our ideas of them do not resemble qualities of objects.
3. Resemblance
Before assessing the strength of these arguments for the primary-secondary quality 
distinction, it is worth briefly pausing to consider the argument’s conceptual conclusion: 
the notorious claim that only our primary quality ideas “resemble” qualities of
28 Although Locke thinks it just “plain” that objects have no colour in the dark, it is interesting to note 
that Boyle deemed the point worthy o f experimental proof, describing an experiment that he conducted 
with the help of “an ingenious person (skilled in optics)” to determine whether or not snow is white in 
the dark. Needless to say, neither Boyle, nor his friend, “could find, that it had any other light than what it 
received”, 1664: 699.
29 1654: 185; Charleton does not, of course, himself endorse this position.
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objects. At least partly on the basis of this claim, some commentators have 
attributed to Locke a veil-of-perception view according to which ideas are not only 
the immediate objects of perception, but bear literally the same determinable (if not 
the same determinate) primary qualities as the material objects for which they stand 
proxy.30
It is worth stressing, however, that nothing in Locke’s argument for the claim 
that only primary quality ideas “resemble” qualities of objects commits him to the 
view that ideas are literally square or yellow. Although at II.viii.12 Locke 
acknowledges that we perceive objects that are not “united” to our minds, he does 
not there say that if external objects are not united to our minds then there must be 
something - ‘real beings’, or ideas — that are. This is not the kind of ‘wandering soul’ 
argument that we find, for example, in Malebranche, who claims that if the 
immediate objects of perception were not “intimately joined to the soul” then the 
soul would have to leave the body and “stroll about the heavens” when it sees 
objects spatially distinct from itself.31 As far as Locke is concerned, the only thing 
that is “evident” when it comes to the perception of bodies external to the mind is 
that some motion must be communicated, by our nerves or animal spirits, from our 
sense organs to our brains, and there produce the particular ideas that we have of 
them. As to what these particular ideas are, Locke here remains neutral. O f course, 
this means that ideas could yet be real beings that are literally square and yellow. But, 
it does not follow that they are, as they could equally be modes or even something 
entirely different again.32
To see this more clearly, it is instructive to compare Locke’s version of the 
Interaction Argument with Descartes’s. According to Descartes, ideas are 
modifications of immaterial substance.33 To the extent that it makes sense at all to 
talk of modifications as being themselves literally modified, to suppose that a 
modification of immaterial substance is literally square would require at least that the
30 For a classic statement of this interpretation, see Reid 1785: Il.xvii. This interpretation has recently 
been revived by Winkler 1992 and Jacovides 1999. It receives more qualified approval from Ayers 1991 i: 
52-69.
31 1674-5:111.2.1,217.
32 Although Locke elsewhere professes to find the hypothesis that ideas are real beings, but neither
substances nor modes unintelligible (1693a: §18), he does not definitively rule it out, being clear that, 
“God is not bound in all he does to subject his ways of operation to the scrutiny of our thoughts” 
(1693b: §2).
33 1644: 1.9; 1.32.
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substance of which it is a modification is itself literally extended. Yet, it is an 
essential property of immaterial substances that they are /^extended. A ‘square idea’ 
therefore cannot itself be literally square. For a similar reason, neither can ‘yellow 
ideas’ be themselves literally yellow. As the more orthodox Cartesian Arnauld says in 
criticism of Malebranche’s ‘doctrine of the rainbow soul’, for instance:
when it is said that the soul is yellow or green,.. .that would imply that the soul is 
something whose surface is covered with the colour green or the colour yellow, something 
that would be a far greater error than the one we are trying to avoid, since this would 
suggest that the soul is corporeal.34
The important point here is that if it does not follow from Descartes’s version of 
the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction that ideas are literally 
square or yellow, and Locke’s argument is a version of essentially the same 
argument, then it does not follow simply from Locke’s version of this argument that 
ideas are the immediate objects of perceptual experience and bear qualities that 
literally resemble those of material bodies.35
But if the resemblance claim is not meant literally, what do Descartes and 
Locke mean when they say that only primary quality ideas resemble qualities of 
objects? Setting aside questions about the metaphysical status of ideas, a promising 
suggestion is that “resemblance” should be understood at least in part metaphorically, 
as describing the functional role that ideas occupy. On this reading, to say that an 
idea “resembles” a quality of an object is to say that it ‘yields an intelligible 
conception o f  that quality, or, in more explicitly Cartesian language, ‘yields a clear 
and distinct conception o f that quality. So, for example, colour ideas do not 
“resemble” qualities of objects because they do not enable us to intelligibly, or 
clearly and distinctly, conceive of properties of objects: as Descartes variously says,
34 1683: Chapter 23,175.
35 Locke was well acquainted with Malebranche’s views and the disputes these views engendered. During 
the period on which he was working on Draft C  o f the Essay, Locke’s journals contain detailed notes on 
Malebranche’s Search After Truth (7th January to 14th February 1684) and Arnauld’s virulent attack on 
Malebranche, On True and False Ideas (15th March 1684; for details, see Bonno 1955). Later, when in the 
process of revising the Essay, Locke prepared one set of comments directed explicidy at the Search, and 
two sets of comments on the English follower of Malebranche John Norris, whose Cursory Reflections upon 
a Book call’d an Essay concerning Human Understanding was the first published critique of the Essay, appearing 
in 1690. A letter to Molyneux suggests that Locke prepared these comments with an eye towards adding a 
new chapter to the Essay (28th March 1693, de Beer 1976 iv: 665, no. 1620). Locke, however, never made 
the proposed changes, explaining his decision to Molyneux in a later letter, saying “I love not 
controversies, and have a personal kindness for the author” (8th March 1695, de Beer 1974 v: 287, no. 
1857).
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“If someone says he sees colour in a body.. .this amounts to saying that he 
sees.. .something there of which he is wholly ignorant”; there is no “intelligible 
resemblance” between colours considered as qualities of objects and sensations. 
Shape ideas, in contrast, “resemble” qualities of objects because they allow us to 
clearly and disdncdy conceive what those qualities are like: “our knowledge of what 
it is for the body to have a shape is much clearer than our knowledge of what it is 
for it to be coloured”.36
This metaphorical interpretation of “resemblance” fits Locke equally well, at 
least to the extent that Locke’s overarching concern in the Essay is not so much with 
ideas considered in themselves, but rather with ideas considered as the 
“instruments” of knowledge.37 Our ideas of primary qualities “resemble” qualities of 
bodies insofar as they yield an intelligible conception of those qualities: we are, for 
example, able to intelligibly conceive of how objects could interact in virtue of these 
qualities. The same is not of true secondary qualities. We cannot conceive of how 
objects could interact in virtue of their secondary qualities. Since they do not yield 
an intelligible conception of any of an object’s qualities, secondary quality ideas do 
not resemble those qualities.
4. Are Secondary Qualities Primary?
When it comes to evaluating the strength of the mechanistic argument for the 
primary-secondary quality distinction, one obvious question that arises is whether it 
is true that sensible qualities like colour fail to satisfy both the empirical and conceptual 
criteria for primary quality status? Clearly if they do not, then even assuming the 
causal likeness principles that underwrite the inference from bodily constitution to 
bodily interaction, there is no reason to suppose that secondary qualities cannot 
intelligibly explain our perception of them.
The claim that colours fail both the empirical or the conceptual criteria for 
primary quality status is something that a number of contemporary critics of 
mechanistic science tried to reject. In her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, for 
instance, the atomist turned critic of mechanistic science Margaret Cavendish
36 See 1644:1.68-70. The present proposal builds on the interpretation of Descartes’s understanding of  
“resemblance” suggested by Wilson 1994.
37 1690: II.xxxiii.19.
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launches a two-pronged attack on the mechanistic denigration of colours to mere 
secondary qualities.
On the one hand, Cavendish tries to show that colours do not fail to satisfy 
the empirical criterion for primary quality status by considering a number of the 
examples that mechanists thought showed otherwise. Considering flax or silk 
divided into small parts, for instance, Cavendish claims that those parts do not “lose 
their colours, and being twisted, regain their colours”. Rather, the colours of the 
smaller parts of the flax or silk are simply not subject to our perception.38 Similarly, 
in response to Boyle’s experiment which purports to show that colour is not an 
essential quality of objects because objects like snow have no colour in the dark, 
Cavendish replies that colour is not “lost or lessened in the dark, but it is only 
concealed from the ordinary perception of human sight”. To suppose otherwise 
would be absurd: “if colours should not be colours in the dark, then it might as 
rationally be said, that a man’s flesh and blood is not flesh and blood in the dark, 
when it is not seen by a human eye”.39
Although Cavendish does not explicitly consider the claim that many objects 
do, as a matter of empirical fact, look pellucid under a microscope, it is no doubt a 
claim that she would also reject. Cavendish exhibits a strong disregard for the then 
burgeoning interest in ‘micrography’, furthered in no small measure by Hooke’s 
celebrated Micrographia of 1665. According to Cavendish, microscopes do not reveal 
any more accurately the real nature of material objects than ordinary perceptual 
experience. Indeed if anything, she thinks that, “magnifying, multiplying, and the like 
optic glasses, may, and do oftentimes present falsely the picture of an exterior 
object”.40
There are still many other examples of supposedly colourless objects that 
Cavendish does not consider. Underlying her piecemeal argument for the primary 
quality status of the secondary qualities, however, lies a rejection of the stronger 
conceptual claim that we can even conceive of bodies that lack secondary qualities. 
According to Cavendish, it is “as impossible to imagine a body without colour as it
38 1666: 81.
39 Cavendish 1666: 77-8, 86; Boyle’s experiment is described above (in a footnote to the discussion of  
Locke’s claim that porphyry has no colour in the dark). Note the importance of the analogy Cavendish 
draws with flesh and blood. Cavendish is vitalist, for whom flesh and blood are amongst the fundamental 
properties of matter. As such, they are analogous to the primary qualities of her mechanistic 
contemporaries. For a discussion of Cavendish’s vitalism, see James 1999.
40 1666: 50.
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is impossible for the mind to conceive a natural immaterial substance”.41 It therefore 
follows from her rejection of the conceptual claim that the empirical claim is false.
I consider in Chapter 2 the general question of whether Cavendish is right to 
claim that we can conceive of colours existing in the absence of the conditions 
necessary for their perception: for instance, whether we can make sense of the idea 
that an object’s colours are really just concealed from sight in the dark. For the time 
being, however, it is enough to note that the stronger claim Cavendish needs to 
block the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction -  that we cannot 
conceive of, let alone perceive, colourless objects — is not of itself especially 
convincing. Even restricting our attention to macroscopic objects, we are seem able 
to make sense of objects lacking colour. The reason why I do not need to open my 
window to determine the colour of objects on the other side of the road, for 
instance, is that the pane of glass in my window is more or less pellucid. Unlike 
coloured or tinted glass, which generally makes colours appear other than they really 
are, the glass in my window does not affect the perceived colours of the objects that 
I see through it.
In light of this problem, an interesting variation on this line of argument is 
therefore found in the more famous critic of mechanistic science, Berkeley. In his 
later published work, Berkeley actually falls short of endorsing the strong claim that 
we cannot conceive of colourless objects. When he famously says, for instance, that:
I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, 
but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to 
exist only in the mind
this is weaker than the claim that Berkeley would actually need to deny the premiss 
of the Descartes-Locke argument. For the premiss of this argument to be false, 
colour has to be inseparable from material substance. But the claim that Berkeley 
makes at 'Principles 1.10 is consistent with the possibility that at least some objects are 
perfectly pellucid: its just that if they are perfectly pellucid, then there must be some 
other secondary quality (taste, smell, sound, temperature) that we perceive them to 
instantiate.
411666: 86.
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In his earlier notebooks, however, Berkeley did more directly challenge the 
claim that colours fail the criteria for primary quality status. But rather than try to 
resist the claim that there are, or at least could be, objects so pellucid as to lack 
colour, like Cavendish, Berkeley tried a different approach. Berkeley claims instead 
that pellucidness is itself a colour: “Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his 
globules without colour, pellucidness is a colour”.42 Clearly if pellucidness is a colour, 
then the existence of perfecdy pellucid objects does not show that colours are not 
nevertheless wholly inseparable from material substance.
It is difficult, because of the nature of his notebooks, to know exactly what 
Berkeley had in mind in making this remark. Certainly taken at face value, it does 
not seem any more plausible to say that pellucidness is a colour than it does to say 
that there are no pellucid objects. Pellucidness has no place within colour space: it 
partakes in none of the relations of similarity and difference characteristic of 
colours. It is not clear that this alone is sufficient to rule out pellucidness as a colour: 
I argue in response to inter-species variation in Chapter 4, for instance, that having a 
location within our colour space is not a necessary condition of being a colour. The 
difference between pellucidness and supposedly novel colours, however, is the way 
in which they have no location within colour space. The reason why there is more 
pressure to admit that pellucidness is not a colour is that we see, through pellucid 
bodies, the colours of other bodies. To the extent that it makes sense to talk of 
pellucid objects as coloured at all, they are coloured only derivatively: they have their 
colour only in virtue of the objects we perceive through them.
But it maybe that Berkeley had something else in mind in saying that 
pellucidness is a colour, something that is much more worrying for the mechanist’s 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The problem concerns the 
status of the primary quality motion in mechanistic science. Central to mechanistic 
science is the law of inertial motion, which states that, in the absence of any 
interference, objects remain in the same state: for example, that without due cause, 
what is moving always continues to move and what is at rest never begins to move.43 
In order to frame this law of inertial motion, it is necessary to treat motion and rest 
as states of the same ontological kind. This contrasts with Scholastic theories of
42 1707-8: §453.
43 See, for example, Descartes 1644:11.37.
31
motion, according to which motion is a process that requires a continuous cause, 
without which moving objects naturally come to rest.44 The admission that rest and 
motion form an ontological kind, however, generates a problem with respect to the 
first premiss of the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction. If the 
law of inertial motion requires that rest — a lack of motion — be treated as a 
determinate of the determinable motion, then why can’t pellucidness -  a lack of 
colour -  also be treated as a determinate of the determinable colour? And if it can, 
then perceiving (or conceiving of) a transparent object that lacks colour, is still 
perceiving (or conceiving of) an object that is coloured. Colours, and by parity of 
reasoning all other secondary qualities, will thereby qualify as primary qualities.45
5. Secondary Qualities
Setting these problems aside, however, there is a more fundamental difficulty with 
the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction. I have argued so far that 
Descartes’s version of the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction 
resembles Locke’s. But there is also a striking difference: only Descartes’s version of 
the argument is actually valid.
For Descartes the inference from bodily constitution to bodily interaction at 
the heart of the argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is guaranteed 
by the clear and distinct conception of particular material substances that sensory 
perception, working in conjunction with the intellect, affords. Locke, however, 
thinks that we lack the clear and distinct conception of material substance we need 
to underwrite this inference. For Locke, solid extended substance is ultimately 
“incomprehensible”, because we are unable to determine the nature of the “primary 
and supposedly obvious” quality of bodies on which extension and figure depend: 
the cohesion of a body’s solid parts.46 It follows that no less “obscure and 
unconceivable” is the only remotely intelligible conception of bodily interaction we 
can hope to achieve: a conception of the capacity of objects to receive and 
communicate motion by impulse, grasping which presupposes a grasp of what the
44 Koyre 1968: Chapter 1.
45 It is interesting to note in light of this that Locke is agnostic on the question of whether rest is properly 
speaking the “privation” (i.e. lack) of motion at all (II.viii.6). Denying that there is any such thing as 
absolute rest would seem to be one way of avoiding this argument.
46 II.xxiii.26.
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cohesion of the parts of matter consists in. According to Locke, we therefore have 
no more detailed conception of impulsive bodily interaction as “of the passing of 
Motion out of one Body into another”.47
Which all poses a serious problem for Locke’s argument for the primary- 
secondary quality distinction. Because our conception of material substance is 
ultimately obscure and confused, it does not follow from the fact that we conceive 
of bodies as extended, solid, shaped pieces of matter, either in motion or at rest, that 
this is what bodies actually are. In turn, because our conception of what bodies are 
determines our conception of how bodies interact, neither does it follow from the 
fact we can conceive of bodies as interacting only by impulse and on contact that 
bodies cannot interact in any other way.
The invalidity of the inference from bodily constitution to bodily interaction is 
graphically illustrated by the revision that Locke makes to the impulsive action 
principle ofII.viii.il in the Fourth Edition of the Essay. In response to Newton’s 
“incomparable” Principia, Locke suppresses the explicit requirement that bodies 
communicate motion to other bodies only on contact. As he explains in his Second 
Reply to Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester:
The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a 
demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation, 
above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of 
matter, but also an unquestionable and every where visible instance, that he has done so.48
But if bodies could\ and even do, act in ways ‘above what can be derived from 
our idea of body’, why bodies couldn’t act, albeit equally unintelligibly, in virtue of 
their secondary qualities? It begins to look as though Locke is himself guilty of the 
same “unfair way” that he remonstrates others for taking who, “because of the 
inconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the 
contrary Hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiased 
Understanding”.49
47 See, for example, II.xxiii.28, IV.iii.14 and IV.iii.29.
48 1699: 467-8. It is natural to speculate that Locke interpolates the definition of secondary qualities at 
II.viii.10 in an attempt to obscure the supposedly deductive character of the argument of II.viii.9-15. If 
this was Locke’s intention, then in light of the confusion that these sections have caused it is fair to say 
that he succeeded!
49 IV.iii.6.
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This interpretative problem becomes still more pressing if we consider the 
explicit role that the “little Excursion into Natural Philosophy” of Il.viii plays in the 
Essay as a whole.50 The primary-secondary quality distinction is introduced to 
emphasise the difference between ideas and qualities, and with it the distinction 
between the inquiry into ideas as they are in the understanding, with which the Essay 
is concerned, and the inquiry into the nature of things as they are in themselves, 
which falls outside the scope of the Essay.51 To merely emphasise this distinction, 
however, it is unnecessary for Locke to actually assert the primary-secondary quality 
distinction; it would be enough to merely conditionally assert it. More generally, 
establishing the existence of a substantial metaphysical distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities is surely irrelevant when it comes to securing our knowledge of 
the great ends of morality and religion, with which above all else the Essay is 
concerned. Secondary qualities ideas contribute towards the great ends of morality 
and religion merely by enabling us to distinguish and re-identify particular material 
bodies. Locke, however, thinks that they could do this whether they were “a 
particular Texture of Parts” or else “that very Colour, the Idea whereof (which is in 
us) is the exact resemblance”: in other words, whether there were a metaphysical 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities or not.52
Locke’s problems on this point ultimately stem from his rejection of the 
Cartesian bifurcation of the mental into distinct sensory and intellectual perceptual 
faculties. For Descartes, the clarity and distinctness of the conception of individual 
material substance that we form via the senses, and which grounds the inference to 
the primary-secondary quality distinction, depends crucially on the interplay between 
the sensory and intellectual faculties: it is only “as a result of sensory stimulation”, 
and not through “sensory awareness” alone, that we clearly and distinctly perceive 
particular material bodies.53 By rejecting this bifurcation of the mental, Locke puts a 
clear and distinct conception of material substance beyond us. The senses alone 
cannot furnish us with any such conception, because they are “scarce acute enough 
to look into the pure Essences of Things”.54 And without a clear and distinct
50 II.viii.22.
51 See, for example, II.viii.2 and II.viii.7.
52 II.xxxii.14.
53 1644: II. 1. Compare the distinction between the second and third grades of sensory response in the 
Sixth Replies and the account of distance perception in the Dioptrics, 1637: VI.
54 1690: II.xiii.24.
34
conception of material substance, the conceivability claims on which Locke’s 
argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction rest cannot establish the 
metaphysical conclusion of this argument: we can infer neither from our conception of 
body to the nature of material substance, nor from the nature of body to the nature 
of bodily interaction.
At the same time, however, part of what makes Locke’s version of the 
primary-secondary quality distinction so attractive is precisely that rejects the 
Cartesian bifurcation of the mental into distinct sensory and intellectual faculties.
The bifurcation of the mental makes it notoriously difficult to accommodate 
sensation, and secondary quality sensations in particular, within the Cartesian 
framework. The temptation, to which Descartes typically succumbs, is to treat 
sensations as elements of perceptual experience distinct from the judgements made 
about them by the intellect; as he does, for example, in the passage from Principles 
II. 1 quoted above. According to this way of thinking it is natural to treat sensations 
as modes of neither the intellectual mind nor the extended body, but of a third 
thing, the mind-body union, which constitutes a substance distinct from both the 
body and the mind, and is that to which sensations are properly referred. Indeed, 
Descartes himself sometimes appears to treat sensations in this way, most famously 
when he explains to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia that we have a “primitive 
notion” of the substantial union between soul and body, much as we have primitive 
notions of both the mind and the body. But, of course, this cannot be Descartes’s 
considered view because it violates his commitment to a strict substance dualism.55 
The official Cartesian view is rather that all ideas, including sensations, are 
modifications of immaterial substance. And this now threatens to make sensory 
perception just a degenerate case of intellectual perception. To the extent that we 
think of pure intellectual perception as propositional and non-imagistic, this makes it 
difficult to respect the distinctive phenomenological character of sensory perception.
Generally speaking, it is not enough that the perceiving mind in which colour 
sensations are located differ in kind to the material world from which qualities 
resembling these sensations are expunged. If colours are to be downgraded to the
55 Descartes to Elizabeth 21st May 1643, CSMK: 218. Cottingham suggests that Descartes is not a 
substance trialist but a merely an “attribute trialist”, 1986: 127-32. Although this is not so clearly in 
tension with Descartes’s substance dualism, however, it doesn’t really address the fundamental problem 
of explaining the distinctively sensuous nature of sensation: if neither mind nor body are alone well suited 
to explain the nature of sensation, then how can they explain it together?
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secondary quality status of mere dispositions to produce in us sensations, then the 
mind must itself be able to accommodate these sensations: our ‘ontological dustbin’ 
has to be up to the task. It should be fairly clear that if there is a problem about how 
to square the existence of qualities resembling our sensations with the nature of 
material substance, then it is no better to locate colour sensations in a purely material 
mind. As Thomas Wise, in his abridgement of Cudworth’s True Intellectual System, 
observes, there is almost a logical connection between mechanism and mind-body 
dualism:
the inward Constitution of [corpuscular] Philosophy is also such, that whosoever really 
entertains it and rightly understands it, must of necessity admit Incorporeal 
Substance...according to this Philosophy the corporeal Phaenomena themselves cannot be 
solv’d by Mechanism alone without Fancy Now Fang is no Mode of Body, and therefore 
must needs be a Mode of some other kind of Being in our selves, which is cogitative and 
incorporeal.56
At the same time, however, it does not represent much of an advance over 
materialism to locate colour sensations in a non-material mind that is itself incapable 
of accounting for the distinctive phenomenology of sensory perception. In effect, 
Descartes’s problem is that his essentially intellectual mind is no better able to 
accommodate the sensations that secondary qualities are dispositions to produce 
than the material world from which qualities resembling these sensations are 
eliminated in the first place. The only way in which Descartes can respect the 
distinctively sensuous nature of sensation is if he predicates sensations of a third 
substance, the mind-body union. But this avenue is foreclosed by his strict 
ontological dualism.
Locke’s account of the primary-secondary quality distinction is in this respect 
much more attractive. By denying the existence of a distinct intellectual faculty, 
Locke avoids any difficult questions about the relationship of the senses to the 
intellect, thereby removing any temptation to treat sensation as a merely degenerate 
case of intellectual perception. Rejecting the existence of a rational intellect may 
mean that we lack the cognitive capacities to conclusively determine whether mind 
and body are distinct, or for that matter whether there is a metaphysical distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities. But mind-body dualism and the primary-
56 1706: 24-5.
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secondary quality distinction at least come out as attractive hypotheses, given their 
ability to account for the distinctive phenomenology of sensation.
One of the things that makes Locke’s account of the primary-secondary 
quality distinction attractive is therefore precisely that in virtue of which his 
argument for this distinction is invalid. It is precisely because he rejects the Cartesian 
distinction between the sensory and intellectual perceptual faculties that Locke’s 
argument for the distinction is at once invalid, and yet more compelling than 
Descartes’s valid version of same the argument. Rejecting the Cartesian bifurcation 
between the senses and the intellect, whilst at the same time accepting a 
fundamental distinction between mind and matter, allows Locke to respect what is 
phenomenologically distinctive about secondary quality perception. And this, after 
all, is exactly what we want from a theory of colour.
37
[2] The Mind-Independence o f Colour
...real colour persists beneath appearances as the background persists beneath the figure, 
that is, not as a seen or thought-of quality, but through a non-sensory presence.
Merleau-Ponty 1945: 356.
Descartes and Locke assume that the vulgar — as it happens, erroneously — conceive 
of colours as mind-independent properties that are metaphysically on a par with the 
primary qualities of corpuscularian science: size, shape, motion, and perhaps solidity. 
I consider the kind of problem that Descartes and Locke raise for this view — that of 
locating colours within the natural world — towards the end of the thesis. Before 
then, however, it is first necessary to get much a much firmer grasp on what the 
common sense view of colour actually consists in. Of particular importance is the 
question of the mind-independence of colour.
The view that common sense already implicitly regards colours as mind- 
dependent properties itself has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, 
the view has proved especially popular in Oxford, where, in one form or another, 
proponents have included John Cook Wilson, H.A Pritchard, Gilbert Ryle, William 
Kneale, Gareth Evans and John McDowell. As Kneale, describing what we can call 
the Oxford View of Colour, puts it:
When Locke said that the secondary qualities were powers in things to produce sensations 
in us, he stated the facts correctly, but he did not realize that his statement was only an 
analysis of the plain man’s use of secondary quality adjectives.. .When in ordinary life we 
say The paper isn’t really red’, we always intend to imply that the paper has some other 
colour as a dispositional property.1
The first question that we need to consider is therefore just what the naive 
conception of colour is. §2.1 sets out a criterion for mind-independence and 
considers Evans’s version of the argument that colours fail to satisfy this criterion. 
§2.2 identifies, and sets aside, a slippage in Evans’s statement of this argument: from 
the conceptual claim that we conceive of colours as mind-dependent properties to the 
metaphysical claim that colours are mind-dependent properties. In §2.3,1 argue that 
the conceptual mind-dependence of colour is inconsistent with the crucial role that
1 Kneale 1950:123. Compare Cook Wilson 1904: 773-4, Pritchard 1909: 86-7, Ryle 1949: 209, Evans 
1980: 272-4 and McDowell 1985: 112. Pritchard’s statement of the view is perhaps the most guarded. 
Pritchard thinks that mind-dependence is implicit in all our secondary quality concepts except colour, and 
only then given a “little reflection” (although admittedly, not much).
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colours play in our grasp of the mind-independent existence of material substance. 
After loosening the traditional link between mind-independent existence and 
sensory amodality in §2.4,1 therefore reconsider Evans’s argument for the mind- 
dependence of colour in §2.5. The idea of a ‘geometrical’ description of colour is 
introduced in support of the claim that our conception of colour is a conception as 
of a mind-independent quality. Geometrical descriptions of colour, in which colours 
are abstractly described in terms of their characteristic relations of similarity and 
difference, offer a way of conceiving of colours in terms that are only indirectly tied 
to our sensory experiences of colour. Geometrical descriptions of colour thereby 
enable us to make sense of the idea that colours are mind-independent properties 
that are there to be perceived.
1. Mind-independence
To say that something is mind-independent is to say that it does not depend for its 
existence on the relation that it bears to the experiences of perceiving subjects. 
Something is mind-dependent if, in contrast, its existence does so depend on 
experience.
At least in the first instance, we are interested in questions of mind- 
independence to the extent that we are able to recognise of a thing whether or not it 
is mind-independent; whether, that is, we can conceive of it existing independent of 
our experiences of it. This presupposes possessing a workable criterion for mind- 
independence. Following Evans, himself following amongst others Strawson, we can 
say that we can conceive of an entity as mind-independent only if we are able to 
embed it within a simple theory of perception. This amounts to recognising the “implicit 
duality” of our experiences of that entity. We need to grasp, as Evans puts it, that:
on the one hand, there is that of which there is an experience (part of the world) and, on the 
other, there is the experience of it (an event in the subject’s biography).2
The rationale for this criterion is to capture the intuition that our experiences 
are responsive to the features of the world of which they purport to be
2 Evans 1980: 277, 261-3, Strawson 1959: 69. Compare Campbell 1993: 180. In the background here is 
the question of how Evans and Campbell can agree about the criterion for mind-independence, but 
disagree about whether secondary qualities like colour satisfy this criterion.
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representative: that we experience a cup as round precisely because it is round, or that 
we experience a marigold as yellow precisely because it is yellow. What being able to 
embed an entity within a simple theory of perception, and so make sense of its 
mind-independent existence, requires, is that we have an independent way of 
conceiving of that which the sensory experience is an experience of. Without an 
independent conception of the entity, we cannot hope to make sense of the 
distinction between the experience and the entity necessary for recognising its mind- 
independent existence. Attempting to conceive of the non-experiential side of the 
equation — the entity in the world to which the experience is responsive — we 
succeed only in m:onceiving the experiential side of the equation. The problem is 
familiar from Berkeley and Hume. If the content of our conception of a thing is 
exhausted by the content of our perception of it, then as Hume says, even if we:
chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits o f the universe; we will never 
really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those 
perceptions, which have appear’d in that narrow compass.3
Assuming that a necessary condition of conceiving of a thing’s mind- 
independent existence is that we have a way of thinking about it that is one step 
removed from our sensory experiences, there is a distinguished tradition which 
claims that secondary qualities like colour fail to satisfy this requirement. A clear 
expression of this view is found in Evans’s investigation into the nature of, and pre­
conditions for, a conception of an independently existing world.
Possessing a conception of a mind-independent world requires that a subject 
be able to make sense of the existence of persisting grounds of the sensory 
phenomena that they experience: they have to be able to make sense of the idea that 
those grounds exist unperceived. We have a conception of a mind-independent 
world because we can conceive of the unperceived existence of material objects. We 
have the resources to think about the qualities essential to our conception of 
material objects as “space-occupying stuff' independent of the sensory experiences to 
which these qualities give rise. This, according to Evans, is because the sense of our 
spatial, primary quality, concepts is not distilled directly from sensory experience. It
3 1739-40: 1.2.6, 49. As Cook Wilson remarks, what is needed to make sense of the idea of independent 
existence is a “positive content different — quite different — from [our experience], and clearly 
distinguishable from it”, 1904: 773.
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is determined instead in part by a primitive mechanics, “a set of interconnected 
principles which make up an elementary theory.. .into which these properties fit”.4 
As such, there is content to our conception of properties like size, shape, motion 
and mass that is independent of our sensory experiences of these properties.
A greatly impoverished subject, Hero, whose perceptual access to the world 
was exclusively auditory, however, may not be so fortunate. We are able to conceive 
of the unperceived existence of secondary qualities like colour and sound because 
according to Evans we have a conception of the persisting space-occupying 
properties of objects which ground the truth of secondary quality ascriptions. Hero’s 
conception of the auditory phenomena that exhaustively comprise his world, 
however, would according to Evans be “directly and exclusively.. .woven out of 
materials given in [auditory] experience”. As such, Evans suggests that Hero would 
be incapable of an independent conception of that which his experiences are 
experiences of. Without any conception of the persisting grounds of the auditory 
phenomena that he experiences, Hero would be unable to embed his auditory 
experiences within the simple theory of perception necessary for an intelligible 
conception of mind-independent existence. He would therefore be unable to make 
sense of the unperceived existence of these auditory phenomena, and so have no 
conception of mind-independent world.
Central to Evans’s argument for this conclusion is the claim that the auditory 
experiences Hero enjoys could not themselves contain the materials to ground a 
conception of an independently existing world. The auditory phenomena Hero 
experiences could only ground a conception of a mind-independent world if he 
could conceive of sounds as properties that resembled his experiences of them, but 
which continued to exist in the absence of those experiences. According to Evans, 
however, reflection on our secondary quality experience shows that this is a 
conceptual impossible: we cannot conceive of secondary qualities existing 
unperceived, yet being exactly as we experience them to be. Instead, the only way in 
which we can conceive of secondary qualities existing unperceived is by virtue of 
conceiving of the mind-independent existence of their primary quality grounds.
4 1980: 269. Whether a primitive mechanics is in fact both necessary and sufficient for a conception of 
mind-independent existence is considered below, in §2.5.
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Consider, by way of illustration, the question of whether colours exist in the 
dark. To suppose that objects are not coloured in the dark belies the claim that 
colours are abiding, mind-independent, properties of objects. It makes their 
existence depend upon the obtaining of the conditions necessary for their 
perception. But if colours can exist unperceived, then they have to be able to exist 
when the conditions necessary for their perception do not hold: when there are no 
suitably placed, suitably receptive perceivers, when they illumination is inadequate, 
and so on. On the other hand, the idea that objects are coloured in the dark is, at 
least initially, “quite obscure”. How could a ‘colour-as-we-see-it’ exist when we 
cannot see it, and how could our experience of colour enable us to form a 
conception of such a state of affairs? It is, according to Evans, indicative of the fact 
that our secondary quality concepts are woven exclusively out of the materials given 
in sensory experience that we cannot break the fundamental tie between sensory 
experience and the content of our secondary quality-thoughts that the recognition of 
mind-independent existence requires. When, for instance, we try to conceive of an 
object that is red in the dark, “[wjhat, after all, is being imagined but experiencing a 
red object that is unseen by anyone elsi^h
For Evans, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is 
therefore a distinction between those properties whose nature is exhaustively 
captured by the conception of them that it is possible to distil direcdy from (‘pure’) 
sensory experience, and those properties whose nature cannot be captured in this 
way. Secondary qualities are properties whose entire nature is direcdy revealed in 
sensory experience. They are properties to which there is nothing more than meets 
the eye.
2. Properties and Concepts
According to Evans, no positive content can be assigned to our conception of 
colours independent of our sensory experiences of colour. Evans himself slips freely
5 1980: 274. We are, as Cook Wilson had earlier complained, “always thrown back on the sensation itself 
for positive content, and can only give a derivative positiveness to the property the body has o f causing it, 
by thinking of it as producing this definite quality of effect.”, 1904: 773-4. Compare Pritchard 1909: 86-7 
and McDowell 1985: 113.
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from talk about concepts to talk about the properties to which these concepts refer.6 
But to say that there is no more positive content to our conception of colours than can 
be distilled direcdy from sensory experience is not yet to say that colours are 
themselves properties whose nature is exhaustively captured by our sensory based 
conception of them. For all that has so far been said, colours could therefore be 
qualities whose essential nature escapes us. As Bolton points out in the context of 
(given what I say in Chapter 1, mis-) attributing a similar argument to Locke, there is 
no straight-forward way of ruling out the possibility that there exist aspects of the 
world that transcend our experience of it. The claim:
rests on an argument from ignorance, or perhaps on the false assumption that whatever is 
distinctive o f ideas of various colours is manifest. In fact, even if we have failed to notice a 
distinctive, separable feature of the content of an idea of red, one which could belong to 
something unperceived, there may still be one.7
In other words, the most that Evans has established so far is merely that 
there is a conceptual distinction between primary and secondary qualities: primary 
qualities are qualities of which our conception outruns the conception that it is 
possible to form on the basis of pure sensory experience, whilst secondary qualities 
are qualities of which no non-sensory conception is possible. To draw from this 
conceptual distinction a further metaphysical distinction would require assuming 
something like the “adequacy” of our secondary quality concepts. It would require 
assuming, as Hume puts it, that “Wherever ideas are adequate representations of 
objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to 
the objects”.8 In response to Evans’s argument, the adequacy of our secondary 
quality ideas is therefore something that we may wish to question.
Certainly the view that there is more to colour than is revealed in so-called 
pure sensory experience is not obviously incoherent. Short of accepting idealism, 
verificationism, or a Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct ideas, there does 
not appear to be any a priori reason to suppose that our ideas must be adequate, and
6 A nice example o f this is when he claims that “To grasp.. .primary properties, one must master a set of 
interconnected principles”, 1980: 269. Bill Child brought this example of Evans’s seemingly unconscious 
slippage from talk about concepts to talk about properties to my attention. As he pointed out, what we 
grasp, of course, are concepts o f properties, and not the properties themselves: except, that is, when we 
literally pick up the material objects that bear the qualities!
7 1983: 363.
8 1739-40:1.2.2,24.
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hence that the world must conform to our conception of it. Nevertheless, the 
default position should at least be that our ordinary thought about colour is not 
systematically mistaken. Unless, for instance, we can confer extra content on our 
conception of colours by means of physical theory, we will have to conclude that the 
non-sensory residue about which visual experience is silent is a something-we-know- 
not-what. Not only would this involve a metaphysically dubious commitment to, 
what Cook Wilson calls in a slightly different context, something “even worse than 
‘a thing in itself, viz. ‘an attribute in itself”.9 But such a manoeuvre would be 
entirely ad hoc. There is no independent motivation to postulate the existence of such 
an attribute in itself. It would certainly be cold comfort for Hero to be told that at 
least his lacking the capacity for thought about a mind-independent world is 
consistent with its existence.
Besides, merely doubting the adequacy of our secondary quality concepts 
concedes to Evans too much. To doubt the adequacy of our secondary quality 
concepts is to agree with Evans that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in 
our ordinary thought about colour. But to suppose that colours are conceptually 
mind-dependent fails to account for the important role that colours play in our 
grasping the mind-independent existence of material substance in the first place.
3. Colour and Material Substance
Conceiving of a quality as mind-independent requires that we be able to make sense 
of the ‘implicit duality’ of our experience. We need to be able to distinguish between 
the quality and our experience of the quality.
The very least that this would seem to require is that the quality exhibit 
perceptual constancy', that we perceive it as persisting through changes in its appearance. 
It is, for instance, indicative of our ability to recognise the mind-independence of 
qualities like size and shape that we are able to distinguish the way these qualities 
appear from the way these qualities really are. We recognize, that is, that the real sizes 
and shapes of objects do not themselves change with changes in the way that they 
appear due to variations in the body’s distance from the perceiver, its orientation 
with respect to the perceiver, the ambient conditions, and so on. Although, for
9 1904: 780.
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example, railway tracks may appear to converge in the distance, we do not think that 
they really do.
But if the recognition of perceptual constancy is indicative of the recognition 
of mind-independent existence, then our conception of colour is as much a 
conception of a mind-independent property as our conception of size and shape. 
Colour, no less than size and shape, exhibits perceptual constancy. The way in which 
colours appear depends on a wide variety of factors. Take, just by way of illustration, 
facts about the illumination. To see the effect of the type of illumination on 
perceived colour, just turn on an incandescent desk lamp in a naturally lit room. You 
will see that there is a very noticeable change in the colour appearances of the 
objects that the lamp illuminates.10 Despite these kinds of phenomenologically 
salient variation in perceived colour, however, we do not normally attribute changes 
in the colour appearance of an object to changes in its colour properties. We judge 
instead that an object’s colour is generally invariant through changes in the 
conditions under which the object is perceived.
The phenomenological salience of colour constancy is worth stressing, as it is 
something that physiological explanations of colour constancy in terms of low-level, 
pre-attentive, adaptational visual mechanisms typically fail to respect. According to 
the adaptational theory of the German psychologist Ewald Hering, for example, 
differences in proximal stimulation do not translate into differences at the 
phenomenological level because constancy is achieved by the desensitisation of 
retinal and immediately post-retinal cones to light that is constantly present; in the 
same way that looking through a pair of green tinted spectacles desensitises the 
retinal cones that are particularly sensitive to middle-wavelength ‘green’ light, 
effectively filtering this light out, and thereby making the visual scene seem at lot 
less green.11 Even discounting cases of constancy involving simultaneous contrast 
effects, in which there is no change to the illuminant and hence in which no 
adaptation can take place, however, the adaptation model does not respect the 
phenomenology of colour constancy. For one thing, adaptation is a relatively slow 
process, taking anything up to a few minutes: as you can verify by putting on a pair 
of green tinted glasses. Colour constancy, however, is instantaneous. But even if
10 Craven and Foster 1992.
11 Hardin 1988: 48.
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adaptation were instantaneous, it would still get the phenomenology wrong. 
Adaptationism effectively discounts changes in the illuminant from attentive 
consideration: on this view, changes in illumination simply would not be noticed.
But this is just false to the phenomenological facts. As the simple lamp experiment 
shows, changes in facts about the illuminant are phenomenologically salient. Indeed, 
that they are may even have significant evolutionary advantages, providing 
important information about weather conditions, the time of day, the proximity of 
large bodies, and so on.12
The perceptual constancy of size and shape is indicative of mind- 
independence. Our conception of these properties as mind-independent in turn 
depends, according to Evans, on the ‘theoretical’ nature of our spatial concepts. It is 
the primitive mechanics into which our spatial concepts fit that Evans thinks 
supplies the extra non-sensory content necessary to conceive of shape and size 
independent of our experiences of these qualities. The phenomenon of colour 
constancy suggests that our colour concepts are no less ‘theoretical’.
Amongst the things that we need to learn in order to grasp our colour 
concepts, for instance, is that the properties to which these concepts refer are not 
affected by certain changes in the properties of other objects in the visual scene. We 
need to learn, for example, that marigolds remain yellow regardless of the 
background against which they are seen, the nature and intensity of the illuminant, 
their distance and angle from the observer, and so on. At the same time, we need to 
know that on still other occasions an object’s colour is affected by the interactions of 
the body in which it inheres. If we stain the flower using a blue dye, for example, 
then our marigold will turn green, just as a yellow paint sample mixed with a blue 
paint sample will produce a paint sample that is green.
Neither is it just the ways in which colour properties affect, or fail to affect, 
other colour properties that we need to master. We also need to know, for example, 
that by changing the colour properties of an object we can change its higher level 
functional and aesthetic properties. If we paint a referee’s yellow-card red, for
12 Jameson and Hurvich 1989. As the phenomenologist Katz says of Hering’s adaptational account of 
colour constancy: “Paradoxical as it may at first sound, such a thoroughgoing efficiency on the part of the 
adaptive mechanisms as Hering postulates is not even to be consider as desirable; for it would partially or 
wholly compensate for any change in illumination, and thereby make it imperceptible”, 1911: 264. von 
Helmholtz’s rival interpretation of colour constancy as a kind of “unconscious inference” is no less 
problematic in this respect. If the inference from proximal stimulus (perceived colour) to distal stimulus 
(real colour) is pre-attentive, then this too involves discounting the illuminant.
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example, then the card no longer serves to caution football players, but to send 
them off. Similarly, if red and green really should never be seen without a colour in 
between, accessorising red trousers and a green jumper with a yellow belt is good 
sartorial advice.
More importandy, although colours may not themselves direcdy affect the 
more fundamental properties of bodies like shape, size or motion, mastering a 
primitive theory of colour is integral to grasping even the mind-independent 
existence of the properties essential to our conception of bodies as space-occupying 
stuff. To grasp the concepts fundamental to the idea of space-occupancy we need to 
master a set of interconnected principles, which, as Evans suggests, include “the 
identity of matter perceived from different points of view... [and] the persistence of 
matter through gaps in observation”.13 Integrating our theory of colour into our 
primitive mechanics represents a means of achieving this end.
Colours allow us to distinguish, identify and reidentify material substances: 
they are, as Locke puts it, “Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able 
to discern one Thing from another; and so chuse any of them for our uses, as we 
have Occasion”.14 Similarity in respect of colour, for instance, is one of the 
principles in virtue of which the visual system partitions the visual scene into 
discrete material objects in the first place. The common colour of different parts of 
the visual scene will often serve as the basis for treating these parts as parts of the 
same object, as Figure 2.1 illustrates. Whilst the array on the left is naturally 
perceived as three columns of four dots, it is at least as natural to perceive the 
spatially identical array on the right as four rows of three dots: the similarity in 
respect of colour of the dots across the rows leads us to group these dots together.
13 1980: 269.
14 1690: II.xxxii.14.
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Figure 2.1: Gestalt Grouping Phenomenon
The array on the left is naturally perceived as three columns of four dots, whereas it is at least as natural 
to perceive the spatially identical array on the right as four rows of three dots.
Part of the reason why we regard a piece of paper lying on a table as a distinct 
material object from the table is that the piece of paper is white and the table on 
which it is placed brown. Indeed, it is pardy because of the similarity in respect of 
colour of the unoccluded parts of the table that we think that there is a single object 
-a  table -  there at all. As the Gestalt psychologist Koffka remarks, a general law of 
“unit formation and segregation” is that “equality of stimulation produces forces of 
cohesion, inequality of stimulation forces of segregation, provided that the inequality 
entails an abrupt change”.15
The importance of colour for segregating areas of the visual field into 
discrete material objects is reflected in the phenomenon of colour spreading. Cases 
of modal completion, in which subjective figures ‘pop out’ from their background, 
as in Figure 2.2a, are often accompanied by colour spreading, in which colour and 
brightness spread from neighbouring regions into a region where they are physically 
absent, as in Figure 2.2b. Modal completion contrasts in this respect with amodal 
completion, as in Fig 2.2c, when one figure merely partially occludes another. Davis 
and Driver suggest that although both modal and amodal completion are the result 
of similar (if not the same) pre-attentive mechanisms, only modal completion is 
accompanied by colour spreading because it is only for modally completed objects 
that we want attention to spread across the completed object’s entire surface. In the 
case of partially occluded objects, in contrast, we merely want attention to spread to 
the visible parts of the object. Colour spreading facilitates this: by spreading from 
neighbouring regions into modally completed areas from which it is absent, colour 
allow us to treat the different areas as parts of a common object.16
15 1935: 126. It should be noted that similarity with respect to colour is not the only principle of unit 
formation and segregation recognised by Gestalt psychologists.
16 Davis and Driver 1997.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.2: Modal and Amodal Completion
In cases of modal completion like 2.2a, subjective figures ‘pop out’ from their backgrounds. Modal 
completion is often accompanied by colour spreading, as in 2.2b. Cases of amodal completion like 2.2c, 
in which one object is merely perceived to partially occlude another, are not accompanied by colour 
spreading. Source: Davis and Driver 1997.
Having served to partition a visual scene into discrete material objects, 
colour subsequently helps with the identification of objects within the scene. 
Colours ground many of the distinctions that we make between material objects. 
One advantage that colour vision confers, for instance, is that it facilitates 
distinguishing material objects from their backgrounds. A common complaint made 
by subjects who are colour blind is that they are unable to discriminate with the 
same ease as normal perceiving subjects objects from their backgrounds. Boyle, for 
instance, describes the case of a gentlewoman who:
when she had a mind to gather Violets, tho’ she kneeled in that Place where they grew, she 
was not able to distinguish them by the Colour from the neighbouring Grass, but only by 
the shape, or by feeling them.17
At the same time, colours also greatly improve our ability to identify objects, or 
groups of objects, that lie in the same plane; much more so than other visual 
attributes like direction, as Figure 2.3 illustrates: the odd-one-out ‘pops out’ more 
freely from amongst its surroundings if it differs in respect of colour than other 
visual attributes. It is no doubt partly for this reason that football teams, for 
instance, play in differently coloured kits rather than differently shaped, sized or 
textured, kits.18
17 1688: 267-8. See Mollon 1989: 381-2 for a number of other quotations to the same effect.
18 According to Christ 1975, if the task is to identify some feature of a target, colours can be accurately 
identified at least 176% better than size, 32% better than brightness and 202% better than shape.
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Figure 2.3 Visual Search Tasks involving Colour
Colour is processed much faster than other visual attributes like direction. The odd-one-out ‘pops out’ 
more freely when it differs in colour than when it differs in orientation.
As well as facilitating the identification of material objects in a scene, colours 
subsequently ground higher-level categorical thought about objects. Colours, for 
instance, represent one of the cues that we use to delineate material objects into 
kinds. Poisonous mushrooms are (generally) red, edible mushrooms (generally) 
aren’t; unripe bananas are green, bananas that are ready to eat are yellow; grey clouds 
generally signal rain, white clouds generally don’t. The role of colours in grounding 
categorical thought about material objects is suggestive of a tight link between an 
object’s colour and facts about its material constitution. It suggests that colours are 
not just accidentally correlated with material substances, but integral to them.
Moving from the identification of material substance to their reidentification, 
colours play no less important a role. One way to determine whether objects persist 
through gaps in our observation of them is by reference to the persistence of their 
colours. If, for instance, a piece of paper on the floor is the same colour as the piece 
of paper that I left on the table before, then this will usually be sufficient to ground 
my belief that it is the same piece of paper, but it has just fallen off the table in the 
meantime.
Colours could not fulfil any of these functions, however, if we implicitly 
thought of them as mind-dependent properties. According to the Oxford View of 
Colour that Evans defends, our grasp of primary quality concepts is prior to our 
grasp of secondary quality concepts. Recognising the unperceived existence of 
colour is supposed to presuppose a grasp of the primary qualities constitutive of our 
conception of material bodies as space-occupying stuff: this gives us the “resources 
for thinking of the abiding stuff in whose changes the truth of the proposition that
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there is a sound [or a colour] can be regarded as consisting”.19 In other words, our 
grasp of the properties constitutive of our conception of material bodies is supposed 
to explain our grasp of the unperceived existence of secondary qualities. Hence, the 
reason why Hero can have no conception of the mind-independent existence of the 
auditory phenomena that comprise his world is that he supposedly has no non- 
auditory conception of that which grounds these sounds.
The problem for Evans is that our conception of material bodies as abiding 
space-occupying stuff itself depends in part on a mind-independent conception of 
colour. Our judgements about material objects and their persistence depend in part 
upon our judgements about sensible qualities and their persistence: it is, for instance, 
at least in part because we conceive of an object’s colour continuing to exist 
unperceived that we conceive of the object as continuing to exist unperceived. But 
colours can only help ground our judgements about the unperceived existence of 
objects if we already have a conception of colours as mind-independent properties. It 
cannot both be the case that our grasp of the mind-independence of colour depends 
upon our grasp of the mind-independence of the spatial qualities essential to 
material substance, and that our grasp of the mind-independence of the spatial 
qualities essential to material substance depends on our grasp of the mind- 
independence of colour.
In claiming that our understanding of what it is to be coloured is parasitic 
upon on our grasp of what it is to be material object, the Oxford View of Colour 
goes hand in hand with the thought that colours are in some sense ‘stretched’ over 
the surfaces of material objects; they are like the ‘clothing’ of material substances. 
The view of colour that Evans ascribes to common sense is therefore neatly 
described by the intellectual ancestor of the Oxford View when, claiming to be of a 
“vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them”, 
Berkeley claims to believe that “colours and other sensible qualities are on the 
objects”.20 But this is just not how we think of colours. As Hering’s famous shadow 
experiment illustrates, there is a world of difference between conceiving of colours 
as properties that lie on the surfaces of material substances, and conceiving of them 
as properties of those objects. If you hang a bit of paper from a silk thread in front
19 1980: 278.
20 1713: 229, emphasis added.
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of a lamp so that the paper casts a shadow onto a piece of writing paper, you see the 
dark shadow as “an incidental darkness that lies on the paper”. But this is not to see 
the darkness as a property of the paper. We can induce this aspect shift if we draw 
around the shadow with a black line that completely covers the shadow’s penumbra. 
When we do this, it no longer appears as though the darkness lies on the surface of 
the paper, the darkness appears to be a property of the paper: it is, Hering remarks, 
“as if the white paper were coloured grey here with India ink, or as if a piece of grey 
paper with a black edge had been pasted on the white paper”.21
Just as Berkeley’s idealism about the external world presupposes an 
impoverished account of our primary quality concepts, Evans’s Berkelian 
conception of colour as a mind-dependent property presupposes an impoverished 
account of our secondary quality concepts. We do not think of colours as merely 
clothing material substances, and if we did, colours could not play the role that they 
actually play in our mastery of the principles which explain our conception of 
material bodies as mind-independent entities. Colour, no less than size and shape, is 
essential to our conception of material substance as persisting space-occupying stuff.
4. Amodality and Mind-independence
To say that it is only if we conceive of colours as mind-independent properties that 
they can play any role in grounding our conception of the mind-independent 
existence of material substance is not yet to say how it is that we conceive of colours 
as mind-independent properties. Recognising the perceptual constancy of colour 
requires that the sense of our colour concepts be determined at least in part by a 
primitive theory into which these concepts fit. But it does not look as though this 
will of itself be sufficient to establish the mind-independence of colour. For one 
thing, it does not seem to go any way towards meeting the Berkelian challenge posed 
by Evans: how are we able to conceive of colours existing in the dark without simply 
thinking of how they would look to suitably placed suitably receptive perceivers if 
the conditions necessary for their perception held?
With this in mind, it will help to consider in more detail exactly why an 
analogous problem does not arise in the case of the paradigmatically mind-
21 Hering 1920: 8.
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independent properties shape and size. Why is it that — unless we are Berkeley — we 
do not think that there is a problem about conceiving of the persistence of shape in 
the dark? An obvious difference between colour and shape is that unlike colours, 
shapes are properties to which different sensory modalities are equally responsive. 
Perhaps, then, it is the amodality of shape that ultimately grounds our conception of 
shape as mind-independent.
The general suggestion that mind-independence and amodality are inexorably 
linked certainly has a distinguished history, and has recently been defended by A.D. 
Smith. Following Berkeley, Smith claims that the concept of an objectively existing 
world can only be sustained on the assumption that our access to this world is not 
restricted to perceptual information received from individual sense modalities:
an essential aspect to our concept of an external world.. .is what we might call inter-modal 
sensory access', an objective realm is one to which our several senses are, in principle, equally 
responsive.22
According to Smith, the different sense modalities are defined by the sensory 
characteristics of the experiences to which they give rise. The difference between the 
auditory and visual modalities, for example, consists in the “peculiar and indefinable 
way” in which auditory perceptions differ from visual (e.g. colour) perceptions. 
Labelling those concepts associated exclusively with an individual sense modality 
“peculiarly sensory concepts”, Smith locates what he considers to be the abiding 
truth of seventeenth century metaphysics in the idea that secondary qualities are 
unique in corresponding to our sensorily determined concepts: they are qualities that 
are represented relative to a sensorily determined conceptualisation. As such, they 
have no place within a genuinely explanatory science:
how [secondary qualities].. .are represented in thought and experience, and what they are 
pre-theoretically taken to be, are determined by intrinsic sensory features of perceptual 
experiences that the objects themselves lack.23
Secondary qualities differ, in this respect, from spatial-temporal qualities 
such as shape and figure, which are not represented in experience by characteristics
22 1990: 242.
23 1990: 237. In other words, “What pre-scientifically we know when we are said to know what redness is 
is nothing about the actual state of any red object other than that it is of such a nature as standardly to 
cause colour qualia within in a certain range”, 1990: 240.
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peculiar to one sense. Rejecting the Berkelian assumption that all of our concepts are 
peculiarly sensory — from which Berkeley argues that there is no mind-independent 
external world — Smith argues that spatial-temporal concepts instead transcend the 
different sense modalities, and represent properties to which we have access via 
more than one sensory modality. By transcending the different modalities, spatio- 
temporal concepts provide the structural framework necessary for experience as of 
an objective world; a framework that is subsequently further filled out by reference 
to the “theoretical properties... specified by a theoretical science in terms of law-like 
behaviour”, necessary for the recognition of material substance as space-occupying 
stuff.24
Though intriguing, however, Smith’s suggestion that amodality is necessary 
for mind-independence rests on two controversial claims. The first is that the 
defining mark of secondary qualities is that they are represented by peculiarly 
sensory concepts. We have already called into question the supposed contrast 
between concepts of secondary qualities and concepts of ‘theoretical’ properties: at 
least in some minimal sense, it seems that grasping secondary quality concepts too 
presupposes grasping a primitive theory. But setting this to one side, there is a more 
general problem. According to Smith, the mode of presentation of a secondary 
quality is determined by the intrinsic nature of the sensory experience in which it is 
represented. These sensory characteristics of perceptual experience in turn define 
the different sensory modalities. The consequence of this is that according to Smith, 
colours could only appear as colours to sight. A creature able to distinguish colours 
only by touch, for instance, would enjoy a radically different mode of presentation 
of these qualities than we do. Consequently, were this creature suddenly to be able 
to see, and taught how to distinguish colours visually, it would be unable to integrate 
the information it received from its visual and tactual modalities.25
But why should we accept this? In the case of spatio-temporal properties, 
phenomenological modality-specificity does not entail conceptual modality- 
specificity. Despite differences in the phenomenological character of tactile and 
visual experiences of shape, for example, we are prepared to accept that the 
concepts formed as a result of these experiences do not themselves differ. As Smith
24 1990: 249.
25 Compare Peacocke 1983: 35.
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himself admits, sight and touch “embody identical spatial concepts”.26 But why 
suppose that this could not also be the case with respect to the sensible qualities as 
well?
Consider taste and smell. Even ignoring those situations in which a smell is 
so strong that it feels as though we can actually taste it, and concentrating purely on 
cases where we are happy to grant that there is at least some phenomenological 
difference between taste and smell, that there is any corresponding difference in the 
concepts formed on the basis of these experiences is far from obvious. Arguably the 
smell of week-old milk, for instance, alerts us to exactly the same quality of the milk 
as the taste of week-old milk; namely that the milk has gone off. Just as it is tempting 
to think with Smith that, “7 learn nothing new when I touch a cube and thereby feel it 
to be a cube, if I can all the time see that it is a cube”, so it seems that the olfactory 
and the gustatory perceptual judgement that the milk is off also embody precisely 
the same thought. I  learn nothing new when I taste the milk and thereby taste it to be 
off, if at the same time I can smell that it is off.
The problem is not just confined to secondary quality experiences of smell 
and taste. As of yet there is no reason to deny that even in the case of colour, 
despite phenomenological differences in visual and tactual experiences of colour, 
sight and touch could embody identical colour concepts. Of course, as a matter of 
empirical fact, we do not possess the right kind of sensory organs to perceive colours 
non-visually. We therefore cannot imagine what such an experience would be like. 
But why assume that if there could be a creature able to detect colours non-visually 
that, on gaining sight, it would be unable to integrate its visual and tactual 
modalities? The mere inconceivability of this seems insufficient grounds for ruling 
out its possibility. If we are prepared to accept that sight and touch embody identical 
spatial concepts with respect to shape and size, then why not accept that sight and 
touch could embody identical spatial concepts with respect to colour?
Of course if, following Berkeley, we suppose that all our concepts are 
necessarily sensorily determined, and therefore that the idea of an amodal concept is 
simply incoherent, then things would be different. There would be a reason to reject 
the possibility that sight and touch could embody identical colour concepts, namely 
no concept could be amodal. In the absence of any independent reason for thinking
26 1990: 242.
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that sight and touch could not embody an identical colour concept, however, it begs 
the question to suppose that a creature able to distinguish colours by touch would 
be unable to integrate the information it received from its visual and tactual 
modalities were it suddenly able to see, and taught how to distinguish colours 
visually.27
Even if we grant that secondary qualities are proper sensibles, however, the 
second, and more controversial of the two controversial claims that Smith needs to 
establish is that a mind-independent conception of something anyway presupposes 
amodal sensory access to it. According to Smith, the mode of presentation under 
which secondary qualities are experienced is determined by modality-specific 
properties of perceptual experience. The result is that secondary qualities are 
represented by peculiarly sensory concepts. Even if we agree with Smith that colours 
could appear as colours only to sight, however, why suppose that this tells us as much 
about visual experience as about the nature of the properties experienced? For all that 
has so far been said, it is consistent with the proper sensibility of colour that colours 
are mind-independent properties that are such that no direct amodal perception of 
them is possible.
Indeed, returning to the original Berkelian problem posed by Evans, amodal 
sensory access to a property is not even sufficient to grasp its mind-independent 
existence (not that Smith himself necessarily claims otherwise). Merely appealing to 
the amodality of shape, for instance, cannot help us answer the Berkelian challenge 
of conceiving of the existence of shape in the dark. It cannot be just because we can 
perceive shapes via a different sensory modality that we are able to conceive of 
shapes existing in the dark. If there is a problem about conceiving of unperceived 
existence on the basis of the sensory information that we receive from one sensory 
modality, then simply adding in more information of the same kind cannot help. Just 
as we can imagine situations in which the conditions necessary for the visual 
perception of the object do not hold, so we can imagine that the conditions 
necessary for tactile perception do not hold either. Perhaps, to use Descartes's 
example, whenever we move our hands in a given direction, all the bodies in that
27 Sorabji 1979 discusses the case of Rosa Kuleshova, reported in Tim  (25th January 1963), who could 
allegedly distinguish colours and read print with her fingertips, without relying on the texture of the 
paper. Kuleshova’s claims may, as a matter of empirical fact, have been false. But, as Sorabji suggests, it is 
not clear that they are conceptually incoherent.
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area move away at the same speed as that of our approaching hands, and so we 
never tactuaUy experience them.28 Even so, we still think that objects retain their 
shape. The question is why? What is it about our conception of shape that allows us 
to think of shapes persisting through gaps in our perception of them?
5. The Geometry of Colour
A different contrast between colour and shape is that shapes enjoy a ‘wider 
cosmological role’ than colours: they explain a body’s interactions with non-sentient 
objects. The reason why it may in contrast seem difficult to conceive of the mind- 
independence of colour is that colours are just too closely tied to the reactions of 
perceiving subjects. This tie is clearest when we consider the effects of illumination 
and contrast on the perceived colour of an object, or the effect of colour on an 
object’s higher-level functional or aesthetic properties, which both clearly involve a 
relation to human interests and responses. Even when it comes to integrating 
colours into our conception of material substance, or explaining the effects on an 
object’s colour on the colour of another object, however, the responses of 
perceiving subjects are never very far from the surface. It is, for instance, our 
capacity for distinguishing and reidentifying material objects that is at stake when it 
comes to determining the relationship of colours to the material objects in which 
they inhere. It is similarly to our responses that the effects of colour mixing are 
ultimately to be referred: mixing yellow and blue paint, for example, produces paint 
that would look, to suitable observers, the same colour as grass. Although our colour 
concepts may therefore be governed by a primitive theory, it may ultimately seem to 
be the wrong kind of theory to secure the conceptual mind-independence of colour. 
Perhaps the trouble is that the primitive theory of colour just does not move far 
enough beyond the deliverances of colour experience.29
But this too misdiagnoses the problem. Even if colours enjoyed a wider 
cosmological role, this would not solve the problem of conceiving of their
28 1644: II.4.
29 Evans, for instance, remarks that m  are able to conceive of the unperceived existence o f the buzzing 
sound because we conceive of the event o f the fly’s moving its wings (the persisting grounds o f the 
buzzing sound) as an event “consisting in space-occupying objects, possessed of qualities characterised 
independently of observers, moving in relation to one another”; 1980: 278-9, emphasis added.
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unperceived existence.30 The problem is not about the scope of our primitive theory 
of colour, but about primitive theories more generally. To grasp a primitive theory 
governing a set of concepts is to grasp how the properties to which the theory’s 
concepts refer contribute to the ways in which their bearers interact with other 
things. In effect, it is to grasp the functional role associated with those properties. 
What makes our ability to conceive of colours as mind-independent properties seem 
problematic is not the fact that the functional role associated with colour makes 
ineliminable reference to perceiving subjects. The problem is more general than this. 
The problem is that grasping any primitive functional theory is not of itself sufficient 
to ground a conception of a property’s abiding, mind-independent, existence.
Consider our grasp of the mind-independent existence of an object’s primary 
spatial qualities. The persistence of these qualities does not depend upon their 
bearer’s interactions with other objects, of which conscious subjects are just a sub­
species. An object’s spatial qualities are there anyway, independent of whatever else 
might be the case. Grasping the abiding existence of an object’s primary qualities 
therefore requires not just that we be able to make sense of their persistence 
through gaps in their bearer’s interaction with perceiving subjects, but also their 
persistence through gaps in their bearer’s interaction with other material substances.
But how could mastering a primitive functional theory governing primary qualities 
of itself explain our grasp of this?
Evans asks whether we can conceive of colours existing in the dark; in the 
absence of the conditions necessary for colours to exhibit their characteristic 
functional role. If we merely think in terms of the primitive theory into which our 
colour concepts fit, then we cannot conceive of how colours could exist in the dark. 
We are forced back onto the contribution that colours make to the causal 
interactions of their bearers: we are forced back onto thinking of how objects would 
look if the conditions necessary for their producing in us the relevant colour 
experiences held. But an exactly analogous problem arises for an object’s primary 
qualities. Consider a lonely world object: a frictionless object spinning in the void.
30 Suppose, for instance, that it were in virtue of being black that black things heat up more quickly than 
white things. As it happens, colours do not affect the interactions of their bearers with non-sentient 
beings in this way. As Broackes points out (1992: 194), it is not in virtue of being black that black things 
heat up more quickly than white things: the functional role conferred on an object by being black is that it 
fail to reflect visible light; what explains the heating up of the black object, however, is its failure to reflect 
invisible infra-red light.
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Of itself, a primitive theory could give us no way of thinking about the persistence 
of this object’s spatial qualities in the absence of the conditions necessary for the 
object to exhibit the characteristic behaviour associated with those properties. In the 
absence of the object’s interaction with other material substances, we can only 
conceive of its continued persistence by thinking about how the object would interact 
with other objects if the necessary conditions held; perhaps even by implicitly 
thinking of its continued interaction with one particular sub-species of object, 
conscious subjects. The spatial qualities conceptually essential to material substance 
are therefore no less subject to a Berkelian challenge than colours. In this case what, 
after all, is being imagined but experientially interacting with a frictionless spinning 
object that is interacting with nothing else?31
If merely grasping a primitive theory is of itself insufficient to grasp the 
abiding existence of the properties conceptually essential to material substance, then 
in virtue of what do we conceive of material substances as persisting space- 
occupying stuff? Perhaps what is special about the spatial qualities that are 
conceptually essential to material substance is not that these properties are amodal, 
nor that they explain an object’s interaction with non-sentient substances, but rather 
that our grasp of the primitive functional theory governing these properties is 
parasitic upon our grasp of non-functional, intrinsic, facts about these properties. 
Maybe it is our grasp of these non-functional facts that grounds our ability to 
conceive of the primary qualities conceptually essential to material substances as 
persisting through gaps in the conditions necessary for their bearer’s casual 
interactions with other bodies.
We can think about shapes, for example, by thinking of the internal relations 
that shapes bear, not to determinates of other determinable properties, but to other 
determinates of the determinable, shape. That is, we can think about how shapes are 
similar to, and different from, other shapes. By thinking about the internal relations
31 Hence the rhetorical force of the reductio implied in Strawson’s response to Evans: “If it seems true of 
the sensory properties in general that they all dissolve together, under reflective pressure, into 
dispositions, this seems even more certainly true of the ‘physical’ properties which are held to constitute 
their categorical base”, 1980: 280. The Oxford View that colours are ordinarily thought o f as dispositional 
properties had earlier been embedded within a wholly general dispositional theory of properties by Ryle 
1949. Evans, however, is keen to distance himself from this position. Evans’s claim that Hero lacks a 
conception of a mind-independent world depends on the idea that a “deep conceptual prejudice” (1980: 
276) of ours is offended by dispositions without categorical grounds, like those presupposed by Ryle’s 
generally dispositional theory of properties.
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that hold between different shapes, we have a way of thinking about shape that is 
independent, both of the interactions with other material bodies into which objects 
enter in virtue of being shaped, and of the interactions with perceiving subjects into 
which objects enter in virtue of being shaped.
Thinking about relations between determinate shapes, for instance, is 
independent of, and indeed prior to, thought about the functional roles associated 
with shape properties, insofar as grasping a property’s functional role presupposes a 
grasp of its relations to other determinates of the same determinable. It is hardly 
possible to grasp how a shape affects a body’s interactions if we don’t first know 
what that shape is. To know what a shape is, however, is at least to know the ways in 
which it is similar to, and different from, other shapes. We do not know what 
squareness is, for instance, if we do not grasp that square things are more like 
triangular things (with respect to the number of their sides) than they are like 
circular things.
At the same time, thinking about the relations between determinate shapes is 
independent of thought about their interactions with perceiving subjects — that is, 
how shapes look or feel — because we can think about the similarities and differences 
between determinate shapes in abstract terms. At the limit, for instance, we can 
represent similarities and differences between shapes by similarities and differences 
in the equations of analytic geometry that we use to describe these shapes: the 
greater similarity between squares and triangles than between squares and circles, for 
example, can be represented by the greater similarity between the equations used to 
describe squares, triangles and circles. Being able to conceive in abstract terms of 
properties like shape gives us a way of making sense of that which our shape 
perception is perception of. It gives us a way of thinking about the properties of 
which our experiences purport to be representative, that is independent of those 
experiences. It is thereby gives us a way of conceiving of shapes as mind- 
independent properties.
But as for shape, so for colour. Just as there are ways of thinking about 
shapes that are not directly tied to the way in which objects interact in virtue of 
being shaped, there are ways of thinking about colours that are only indirectly tied to 
the way in which objects interact in virtue of being coloured; which, given the 
ineliminable reference to colour experience in the primitive theory into which our
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colour concepts fit, amounts just to there being analogous ways of thinking about 
colours that are only indirectly tied to our sensory experiences of colour. Consider a 
determinate colour like yellow. To know what yellowness is in itself, independent of 
the ways in which objects interact in virtue of being yellow, is at least to know what 
position yellow occupies within the network of determinate colour properties, a 
network defined amongst by other things the relations of similarity and difference in 
which different determinate colours stand. It is at least to know, for instance, that 
yellow is more similar to orange than red, more similar to chartreuse than green, and 
more similar to either red or green than blue.
The relations of similarity and difference that hold between the colours 
jointly define a property space. Property spaces are abstract structures that can be 
represented using multidimensional spatial models, in which properties are mapped 
onto different points in the model in order to represent salient structural relations 
between them. The precise nature of the multidimensional spatial model that you 
use to represent colour space will vary depending on precisely which structural 
relations you want to emphasise: in an empirically adequate representation of a 
colour space, for instance, similarities between the colours will be represented by 
distances between the points in the space, although this strict isomorphism can be 
relaxed in order to highlight other structural relations between the colours. At least 
for illustrative purposes, however, just consider the most common spatial 
representation of colour space: the basic three-dimensional colour space, as 
represented in Figure 2.4, in which colours are arranged along the three axes,
hue: whether the colour is red, yellow, green, blue, or some mixture of these; 
saturation (or chroma)', the proportion of hue relative to a neutral
achromatic point; or, more roughly, the ‘strength’ of the hue; 
lightness (or value)', how much black, white or grey the colour contains.32
32 The three values hue, saturation and brightness are not universally recognised as necessary and 
sufficient for the description of any given colour sample, but will at least suffice for illustrative purposes. 
Note also that colour space is often called psychological colour space, betraying the fact that the received 
view of colour amongst visual scientists is that colour is a ‘psychological’ property of visual experiences.
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Figure 2.4: Three-Dimensional Colour Space
Colour samples vary along three dimensions: hue, saturation and lightness.
Abstract representations of colour space formalise the way that we have of 
thinking about colour at one step removed from our sensory experience of colour. 
These representations reflect our ability to conceive of colours without just thinking 
of how the colours would look in the relevant perceptual situations. Although 
colour space is sometimes represented with the relevant colour samples occupying 
the relevant spatial regions, it does not have to be represented in this way. Different 
colours can be designated instead by names or numbers that uniquely locate 
different regions of colour space. Indeed, it is not even necessary that the relations 
of similarity and difference in which the colours stand be represented in explicitly 
spatial terms at all. The network of properties that the colours constitute could be 
equally well represented just using mathematical formulae. The important point is 
just that the internal relations of similarity and difference in which colours stand, 
and which colour spaces represent, afford us the independent way of conceiving of 
that which our colour experiences are experiences of necessary for recognising the 
mind-independent existence of colour. It gives us a way of thinking about colours 
without simply thinking about how they would look in the relevant circumstances.
Looking ahead to Chapter 4, our ability to conceive of colours independent 
of our sensory experiences of colour is graphically illustrated if we compare normal 
human colour vision with that of other species. Using stimulus-response 
experiments, we can determine third-personally facts about the colours that other
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species perceive. There is evidence to suggest that pigeons, for instance, can 
perceive more colours than humans: they are not only sensitive to a greater range of 
spectral wavelengths than humans, but their visual processing mechanisms are more 
complex than our own. This is not just to say that pigeons are able to make more 
fine-grained discriminations between colour samples than humans, either. The 
colour properties pigeons perceive appear to be qualitatively different from the 
colour properties that we perceive.
Human hues, for instance, can be divided into two mutually exclusive 
classes: elemental and binary. Instances of the elemental hues, red, yellow, green and 
blue, can be identified as containing no trace of any other colour, and taken together 
the elemental hues are minimally sufficient for the description of any other hue 
sample. The binary hues, orange, chartreuse, cyan and purple, in contrast, are always 
perceived as a mixture of other colours: orange, for instance, is always perceived as a 
mixture of red and yellow, chartreuse, yellow and green, and so on. Consequently, 
the binary hues are not minimally sufficient for the description of any other hue 
sample: we cannot describe red in terms of orange and purple in the way that we can 
describe orange in terms of red and yellow. Pigeons, in contrast, seem to not only 
perceive a greater number of elemental hues than humans, correspondingly more 
binary hues, but possibly even a completely different kind of hue, ‘ternary hues’, 
which are like our binary hues but mixtures of three different elemental hues: this 
would be the equivalent of seeing something that is a mixture of red, green and 
blue.33
What such colour properties look like is beyond our powers of sensory 
imagination: there is simply no way of adequately representing these colours in the 
three-dimensional space in which it is possible to locate our own colour properties. 
Simply conceiving of these properties in terms of the sensory experiences that they 
would produce in suitable observers is therefore out of the question: we cannot 
imagine what those experiences would be like. But we are not thereby bereft of any 
conception of these properties. We are at least able to abstractly describe the 
structure of the space that these properties define.
33 Thompson 1995: 141-60.1 argue in §4.2 that there is actually reason to suppose that pigeons do not 
stricdy speaking perceive hues at all, but for present purposes this point is not important.
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[3] Illuminating ‘Real Colour’
The layman.. .is convinced that external objects have intrinsic colours.. .He ascribes to 
these colours an existence that is independent of the eye, designates them as the real 
colours of the objects in question, and distinguishes them from the incidental colours that 
the same objects may show under unusual circumstances, for example, in illumination that 
is inadequate or that deviates strongly from ordinary daylight. The red of the mountain 
peak in the alpenglow, the pallor o f a face that is illuminated by sodium light, the coloured 
spot on a floor when sunlight falls on it through a coloured window pane, are such 
incidental colours which we relate to the momentary nature of the illumination and do not 
take as properties of the objects in question.
Hering 1920: 6-7.
I have argued so far that the view of colour implicit in our ordinary thought is that 
colours are mind-independent properties: they are properties that exist independent 
of our experience of colour, and hence the conditions necessary for our experience 
of colour. The relevant contrast is with broadly speaking relational theories of 
colour, according to which colours are properties whose nature is metaphysically 
dependent upon the material objects, perceiving subjects and environmental 
conditions that are their relata; accordingly for which a difference in relata entails a 
difference in the relation that the relata constitute. This, however, is to make a 
merely conceptual claim: it is to make a claim about how we conceive of colours. In 
Strawsonian terms, the exercise up until this point has merely been an exercise in 
“descriptive metaphysics”.1 Nothing that I have said yet goes any way towards 
establishing the metaphysical conclusion that colours really are mind-independent 
properties. It therefore so far remains an open question whether our common sense 
conception of colour is adequate to the real nature of colour.
Although it would be nice if colours are what ordinarily think they are, there 
is considerable pressure to suppose that this is not the case. I will return to the 
problem of locating mind-independent colours within the natural world in Chapters 
6 and 7. Before then, however, it will be helpful to consider a less recherche challenge 
to the mind-independence of colour based on familiar facts about perceptual 
variation, starting in this chapter with perceptual variation that is the result of 
differences in the environmental conditions, and differences in the illumination in 
particular: inter-species differences in colour perception will be the subject of 
Chapter 4 and intra-species differences are dealt with in Chapter 5. Considering this
1 1959: 9.
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less recherche challenge to the mind-independence of colour will in turn put us in a 
better position to understand exactly what the common sense view of colour 
amounts to.
After making sure that the inquiry into the metaphysical reality of colour is 
even on a secure footing in §3.1,1 outline in §3.2 the general form of the Argument 
from Perceptual Variation, which attempts to undermine a consequence of the naive 
view that colours are mind-independent properties: the distinction between the 
colours objects really are and the colours the merely appear to be because of facts 
about the situation in which they are perceived. Variations in colour appearance that 
are the result of differences in viewing distance and background are considered in 
§3.3, whilst §§3.4-5 consider perceptual variation that is the result of differences in 
illumination. In each case, albeit for different reasons, I suggest that the differences 
in perceived colour do not undermine the common sense view that colours are 
mind-independent properties.
1. The Quest for Reality
Before considering the Argument from Perceptual Variation directly, however, it is 
important to make sure that the investigation into our common sense thought about 
colour is in good conceptual order. Is the reality of colour even up for discussion?
We have already voiced suspicions about the most direct line of argument 
that could be used to bypass discussion of the reality of colour: the inference from 
the conceptual claim that we ordinarily conceive of colours as mind-independent 
properties to the metaphysical claim that colours are mind-independent properties. If 
this approach is not just to collapse into idealism, then there must be some a priori 
principle that guarantees the inference from the way we conceive the world to be to 
the way that the world really is. The prospects for identifying any such principle are, 
however, bleak. Certainly neither a Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct 
ideas, nor verificationism, two of the most famous attempts to bridge this gap, seem 
especially promising (§2.2).
An interesting variation on this general strategy, however, has recently been 
proposed by Barry Stroud. Rather than argue that our ordinary thought about colour 
is veridical, Stroud argues instead that our common sense conception of colour is
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immune to critical evaluation. According to Stroud, our ordinary thought about 
colour can neither be validated nor invalidated because we cannot even get ourselves 
into the position to critically examine our ordinary beliefs about colour, such that we 
could find those beliefs to be systematically true or false.
At the heart of Stroud’s argument is the idea that would-be “unmaskers” — 
people who try to explain away our ordinary beliefs in the existence of colour 
without requiring that they be true, as we might explain away beliefs in ghosts or 
God -  are unable to identify in the first place the beliefs whose truth they call into 
question. In order to give an unmasking explanation of our colour directed 
psychological attitudes, it is clearly necessary to acknowledge that people have a 
great number of perceptions of, and beliefs about, colour. Furthermore, ascribing 
these psychological attitudes to other subjects requires that the unmasker have at 
least some grasp of the properties on which these attitudes are directed: they have to 
be able to at least identify what properties it is that we ordinarily (but erroneously) 
ascribe to physical objects in thought and perception.
The unmasker has to be able to do this, however, without themselves 
referring to any colour properties of material objects, given that ex hypothesis material 
objects are colourless. If the unmasker can identify the thoughts and perceptions 
whose truth they want to unmask without themselves believing that material objects 
are coloured, then they can identify the relevant thoughts and perceptions without 
having to hold the contradictory beliefs that material objects are, and are not, 
coloured. The unmasker can maintain that ordinary consciousness is systematically 
mistaken in attributing the experienced properties to material objects. Instead, they 
can hold that our colour thoughts and perceptions are in fact just thoughts and 
perceptions about properties of the visual field, or properties that figure in the 
intentional contents of experience but have no real bearers at all.
Stroud, however, is sceptical that the unmasker could identify the relevant 
experiential properties without assuming that they are properties of material objects. 
To ostensively or demonstratively identify these properties you need to have a set of 
background beliefs that uniquely determine the reference of the demonstration; 
otherwise it is just left indeterminate which experiential properties you mean to 
demonstrate. But Stroud thinks that amongst these background beliefs will be
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beliefs about the colours of material objects, precisely those beliefs to which the 
unmasker cannot appeal. This, according to Stroud, is because:
For those who are competent in the use of colour terms, the property they take themselves 
to see in a perception of colour is the same property that they believe a physical object to 
have, in the belief that it is coloured.2
In other words, if unmaskers do not understand themselves to perceive properties 
of material objects, then they do not succeed in identifying the properties about 
which the rest of us ordinarily have psychological attitudes. And this just means that 
they do not succeed in identifying the perceptions and beliefs that they set out to 
unmask.
From the failure of the unmasking project to establish the conclusion that 
objects are not ‘really’ coloured, neither does Stroud think that we can draw the 
contrary conclusion that colours ‘really’ exist. According to Stroud, we are left in 
exactly the same epistemic position as we found ourselves before embarking on the 
‘quest for reality’. We find ourselves surrounded by material objects that appear to 
be coloured, with no way of going beyond these appearances to discover whether 
appearance and reality coincide. Returning a positive answer to the quest for reality 
presupposes exactly the same as returning a negative answer: that we can get 
ourselves into the position to ask the question in the first place. Either way we need, 
per impossibile, to:
consider all human perceptions and beliefs concerning the colours of things, on the one 
hand, and the world as it is independendy of us, on the other, and still manage to ask a 
still-open question about the relation between them.3
If Stroud is right, then the ordinary belief that material objects are coloured 
is beyond critical investigation. Although this falls short of vindicating our ordinary 
thought about colour outright, it at least gives us a short way with the prevailing 
view that colour experience is systematically mistaken. The question is just whether 
Stroud’s arguments establish this exciting conclusion. And unfortunately, they do 
not.
2 2000: 166.
3 2000:192-3.
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Even if what Stroud says about the unmasker is correct, Stroud’s scepticism 
about the prospects of returning a positive verdict to the quest for reality is 
misplaced. The colour realist is not in nearly so bad a position as the unmasker. The 
problem for the unmasker is to identify the psychological attitudes whose truth they 
want to unmask without presupposing any beliefs about the colours of material 
objects, given that ex hypothesi, material objects are not coloured. But there is no 
direct analogue of this problem for the realist. The realist starts with our beliefs 
about the colours of objects, and working backwards, tries to identify a 
metaphysically acceptable property that would render some, or all, of those beliefs 
true. There is no problem for the realist in appealing to our ordinary thoughts about 
and perceptions of colour in order to do this if, ex hypothesi, objects really are 
coloured.
But if Stroud’s arguments do not rule out realism about colour, then the 
spectre of error remains. The unmasker does not have the monopoly on error. 
Realism about colour is consistent with the attribution of error to ordinary colour 
experience. According to the physicalist, for instance, colours exist, but have a 
hidden essence that ordinary visual experience does not reveal: for instance, they are 
properties in virtue of which objects modify electromagnetic light. Although 
ordinary consciousness correctly ascribes colours to objects, it does not tell us what, 
essentially, those properties are: it tells us the truth, but not the whole truth. The 
relationist also thinks that objects really are coloured, but they couple this with the 
claim that in ascribing colours to objects ordinary thought commits a category 
mistake: it mistakes merely relational mind-dependent properties of objects for 
intrinsic mind-independent properties.
Stroud elsewhere offers independent arguments at least against relationist 
theories of colour, if not physicalist theories of colour as well.4 Rather than consider 
the details of these further arguments, however, I want to just consider Stroud’s 
argument against the unmasker. Even if these further arguments are successful, 
there are problems with Stroud’s arguments against the stronger unmasking strategy. 
Things are not as difficult as Stroud maintains even for the unmasker.
4 Stroud criticises relationist theories of colour in Chapter 6, prior to attempting to unmask the 
unmasker’s strategy in Chapter 7. Stroud does not consider physicalist views of colour directly, although 
some of the earlier considerations concerning the ‘idea of physical reality’ (Chapter 3) bear at least 
indirectly on this question.
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Stroud’s objection turns on the idea that the unmasker cannot identify the 
perceptions and beliefs they want to unmask without illicitly appealing to 
perceptions and beliefs about properties of material objects, perceptions and beliefs 
which by their own admission are systematically false. The Wittgensteinian 
considerations about ostensive definition to which Stroud appeals require that there 
be some way of uniquely specifying the property on which these psychological 
attitudes are directed: there has to be some way of ‘setting the stage’, so we know 
precisely which properties it is that we mean to ostensively identify. But even 
accepting this, why must it be that the only ways of recognising the properties we 
perceive, and about which we have beliefs, are as properties of material objects? Why 
must the unmasker refer to beliefs about “what sorts of things he thinks can have 
the property” in order to identify the colours?5
Although I have argued so far that our ordinary conception of colour is in 
fact a conception of a mind-independent property of material objects, there are 
other beliefs about colour that could set the scene. I have argued, for instance, that 
essential to our grasp of the mind-independence of colour is a grasp of the internal 
relations of similarity and difference in which colours stand. But if grasping facts 
about the relations between different colours puts us in a position to think of 
colours as mind-independent properties of material substances, then it should also 
put us in a position to entertain the thought that these mind-independent properties 
do not really exist. Perceptions of, and beliefs about, the internal relations between 
colours allow us to fix the reference of our colour terms. They therefore put us in a 
position to know which properties the unmasker means to deny the mind- 
independent existence of.6
2. Appearance and Reality
The failure of more or less a priori attempts to safeguard our ordinary thought about 
colour requires us consider this view, and its consequences, more directly.
5 2000:165.
6 Compare Johnston’s remark that, “The conditions on thinking about the colors, on identifying 
particular colors, and on identifying one’s visual perceptions as ostensibly of the colors of things, are 
sufficiently holistic to allow for a range of ‘package deals’ only some of which require endorsing ordinary 
first-order beliefs about the colors”, 2004: 196.
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It follows from the common sense view that colours are mind-independent 
properties that there is a sharp distinction between the colours objects really are and 
the colours they merely appear to be because of facts about the situation in which 
they are perceived. This appearance-reality distinction falls out, subject to a 
qualification below, just from the claim that colours do not depend for their 
existence on our experience, and hence the conditions necessary for our experience, 
of colour. At the same time, this commitment to a sharp appearance-reality 
distinction is often thought to present a serious problem for the naive view that 
colours are mind-independent properties. The problem, it is claimed, is that the idea 
of an object’s ‘real’ colour dissolves under even minimal critical scrutiny.
The classic modern statement of this argument is Berkeley’s ‘First Dialogue’. 
In response to Hylas’s claim that material substances have “true and real colours 
inhering in them”, Berkeley’s spokesman Philonous makes short work of the 
distinction between real and apparent colour, very quickly convincing the hapless 
Hylas that there is no such thing as an object’s real colour, and that colours are really 
“all equally apparent”. Berkeley starts by identify a conflict of appearances: that is, 
he starts by identifying an object, x, that appears to have two incompatible 
properties, F  and G. Assuming that F  and G are incompatible, and both properties 
of the same object, then at least one of the appearances must be merely apparent: x 
must merely appear F, or merely appear G, or both. To say either that x only appears 
F, or that x only appears G, however, presupposes some criterion by which to judge 
which appearance is illusory. In the absence of a non-arbitrary reason to regard 
either appearance as illusory, Berkeley concludes that x is really neither F  nor G. 
Schematically:
Argument from Perceptual Variation
1. x appears to be F  and x appears to be G
2. x cannot be both F  and G
3. there is no non-arbitrary reason to regard either appearance as illusory
4. therefore, x is really neither F  nor G.7
7 Berkeley 1713: 184-6. Earlier versions of this argument can be found in Malebranche 1674-5: 63-6, 441- 
2, and much earlier still, in ancient Greek atomists like Democritus. More recently, this kind o f argument 
has been used to motivate eliminativism about colour by, for example, Hardin 1988, and used to motivate 
relationist theories of colour by, amongst others, McGinn 1983, McLaughlin 2003, and Cohen 2005.
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In effect, the question that I consider over the next three chapters is whether, in 
the face of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, the appearance-reality 
distinction can support the weight placed on it. Before considering this question in 
detail, however, a few general points about the Argument need to be made.
The first is that the Argument from Perceptual Variation often forms parts of 
the more general ‘argument from illusion’. The argument from illusion attempts to 
establish a conclusion about the nature of perceptual experience: traditionally, that 
perceptual experience is constitutively dependent upon either a certain kind of 
subjective object — a sense-datum — or else upon a certain kind of subjective, 
experiential property — a quale.
Berkeley, for instance, uses facts about perceptual variation to argue that 
colours are subjective properties of inner subjective objects (‘ideas’). At least some 
subsequent proponents of the traditional argument from illusion have questioned 
Berkeley’s inference from the subjectivity of colours to their interiority. C.I. Lewis’s 
use of the term “qualia ’ to refer to properties of that which is “given” in sensory 
experience, for instance, leaves it open whether these subjective qualities exist in 
physical space, outside the mind.8 G.E. Moore’s introduction of the term ‘sense- 
data’, as that which is directly apprehended in sense perception, similarly leaves it 
open whether sense-data exist without the mind. Although Moore ultimately thinks 
that sense-data are not in fact parts of the material world, Moore concedes that it is 
at least “conceivable that this whitish colour is really on the surface of the material 
envelope”.9 The conclusion that “sensa” (sense-data) are states of mind is one that 
C.D. Broad even provisionally rejects. Broad claims to be unable to find any good 
arguments in support of this position, and indeed thinks that the view is fraught 
with problems. Echoing the kinds of criticism we saw Arnauld make of 
Malebranche in §1.3, Broad complains that:
something is said to be a state of mind, though it possesses properties which it is very 
difficult to ascribe to states o f mind. If a sensum is a state of mind, then there are states of 
mind which are literally red or round or hot or loud or triangular, and so on .. .1 find it 
difficult to believe that any state of mind actually is a term of this sort.10
8 “What is given may exist outside the mind — that question should not be prejudged”, 1929: 64.
9 1910-11: 31.
10 1923:106.
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Whatever the metaphysics of the direct objects of perception, however, these writers 
at least agree that the Argument from Perceptual Variation tells us something 
interesting about the nature of perceptual experience: they agree that it tells that an 
experience (or ‘presentation’) logically implies the existence of something that it is 
an experience (or presentation) of, be this a sense-datum or quale, internal to or 
external to the mind.
In what follows, however, I am going to set aside questions about the wider 
significance of perceptual variation. Questions about the nature of colour are largely 
independent of questions about the nature of perceptual experience.
On the one hand, further argument is needed to move from facts about 
perceptual variation to facts about perceptual experience, as even the dispute 
between different subjective theories of perception illustrates. Indeed, the fact that 
perceptual experience is at least sometimes subject to variation is not even sufficient 
to establish the subjectivist’s conclusion that experience is constitutively dependent 
upon a subjective object or property in the first place. Intentionalists about 
perception, for instance, reject the existential commitment of subjective theories of 
perception on the grounds that subjective objects or properties are unnecessary to 
explain the possibility of perceptual experience. According to intentionalists, 
perceptual experience is just an intentional state with a certain kind of 
representational content: no further explanation of the character of visual experience 
is necessary or perhaps even possible. Disjunctivists, on the other hand, reject the 
inference to subjective entities by rejecting ‘the common kind assumption’ that 
underwrites the move from the possibility of illusion to the conclusion that we are 
only ever directly aware of subjective entities. According to disjunctivists, veridical 
and non-veridical experiences differ fundamentally in kind: one is a direct awareness 
of mind-independent material objects and their properties, the other something else. 
The important point is that whatever the disagreement between these different 
theories is, it is not about the facts of perceptual variation. All three theories 
acknowledge that perceptual variation can, and indeed does, occur. Their 
disagreement is about independent assumptions involved in the subjectivist’s response 
to this variation.
On the other hand, even if we accept the subjectivist’s conclusion that our 
colour experiences are constitutively dependent upon certain kinds of subjective
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object or quality, this does not anyway entail anything about the metaphysical status 
of colour. It is consistent with subjective theories of perception that material objects 
exist, that they are really coloured, and that the subjective objects or qualities that we 
immediately perceive literally resemble these qualities of material objects. The 
further conclusion that material objects are not really coloured requires additional 
argument: for instance, either that colours have no location within the ‘scientific 
image’, or perhaps even that the very notion of material substance is incoherent.11 
But this is further argument. The subjectivity of colours does not follow simply from 
a subjective theory of perception.
The second general point to make about the Argument from Perceptual 
Variation is that ‘real’ is, as Austin points out, context sensitive. ‘Real’ is a word 
whose negative use “wears the trousers”, insofar as the sense of ‘real’ in a given 
context is determined by the intended contrast. ‘Real’ can be used to mark a contrast 
with something that, though natural, is unusual -  a ‘real’ summer, unlike the 
miserable one we had last year. It can be used to mark a contrast with the artificial — 
a ‘real’ (natural) blonde, as opposed to someone who has dyed their hair. It can be 
used to mark a contrast, amongst artificial things, with the fake — a ‘real’ Rolex, in 
contrast to a cheap imitation. It can even be used in the way that proponents of the 
argument from illusion fix on, to mark a contrast with the non-existent — Katy has 
finally got herself a ‘real’ friend, instead of the imaginary one she was playing with 
last week.12
The context sensitivity of ‘real’ does not mean that we cannot sensibly 
discuss the question of whether objects are really coloured. But it does mean that we 
have to fix the relevant contrast. The relevant contrast in the present context is with 
the colour an object appears to have as a result of facts about the situation in which 
it is perceived. Of course, as Austin also points out, ‘appears’ is itself context 
sensitive. If, for instance, you look at railway tracks from the ground with the usual 
visual clues, there is a clear sense in which they appear, not to be convergent, but 
parallel and receding into the distance. Similarly, if you look at a white wall 
illuminated by a blue light and you can see the illumination independent of its
11 For a discussion of the broadly physicalist argument against literal resemblance, see Broad 1923: 125-9. 
Recent subjectivist proponents of this argument include Jackson 1977, Boghossian and Velleman 1989 
and Smith 1990.
12 Austin 1962: 62-77, especially 70.
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interaction with the wall, there is a clear sense in which it does not appear to you that 
the wall is blue. Because of the perceptual constancy of colour, the wall actually 
appears to be a white wall illuminated by a blue light.
But it is not this sense of the word ‘appear’ that we mean. When we say that 
the relevant contrast is with ‘the colour an object appears to have’, it is with local 
appearance properties that we are interested: it is the colour an object appears to be 
absent any non-local features of the visual scene that might serve as visual cues to its 
real colour. We are interested, for instance, in the colour the wall appears when we 
discount from consideration the nature of the illuminant, by screening it off from 
attentive consideration using either a reduction screen, a matchbox lid or just half­
closing our eyes. Roughly speaking, the colour an object appears to be is the colour 
that we would need to paint a canvass to faithfully represent the visual scene of 
which it is a part: the white wall appears blue because if, for instance, you were to 
paint a picture of the wall you would paint it using blue paint, not white paint.13
The third general point to make about the Argument from Perceptual 
Variation, before considering this argument more directly, is that we should not 
assume at the outset that it will be possible to deal with each and every case of 
perceptual variation in the same way. The Argument from Perceptual Variation is 
usually presented in such a way as to invite a unilateral response. The operative 
assumption is that the different ways in which an object’s colour appears as a result 
of variations in the perceptual conditions form a common kind: that variations 
consequent upon differences in viewing distance, background, illumination and the 
nature of the perceiving subject are merely sub-species of the same genus.14
Although the overall argumentative strategy is the same with respect to each 
kind of variation, however, the differences in colour appearance in these situations 
are generated by varying factors that are, at least on the face of it, quite 
heterogonous. Broadly speaking, the factors that affect perceived colour fall into 
two distinct categories: differences in environmental conditions and differences in 
perceiving subjects. The environmental differences themselves include variations the
13 We are interested in what are called film or aperture colours (see §6.3).
14 Berkeley’s use of the Argument from Perceptual Variation is wholly indiscriminate, applying it to all 
kinds of variation for all kinds of perceptual property. A more recent example of the tendency to treat 
cases o f variation in colour perception alike is Cohen 2005. Calling it “The Master Argument”, Cohen 
sets out the Argument from Perceptual Variation before plugging into the general argument schema 
different kinds of variation in colour appearance, in each case arguing for a relationist theory o f colour by 
rejecting the incompatibility claim, premiss (2).
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viewing distance, the background against which an object is perceived and the 
illumination under which the observation occurs, which all appear to be very 
different kinds of factor. The differences on the subjective side are seemingly no less 
disparate. Colour perception varies not only across species, for instance, but within 
one and the same species. Even within the same species, variation is the result of 
very different kinds of factor: the natural ageing processes, genetic defects, cortical 
damage, minor physiological variations, and so on. Given the sheer diversity of the 
factors that affect perceived colour, we should not simply assume that it will be 
possible to deal with all cases of variation in the same way. Just because one kind of 
response is appropriate in one situation, there’s no guarantee that it will be 
appropriate in another context.
Indeed, I will argue over the next three chapters that the different kinds of 
variation do indeed call for different kinds of response. In relation to (some) 
variations in perceived colour that are due to differences in viewing distance, for 
instance, I will argue that we should reject premiss (1) of the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation: the assumption that it is the very same object, and not just 
different parts of the same object, that appears to have the incompatible properties. 
Sometimes, as in the case of variations due to illumination and defective colour 
vision, I will argue that we should reject premiss (3) of the Argument from 
Perception Variation — that there is no non-arbitrary reason to prefer one set of 
viewing conditions over another. In response to variations in colour perception 
across species, I will argue that we need to reject premiss (2) — that the different 
colour appearances are incompatible. On still other occasions, I will suggest that the 
Argument from Variation actually tells us something very important about the limits 
of colour perception: there comes a point at which variation in colour perception 
forces us to consider questions about the acuity of our colour perception and delimit 
the extent to which our common sense beliefs about colours are veridical 
accordingly.
3. Distance and Background
Although the colour an object appears depends both on the viewing distance and 
the background against which it is perceived, in elucidating the notion of ‘real’
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colour I am concentrate on variations in illumination (§§3.4-5). This is because 
variations in perceived colour that are the result of variations in illumination are far 
more striking than the effects of either distance or background.
The most striking examples of the effects of viewing distance on perceived 
colour, for instance, are relatively easily dealt with. In the Dialogues, Berkeley 
mentions that “a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from 
those perceived by the unassisted sight”.15 A famous example, noted by amongst 
others Locke, is that a drop of blood, which appears to be uniformly red to the 
naked eye, appears under a microscope to be composed only of a “few Globules of 
Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor”.16 The differences of appearance generated 
using a microscope are just the limiting case of a much more prevalent 
phenomenon. In his notebooks, for instance, Berkeley describes blue and yellow 
chequered squares that, receding into the distance, appear green.17 A variation on 
this theme concerns differendy coloured threads that when woven together produce 
a garment that appears a third colour: in Austin's version the threads are black and 
white and the garment grey, in Armstrong’s the threads are red and white and the 
garment pink, although clearly, many other combinations would also work.18 
Pixelated colour arrays, such as those found in newspaper pictures, mosaics, 
pointillist paintings and television screens, all work on essentially the same principle: 
in the case of colour television screens, for instance, all the colours that you 
perceived are generated by cathode tubes that contain just red, green and blue 
phosphors.19
Striking though these examples are, however, they do not undermine the 
appearance-reality distinction that is a commitment of the naive view that colours 
are mind-independent properties. At least as they are used by Berkeley, for instance, 
these examples function at best only as an implicit reductio of the distinction. 
Although viewing an object at different distances — at the limit with a microscope — 
generates different appearances, Berkeley himself suggests a non-arbitrary principle 
that allows us to choose between these conflicting appearances: that an object’s real 
colour is that which is “discovered by the most near and exact survey”. At least
151713:184.
16 1690: II.xxiii.ll.
17 1707-8: 502.
18 See, for instance, Austin 1962: 83 and Armstrong 1969:127.
19 For an overview of the different ways in which colours can be reproduced, see Hurvich 1981: 299-313.
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taken at face value, Berkeley’s argument therefore proves, not that there is no 
appearance-reality distinction, and hence that all colours are equally apparent, but 
only that an object’s real colour is that colour which it appears to have when it is 
seen at the shortest possible viewing distance.
The implied reductio rests on the suppressed assumption that this way of 
drawing the appearance-reality distinction is unquestionably unacceptable: that no 
distinction would be preferable to a distinction drawn in this way. But even if we 
accept the argument up until this point, this further step is questionable. 
Acknowledging the possibility that our ordinary colour thought is to a greater or 
lesser extent erroneous is an occupational hazard of the naively realistic view that 
colours are mind-independent properties that are there to he perceived. To acknowledge 
the mind-independence of colour is just to acknowledge the possibility that the 
environmental and subjective conditions necessary for the veridical perception of 
colour might fail to hold. The naive realist therefore has to be prepared to accept 
that in the worst case scenario many, if not all, of our ordinary colour ascriptions are 
false. Assuming for the sake of argument that an object’s real colour is that which is 
discovered by the most near and exact survey, for instance, the naive realist should 
concede the possibility that no medium-sized dry good is ever really coloured in the 
way that it appears to be, and that in fact the colours we ordinarily appear to 
perceive all vanish on closer inspection. The naive realist should even concede the 
possibility that some of the colours we ordinarily perceive are never really 
instantiated at all. It is at least logically possible, as Armstrong suggests, that every 
pink surface will turn out on closer inspection to really be a mosaic of red and white 
pieces. Indeed, Berkeley uses the example of diminishing yellow and blue chequered 
squares to try to prove that green is ‘compounded’ in exactly this way.
Still, even if our ordinary colour experience were systematically false in this 
way, naive realism about colour would not be a wholly unattractive theory. Nothing 
has been said, for instance, to imply that the colours objects are discovered to be on 
closer inspection would differ fundamentally in kind to the colours that they appear 
to be on first view. For instance, the examples used by Berkeley, Austin and 
Armstrong, in which colours that have a location within human colour space are 
juxtaposed to produce the appearance of a third colour that also has a location in 
human colour space, do nothing to support the claim that objects could have novel
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colours that have no location in human colour space. At worst — if, say, pink or 
green turned out to be compound colours — the set of real colours would be subset 
of the set of apparent colours. But so long as the colours that we discover on closer 
inspection are determinates of the same determinable as the properties that we 
perceive at the macroscopic level, we at least know in general what colours are.20
More to the point, however, these examples of perceptual variation do not 
anyway threaten the reality of the colours that we normally perceive. For the 
Argument from Perceptual Variation to work, the conflicting appearances identified 
in premiss (1) have to be appearances of the very same thing, it has to be the very same 
object that at one viewing distance appears to be one colour and at another appears 
to be another. The problem with these cases is that the appearances are not even 
appearances of the very same thing: it is not the very same thing that appears red 
and pellucid, blue and green, or red and white. Wholes can have properties that their 
individual parts lack. My coffee table can have a mass of lOkgs, for example, without 
the parts that constitute it being themselves 10kg: the table top might have a mass of 
6kgs and the legs a mass of 4kgs. Similarly, my coffee table can be coffee table 
shaped without its proper parts also being coffee table shaped: the legs might be 
cylindrical and the top rectangular. It is no less counter-intuitive to suppose that an 
object can have a colour that its proper parts lack: for example, that a shirt can really 
be pink even though the threads out of which it is woven are themselves red and 
white.21
Not every case in which viewing distance affects perceived colour is a case in 
which different things — wholes and their individual parts — actually have different 
colours. For example, colours generally appear lighter and slightly more saturated at 
larger viewing distances than close up.22 As the viewing distance increases still 
further, objects begin to appear progressively bluer, an effect that is most closely 
associated with the perception of distant mountains and is best appreciated by
20 This idea is exploited in corpuscularian science, which models the insensible microscopic bodies 
essential to natural explanation on the macroscopic bodies that we more normally perceive. As Descartes 
remarks, “No one who uses his reason will, I think, deny the advantage of using what happens in large 
bodies, as perceived by our senses, as a model for our ideas about what happens in tiny bodies which 
elude our senses merely because of their small size. This is much better than explaining matters by 
inventing all sorts of strange objects which have no resemblance to what is perceived by the senses”,
1644: IV.201. See §7.4.
21 As Hilbert suggests, colour predicates are not “dissective”: they are not satisfied by every part o f every 
individual that satisfies the predicate, 1987: 35.
22 Sivik 1997: 184-5.
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looking a succession of ridges that become gradually bluer as they recede into the 
distance.23
But, these examples do not undermine the appearance-reality distinction 
either. The effect whereby objects appear blue at very large viewing distances, for 
instance, is caused by an atmospheric effect called ‘airtight’, which occurs when the 
tight travelling from the object to our eye is scattered by intervening particles in the 
air. The mountain appears blue because these particles preferentially scatter short 
wavelength blue tight.24 In this case, there is a non-arbitrary reason to prefer one set 
of viewing conditions over another. The non-arbitrary reason to say that the 
mountains only appear blue at large viewing distances is that the tight reaching the 
eye is modified by the intervening medium; it is distorted in transit. As I explain in 
more detail below, an object’s colour is intimately related to the way in which it 
modifies tight (§3.4). Reducing the viewing distance gives you a better picture of the 
real colour of the mountain because it reduces the amount of atmospheric 
interference to the tight reaching the eye, and so reduces the extent to which the 
object’s propensity to modify the incident tight is masked. As such, premiss (3) of 
the Argument from Perceptual Variation, which requires that there be no non- 
arbitrary reason to prefer one set of viewing conditions over another, is false.
Generally speaking, if you want to know what colour an object really is, it is 
best to view the object at as short a distance as possible, such that it is still the object 
you perceived and not the distinct parts that compose the object: you need to be as 
close as possible, but not so close that you cannot still see the wood for the trees. 
This not only reduces the effects of atmospheric interference, but it optimises the 
resolving power of the eye which is better able to extract information about objects 
in its environment the greater the area of the visual field those objects occupy. A 
good rule of thumb, given the necessary connection between colour and shape, is 
that the optimal viewing distance for determining an object’s colour is also the best 
distance at which to determine its shape. If you’re too far away to reliably tell what 
shape something is, then you’re probably too far away to reliably see what colour it 
is as well.
23 For an illustration o f this, see Lynch and Livingston’s visually stunning Color and Light in Nature, 2001: 
28.
24 See Minnaert 1954: 239, Lynch and Livingston 2001: 29.
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Obviously this is rather vague. But then perhaps this is just what we should 
expect. For one thing, the optimal distance at which to perceive an object’s colour 
will vary from object to object, depending upon the size, and more general nature, 
of the object. Besides, as I argue in more detail below, the visual system is not 
naturally geared towards grounding very precise colour ascriptions. For most 
purposes, it is sufficient to know what colour an object is just at the level of 
determinable colours like yellow, green or blue (for more details, see §5.3). Variation 
in perceived colour that is the result of variation in viewing distance is just too slight 
to alter the coarse-grained colour judgements that we make about objects. An object 
that looks broadly speaking red at a viewing distance of 0.5 metres will still look 
broadly speaking red at a viewing distance of 80 metres. So long as we are obviously 
neither too close to, nor too far away from the object, then at least our coarse­
grained colour perception will be veridical.
For a similar reason, variation in perceived colour that is the result of 
simultaneous colour contrast is no more problematic. It has long been known in the 
artistic community that contrast affects perceived colour. In the early sixteenth 
century, for instance, Leonardo da Vinci noted that “black clothes make a face 
appear whiter than it is, white clothes darker, yellow clothes bring out the colours in 
it, and red clothes make it paler”.25 Later, in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
Delacroix boasted that he could even reproduce the radiant flesh of Venus from 
mud, if has was allowed suitable contrasts.26 Building on Goethe’s famous 
discussion, the phenomenon of colour contrast was extensively studied by Chevreul, 
who, as designer of dyes at the Gobelin tapestry factory in Paris, had to convince 
weavers of calicos with red and black patterns that the green tint the black appeared 
to have was the result of contrast effects, and not inferior quality dye.27
Contrast affects are generally most pronounced for the so-called pure 
contrast colours, black, white, grey and brown. Simultaneous contrast involving the 
achromatic colours is illustrated in Figure 3.1: in each case the inner square is the 
same shade of grey, but appears different depending upon the colour of the
25 Minnaert 1954: 134.
26 Hardin 1988: 49.
27 Goethe 1810: §§47-61, Chevreul 1839. Goethe mentions, for example, that “If a green paper is seen 
through striped or flowered muslin, the stripes or flowers will appear reddish. A grey building seen 
through green palisades appears in the like manner reddish.. .Objects seen through an opening in a red or 
green curtain appear to wear the opposite hue” (§57).
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background against which it is seen. Striking contrast effects for the chromatic 
colours can, however, also be generated. Whittle, for instance, has recendy devised 
an set up in which patches spanning a limited chromatic interval -  such as blue to 
violet, or red to orange — can be made to appear all the main colours of the hue 
circle by varying their background.28
Figure 3.1: Achromatic Simultaneous Contrast Effect
The inner boxes are the same shade of grey, but the grey boxes on the left, seen against the lighter 
backgrounds, appear darker than the grey boxes on the right, seen against the darker backgrounds.
Outside of the lab or artist’s studio, however, differences in perceived colour 
generated by simultaneous contrast generally go unnoticed. Even Berkeley, who was 
obsessed with perceptual variation, does not include background amongst the litany 
of factors that he mentions affects perceived colour. Part of the reason why we 
don’t notice contrast effects is because of the perceptual constancy of colour: we 
perceive an object’s colour to remain constant throughout changes in the 
background against which it is perceived. Part of the reason why we don’t generally 
notice contrast effects, however, is just that they are normally far less pronounced 
than variations in perceived colour that are the result of varying the illumination; 
throughout which colours are, after all, also perceived to remain constant. The 
startling contrast effects that Whittle generates, for instance, in which colours from 
the hue circle can be made to appear any other colour on the hue circle, require a 
very convoluted set up. The more common place examples of contrast, on the other 
hand, are not nearly so striking, and do not affect the coarse-grained, determinable, 
colour judgments that we make. In the example presented in Figure 3.1, for 
instance, although the grey boxes appear slightly different in each case, we would 
not hesitate to say that any of them were, broadly speaking, grey. Standard textbook 
versions of chromatic contrast are even less striking. As with variations in distance,
28 Whittle 2003.
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variations in background therefore do not generally affect the truth of the coarse­
grained colour judgements that our visual system is geared towards making. An 
object will appear to be the determinable colour that it really is against pretty much 
any background.
4. In Defence of Natural Daylight
The colour an object appears varies much more dramatically depending upon the 
illumination under which it is perceived. Berkeley mentions that “the same bodies 
appear differently coloured by candlelight, from what they do in the open day”.29 
There are, however, many other examples of the way in which the illumination 
affects perceived colour that we can add to this. Consider the effect on perceived 
colour of shining a blue light on a white wall. Or — varying the colour of the 
illumination less noticeably — consider the effect on perceived colour of turning on a 
incandescent desk lamp in a room that is already lit by natural daylight, or the colour 
an item of clothing appears under the fluorescent strip lighting of a shop changing 
room.30 Do these kinds of variation in perceived colour suffice to show that objects 
are not ‘really’ coloured at all?
One response in the face of this kind of variation is to deny premiss (2) of 
the Argument from Perceptual Variation, which states that the colours an object 
appears under different illuminations are incompatible. This response is most 
naturally associated with the view that an object’s colour changes as the illumination 
changes, which is itself most naturally associated with the view that colours are 
relations between objects, subjects and illuminants, relations that change as their 
constituent relata change. Changing the illumination under which an object is seen is 
not at all like grinding it with a pestle and mortar or painting its surface. Light is 
non-invasive in a way that pestles and paint are not. Needless to say there are 
exceptions: some objects, like photographic paper and clouds, are especially
29 1713: 186.
30 Although lights like these are often described as ‘white’, they actually have a slight colouration. 
Incandescent tungsten lights, for instance, typically appear a yellowish-white, whereas fluorescent lights 
usually appear a slightly bluish-white. A simple experiment illustrates this (Hurvich 1981: 41). Fold a piece 
of white paper and place it like an open book on a table, such that one side is illuminated by daylight and 
the other by an artificial light source. If you look at the edge of the paper through a tube (or rolled up 
piece of paper) a difference in the colour of the two light sources should be easily discernible. For a 
discussion of variations in ‘white’ light, see Henderson 1977: 244-57.
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sensitive to changes in light, whilst most other objects are affected by very intense 
light, as from a laser, or prolonged exposure to less intense light, as when sunlight 
bleaches the colours of objects in a shop window. Generally speaking, however, 
light is unable to bring about a change in the material constitution of objects; 
certainly not at the rate that it would need to for an object’s colour to change 
throughout changes in the illumination. It therefore only makes sense to think of 
colours changing with variations in the illumination if we think of colours as 
relations between objects, subjects and illuminants. This is precisely the point of 
Locke’s porphyry example: Locke argues that unless we think of colours as relations, 
then we cannot make sense of the idea -  which Locke regards as simply self-evident 
— that objects lose their colours in the dark (§1.2). It is also the point that Evans 
makes in asking us to try to conceive of colours existing in the dark in the first place: 
what is it we conceive, Evans asks, when we think of colours existing in the dark, if 
not how the object would look in a situation in which subject, object and 
environmental conditions co-exist (§2.1)?31
Notwithstanding Austin’s observation that it is the negative use of ‘real’ that 
generally ‘wears the trousers’, it makes some sense to say that relationism is at least a 
realist theory of colour: that objects really are all the colours that, under different 
illuminants, they appear to be. Still, in the first instance, the plausibility of 
relationism as a response to the Argument from Perceptual Variation depends upon 
the extent to which relationism coheres with our ordinary thought about colour 
more generally: insofar as the motivation for resisting the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation is to avoid convicting common sense of widespread error, we 
should prefer a response to this problem that does not itself suggest that our 
ordinary colour thought is systematically mistaken. As we have already seen, 
however, if relationism is true, then it is true at the expense of common sense beliefs 
about colour; it is, for instance, inconsistent with the common sense belief that 
colours are mind-independent properties that persist through variations in the 
conditions necessary for their perception. Mistaking a relational property for a non­
relational property is no doubt a less serious offence than ascribing a property to an
31 For a more recent defence of relationism in response to illumination-dependent variation, see Cohen 
2005. Jackson and Pargetter combine relationism with physicalism, suggesting that “The blue light may 
actually change the relevant physical properties o f the wall’s surface, in which case the right thing to say is 
that the wall under blue light is blue. The light actually turns the wall from white to blue”, 1987: 73. See 
also Campbell 1969 and McLaughlin 2003.
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object that has nothing even remotely resembling that property. But it is still a 
mistake. All else being equal, we should therefore try to avoid the relationist 
response to the Argument from Perceptual Variation.
Consistent with the view that colours are genuinely mind-independent 
properties, it is still theoretically possible to deny premiss (2) of the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation. According to this view, defended by amongst others the early 
twentieth century New Realists (or New Naturalists), objects really have as many 
colours as there are colours they appear to be, all of them robustly mind- 
independent.32 I will suggest later that something like this is appropriate in response 
to inter-species variation in colour perception (§4.2). In relation to differences in 
perceived colour that are the result of varying the illumination under which an 
object is perceived, however, this response is also less than ideal.
Although it is consistent with the general view that colours are mind- 
independent properties, it is not consistent with the naive view that colours are mind- 
independent. For instance, we do not ordinarily think that when we hold an object 
up to the light, or illuminate it with a new light source, we thereby perceive different 
(albeit mind-independent) properties of the object. We think instead that objects 
have only a limited stock of colours that in non-standard conditions appear other 
than they really are. Indeed, colours could not play the role that they play in 
grounding our conception of the mind-independent existence of material substance 
if this were not the case. Sameness or difference of colour, for instance, is one of the 
principles in virtue of which we determine sameness or difference of material 
substance. But our judgements about sameness or difference of colour are not 
restricted to situations in which the object is illuminated by the very same kind of 
light, as they would have to be if New Realism was true of our common sense 
thought about colour.
Moreover, as far as revisionary theories of colour go, New Realism is not 
even especially attractive. It offends against even the weakest sense of parsimony. As 
Barnes complains, according to these “wilder excesses of realism”:
32 See, for instance, Nunn 1909-10, Holt et al 1912, and for a recent discussion, Smith 2002: 29-31. Smith 
also lists as sympathetic to the New Realist position Epicurus and Sartre.
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the world... [takes] on the appearance of a great museum in which a few of the contents 
were operative beings but the vast majority were exhibits only, ready to be produced on the 
appropriate occasion, but possessed of no other ground of existence.33
Rather than question premiss (2) of the Argument from Perceptual 
Variation, a much more promising strategy is therefore to look more closely at 
premiss (3). The truth of premiss (3) requires that there be no non-arbitrary reason 
to privilege one set of illumination conditions as revelatory of an object’s real colour 
over any other. But is this right? Certainly as a matter of descriptive fact, we tend to 
think that the real colours of objects are actually revealed in natural daylight. The 
reason why we say that ‘white walls appear blue under blue light’, for example, is 
that we do not think that the walls appear as they really are when so illuminated: 
‘appear’ implies a contrast with the way things really are, underscored by the 
description of the walls as ‘white walls’, and not just ‘walls’. Similarly, if we like the 
colour of a piece of clothing under the fluorescent light of a shop changing room 
but not in broad daylight, we do not think that natural daylight is deceptive. We 
think that the garment does not appear the rather unpleasant colour it really is under 
the artificial illumination in the shop. But can we can justify this preference? Is there 
any non-arbitrary reason to suppose that natural daylight reveals the real colours of 
objects?
A shallow explanation of our preference for natural daylight is that natural 
daylight happens to be the statistically normal illuminant under which we perceive 
colours. This explanation, however, depends too heavily on the contingencies of our 
situation. If fluorescent strip lighting became the statistically normal illuminant 
under which to perceive colours, this would not thereby become the illuminant 
under which the real colours of objects were revealed. To suppose that it would 
undermines any robust sense in which colours are non-relational, mind-independent 
properties. If colours are mind-independent properties then they must be as they are 
independent of both the subjects that perceive them and the conditions under which 
they are perceived: changing either of these variables cannot be thought to bring 
about a change in an object’s colour.
Neither does simply rigidifying the description of viewing conditions to 
statistically normal viewing conditions as they actually are solve this problem.34
33 1944- 5: 144.
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Rigidification is supposed to help respect the intuition that the colours of objects 
would not really change if the prevailing conditions changed. The ‘really’ here, 
however, carries no metaphysical force, unless there is some reason to privilege 
actual normal conditions over and above the fact that they are the statistically 
normal conditions hereabouts: otherwise, ‘really’ is just an honorific that marks the 
existence of a convention to arbitrarily prefer one set of conditions over any other. 
For instance, suppose that there is a world exactly alike ours, inhabited by people 
exactly alike ourselves, but where the statistically normal illumination is fluorescent 
strip lighting. Considering the possibility that the prevailing illumination might have 
been different, the philosophers in this world assure themselves that if, for instance, 
natural daylight had been the statistically normal illumination, things would not have 
been differently coloured because objects really are the colours they appear under 
what is actually the statistically normal illuminant: in this world, fluorescent strip 
lighting. If the rigidification strategy is valid, then it should be valid for our 
counterparts on this world. And now there will be as many real colours as there are 
conditions that can be used to fix the extension of the term ‘real colour’. But this 
just seems wrong. It seems wrong to say that there is any sense in which tomatoes 
would really be orange in the fluorescent world, even if this was how they normally 
appeared. There has to be something about the normal conditions in a world that 
confers on them a special advantage. We therefore need a deeper explanation of our 
de facto preference for natural daylight.
With this in mind, we need to consider in more detail the relationship 
between colour and light. It has long been known that there is a close relationship 
between colours and the way in which objects reflect light. Material objects reflect 
different amounts of light from every part of the visible electromagnetic spectrum: 
the region of the electromagnetic spectrum between 400 and 700 nanometres (nms), 
light from which appears violet at its lower end, red at its higher end, and passes 
through the colours of the rainbow — blue, green, yellow and orange — in between. 
The relative proportion of the incident light that an object reflects at each spectral 
wavelength can be represented graphically, as in Figure 3.2, by a surface reflectance 
profile.
34 This is the standard dispositionalist manoeuvre. See, for instance, Peacocke 1983, Johnston 1992: 144, 
Wright 1992:114.
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Figure 3.2: Sample Surface Reflectance Profiles
Source: Byrne and Hilbert 2003.
As I discuss in more detail later, the exact nature of the relationship between 
colours and surface reflectance properties is not entirely straightforward. Colours 
cannot simply be identical with reflectances because reflectances cut too fine: 
objects that differ in their reflectance can, and indeed often do, appear identical in 
colour (at least in specific circumstances), a phenomenon known as metamerism 
(§6.3). Although metamerism blocks the identification of colours with individual 
reflectances, however, it is generally speaking common ground amongst those who 
accept the mind-independence of colour that there is some close relationship 
between colours and reflectances. Whether they identify colours either with 
reflectance-types or distinct suigeneris properties, almost all parties agree that 
reflectances at least determine colours; or to put it round the other way, that colours 
supervene on reflectances: that there can be no difference in colour without a 
difference in reflectance (§7.1).35
The important point here is that the supervenience of colours on 
reflectances suggests a solution to the Argument from Perceptual Variation. The 
light that an object reflects is a function of the composition of the light that strikes it 
(the incident light) and the object’s surface reflectance property. What this
35 In advance, I should mention that what we want here is specifically necessary (or strong) 
supervenience. For more details, and a defence o f the necessary supervenience of colours on reflectances, 
see Chapter 7.
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effectively means is that the light that reaches the eye from material objects carries 
information about the reflective behaviour of those bodies: it encodes information 
about how objects modify the incident light. Given the supervenience of colours on 
reflectances, it follows that any conditions under which the light reaching the eye 
carries full and accurate information about the object’s reflectance will be conditions 
under which the nature of that object’s colour is revealed. There are, in particular, 
two conditions that the illumination must satisfy.
First, the light reaching the eye must carry information about the object’s 
reflective behaviour at every visible spectral wavelength. Consider, for instance, the 
contrast between natural daylight and monochromatic light: light composed of a 
single spectral wavelength (or else strictly limited range of spectral wavelengths, up 
to no more than about lOnms). The reason why monochromatic light does not 
accurately reveal the colours of objects is that it conveys only partial information 
about their reflective behaviour. Because the light striking the object is composed of 
light from a strictly limited range of spectral wavelengths, it only encodes 
information about the reflective behaviour of the object at those wavelengths. But 
as an object’s reflective behaviour is much more extensive than this, the light that 
reaches the eye carries only partial information as to its reflectance: the eye receives 
no information about how the object reflects light in any other part of the visible 
spectrum. The information about the object’s reflectance that the light carries 
therefore underdetermines its nature.
At 510nms, for instance, the yellow lemon and blue faded jeans whose 
reflectances are illustrated in Figure 3.2 reflect the same proportion of the incident 
light: roughly 30%. This means that illuminated by a 510nm monochromatic green 
light, the information that the reflected light reaching the eye encodes doesn’t put us 
in a position to distinguish between these objects: it doesn’t tell us whether the 
object’s reflective behaviour across the rest of the visible spectrum is more like that 
of the lemon or the jeans. But there is clearly a very big difference in this, and 
dependent upon it, a very big difference in the colours these objects are: indeed, 
blue and yellow lie on opposite sides of the human hue circle.
Natural daylight differs from monochromatic light insofar as it is a continuous 
illuminant: it is composed of light of a broadband spectral wavelength, and not just 
light of a specific wavelength. Therefore, the information about an object’s reflective
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behaviour that it conveys is not partial in the way that the information conveyed by 
a monochromatic light is. More than this, the broadband wavelength light of which 
natural daylight is composed is not just continuous, but spans the entire visible 
spectrum: it is entire spectrum light. It is for this reason that when we pass natural 
daylight through a prism the full gamut of spectral colours can be seen. The 
refractive indices of the different wavelength lights that compose daylight differ: 
short wavelength light is refracted through a larger angle than long wavelength light, 
so passing natural daylight through a prism splits it into its component parts, from 
short wavelength ‘violet’ light of 400nms, through the different colours of the 
rainbow — green (520nms), yellow (570nms) and orange (600nms) — to long 
wavelength ‘red’ light of 700nms.
Not all continuous illuminants are entire spectrum lights. Part of the reason 
why an object’s colour appears different in candlelight — one of the facts to which 
Berkeley draws our attention — is that although candles emit light continuously, they 
do so only in the higher end of the visible spectrum: candlelight is composed 
exclusively of light with a wavelength of no less than 550nms, light that is 
phenomenally red-orange (see Figure 3.6). Hence, white things, for instance, which 
reflect light in equal proportion across the visible spectrum, assume a reddy glow in 
candlelight because they reflect almost entirely the phenomenally red-orange light 
that strikes them. More generally, the colours of red and yellow things, which tend 
to reflect more long wavelength light than short wavelength light, appear more vivid, 
whereas the colours of blue and green things, which tend to reflect more light in the 
lower regions of the visible spectrum, appear duller.
Entire spectrum light is clearly preferable to any kind of light — continuous 
or otherwise — that is not composed of light from every part of the visible spectrum. 
If there is any part of the visible spectrum that the light striking the object does not 
contain, then it cannot convey information about the reflective behaviour of the 
object at that wavelength. The information about the object’s reflective behaviour 
that it encodes is merely partial: it can fully reveal neither the object’s reflectance, 
nor the colour that this reflectance determines.
It is not just that natural daylight is continuous across the entire visible 
spectrum that singles it out as revelatory of the real colours of objects, however. 
Natural daylight is not unique in respect of being composed of light of each and
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every spectral wavelength. Many light sources emit light at each part of the visible 
spectrum. Like material objects, entire spectrum light sources behave differently at 
different spectral wavelengths. Just as the different proportions of the incident light 
that material objects reflect at each spectral wavelength can be represented by their 
surface reflectance profile, we can represent the different proportions of light that a 
light source emits at each spectral wavelength (in an arbitrary unit) by the light 
source’s spectralpower distribution profile, as Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate.
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Figure 3.3 Spectral Power Distributions of C.I.E. Standard Illuminants
Source A represents the spectral power distribution of an incandescent tungsten lamp; Source B direct 
sunlight at noon on a clear day; Source C skylight on an overcast day; Source D daylight on a clear day. 
Source: Wyszecki and Stiles 1967.
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Figure 3.4: The Spectral Power Distribution White Fluorescent Light
In addition to a more or less intense continuous spectral emission, fluorescent lights have a number of 
line spectra, represented by the sharp peaks. Source: Wyszecki and Stiles 1967.
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Even amongst illuminants that emit light in every part of the visible 
spectrum, however, natural daylight is still the gold standard because it is roughly 
speaking equal energy light, its spectral power distribution is to all intents and purposes 
flat across the visible spectrum. For an illuminant to carry full and accurate 
information about the way in which objects reflect light, the reflected light cannot 
encode disproportionately more information about how objects reflect light in one 
part of the spectrum over any other. Any differences in the spectral composition of 
the light that reaches the eye have to reflect the fact that an object reflects light 
differently in different parts of the visible spectrum; we don’t want differences in the 
composition of the reflected light to be a function of differences in the composition 
of the light incident upon the object in the first place.
Consider, by way of illustration, the difference between natural daylight and 
fluorescent illumination. Fluorescent lights are relatively efficient illuminants, 
emitting most of their energy in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum; in 
contrast, incandescent tungsten lamps, for instance, get very hot when they are used 
for extended periods of time because they emit as much, if not more, energy in the 
infra-red part of the spectrum (over 700nms) as they do in the visible part, as Figure 
3.6 illustrates. Fluorescent lamps do not accurately reveal the real colours of objects, 
however, because like other electrical discharge lamps — illuminants in which radiant 
energy is produced by passing and electric current through a gas or vapour — the 
emission spectra for fluorescent lights contain sharp peaks and troughs. In the case 
of fluorescent lights these peaks are at least fairly evenly spread across the spectrum, 
thereby giving a reasonably representative sample of an object’s reflective behaviour. 
Still, the fact that there are these disparities in the spectral power distribution of 
fluorescent lamps means that reflected fluorescent light carries only distorted 
information about an object’s reflectance.
The fluorescent light source whose spectral power distribution is represented 
in Figure 3.4, for instance, emits most light in the yellow, green and blue regions of 
the spectrum, but very little in the high end of the red part of the visible spectrum 
between 650 and 700nms. Consequently, the information that the light can encode 
about an object’s reflective behaviour in this part of the spectrum is decidedly 
limited.
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Figure 3.5: Skin under Different Illuminations
(a) represents the spectral power distributions o f a standard fluorescent light (in black) and natural 
daylight, Dos Cin grey)- (h) represents the surface reflectance profile of pale skin, (c) represents the spectral 
power distribution of the light reflected by the skin under these illuminants. The light an object reflects at 
a wavelength is a function of the quantity of light that strikes it and the proportion of this light that it 
reflects. Source: Williamson and Cummins 1983: 35.
Suppose that we are perceiving pale skin under this fluorescent lamp. Skin 
reflects a higher proportion of the incident light in the long wavelength region of the 
spectrum than in the lower region, as Figure 3.5b illustrates. Because the fluorescent 
lamp emits comparatively little light in this part of the spectrum in the first place, the 
spectral power distribution of the light that reaches the eye is skewed in favour of 
those wavelengths where the illuminant’s emission is greater to start with, as Figure 
3.5c illustrates. The result is that the fluorescent light does not carry accurate 
information about how the skin reflects light in the top end of the visible spectrum, 
between 650-700nms. Consequently under this illumination, the skin appears less 
red than it really is. This is the reason why you often appear pale and tired under 
fluorescent light. Under natural daylight, in contrast, differences across the spectrum 
in the power distribution of the light reaching the eye mirror differences in the way 
the skin reflects light in different parts of the visible spectrum: the skin’s reflectance
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profile and the spectral power distribution profile of the reflected light are roughly 
isomorphic. This means that natural daylight carries full and accurate information 
about how the object reflects the incident light. As a result its colour, which 
supervenes on its reflectance, is thereby revealed.36
5. The Limits of Natural Daylight
I have argued so far that where differences in perceived colour are generated by 
varying the illumination, premiss (3) of the version of the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation is false. Assuming the supervenience of colours on reflectances, 
the real colours of objects are revealed in those conditions under which full and 
accurate information about their reflectances reaches the eye. Natural daylight 
therefore reveals the real colours of objects because natural daylight is roughly 
speaking equal energy light, that is continuous across the visible spectrum. Three 
qualifications to this defence of natural daylight, however, need to be made.
The first qualification is that the spectral power distribution of C.I.E. 
illuminant D (or D65) only represents one of the phases of natural daylight. Because 
the nature of the light that reaches objects on the ground varies constantly, there is 
not actually any single spectral power distribution profile that describes natural 
daylight as such. Consider, for instance, the difference between daylight on a heavily 
overcast and lightly overcast day; when the sun goes behind a cloud in an otherwise 
blue sky and when there is not a cloud in sight; the direct illumination of the sun at 
noon and the red light of the sun at dusk.
We can be more specific about differences in the phases of natural daylight 
by describing them in terms of their colour temperature. A light can be described in 
terms of a colour temperature if its spectral power distribution roughly 
approximates to the spectral power distribution of the light emitted by a “black 
body” — an ideal body which emits the maximum possible amount of 
electromagnetic radiation, and absorbs all the incident light that strikes it — at a
36 The light reaching the eye from the scene as a whole may encode enough information for the eye to 
determine the real colours of objects even in less than ideal conditions. If the eye can estimate the spectral 
composition of the incident light then it can often discount variations in the spectral power distribution 
of the reflected light that are not a function of the way material objects reflect that light. This, roughly 
speaking, is how constancy is achieved. Note, however, this is not a situation in which the illumination 
simply reveals the real colour of the object, as it requires extra work on the part of the visual system.
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specific temperature. Excluding monochromatic lights, most light sources can be 
described in terms of their colour temperature: candles, for instance, have a colour 
temperature of approximately 1900K, sodium street lamps a colour temperature of 
2100K, incandescent tungsten lamps a colour temperature of around 2800K, and 
fluorescent lamps a colour temperature of anywhere between 3000-7500K, 
depending on their constitution. Generally speaking, the light that black bodies emit 
shifts towards shorter wavelengths as their temperature increases. At around 800 
degrees Kelvin (K), black bodies begin to emit light in the long wavelength region of 
the visible spectrum, thereby appearing red. They subsequently emit a higher 
proportion of light at lower wavelengths as they become hotter, appearing orange at 
around 2000K, yellow at 3000K, white at 6000K and blue as their temperature 
increases to 10000K, as Figure 3.6 illustrates.
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Figure 3.6 Black Body Radiation
Emission spectra for various black bodies. Values for the sun have been reduced by a factor o f ten. 
Radiant power is measured in 103 watts per square metre of surface per nanometre interval. Source: 
Williamson and Cummins 1983:197.
Differences in colour temperature help to bring out differences in the phases 
of natural daylight. The colour temperature of direct sunlight at noon, for instance, 
is around 5000K, signifying that its spectral power distribution is shifted slightly 
towards higher visible spectral wavelengths, and so appears slightly yellowish. This
94
colour temperature decreases as the sun moves closer to the horizon: at an altitude 
of 10° it is roughly 4000K, reducing to 2000K at sunset, reflecting the fact that as 
the sun moves closer to the horizon, the balance of the spectral power distribution 
of sunlight shifts towards the long wavelength, phenomenally red, region of the 
visible spectrum. The light on an lightly overcast sky (‘north daylight’) has a colour 
temperature of between 6500-7500K, reflecting the fact that it contains a greater 
proportion of short wavelength, phenomenally blue, light. Skylight — light from the 
sky, with no direct sunlight -  in contrast, has a temperature of over 12000K, and as 
such is predominantly blue light.37
These variations in natural light are caused by atmospheric interference, the 
most prevalent of which is Rayleigh scatterings whereby small particles in the 
atmosphere — such as air molecules, dust and water particles, volcanic ash, and 
pollution — more efficiently scatter from the sun’s beam shorter wavelength blue 
light than longer wavelength red light: it is for this reason that the sky generally 
appears blue.38 Direct sunlight has a relatively low colour temperature — the balance 
of its spectral power distribution is shifted towards the higher end of the visible 
spectrum — because the short wavelength light that the sun’s radiation contains is 
more effectively scattered from the sun’s beam by small particles in the atmosphere. 
The direct sunlight represented by the C.I.E.’s standard illuminant B, for instance, 
has a colour temperature of just 4874K (Figure 3.3). This colour temperature 
reduces still further when the sun is closer to the horizon, after sunrise and before 
sunset, as the amount of air that the sun’s light has to pass through increases: when 
directly overhead the light from the sun has to pass through a smaller amount of air, 
and so is less subject to atmospheric distortion, than when it is nearer the horizon 
and, due to the curvature of the earth, travels through a much larger body of air, as 
Figure 3.7 illustrates. The progressive reddening of the sun is still more dramatic in
37 This list of colour temperatures is pieced together from a number of sources, including Henderson 
1977: passim, and Williamson and Cummins 1983: 216 and passim. It should be stressed that colour 
temperatures do not describe the actual temperatures of the source. A lamp can have a colour 
temperature of 6500K (6227°C) but be cool enough to touch. Colour temperature describes the nature of 
the light that a source emits in relation to the temperature of the black body that emits a similar kind of  
light. For more details, see Williamson and Cummins 1983: Chapter 7, esp. 193-201.
38 Particles in the atmosphere also absorb the light from the sun. As well as absorbing energy from the 
potentially harmful ultra-violet part of the electromagnetic spectrum, ozone, for instance, absorbs heavily 
in the lower end — in the blue and green regions — o f the visible spectrum; Lynch and Livingston 2001:
31.
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summer, when there is less rain and consequendy more particles in the air, and in 
built up areas, where there is much more pollution in the atmosphere.39
Figure 3.7 Distances Travelled by Sunlight
Comparison of the distance travelled through the atmosphere by sunlight at noon and sunset. Source: 
Lynch and Livingston 2001.
Of the phases of direct sunlight, the midday sun best reveals the real colours 
of objects because it is at midday that the sun’s light most closely approximates to 
true equal energy light, light with a colour temperature of around 6000K. Still, direct 
sunlight is not the ideal illuminant under which to perceive an object’s real colour. 
Because proportionally more of the short wavelength blue light has already been 
scattered by the particles in the atmosphere, the sun’s light is of itself slightly too 
yellow. If a scene is illuminated only by direct midday sunlight — for instance, if light 
is only admitted into the scene by a small opening in a cave or canopy — the balance 
of the spectral power distribution of the light is shifted towards the higher end of 
the spectrum, affecting the colours that objects in the scene appear accordingly. 
Eliminating direct sunlight from the scene has the converse effect. If the direct 
sunlight on an otherwise clear day is blocked — by a tree or a lone cloud — the 
objects in the perceptual scene are illuminated instead by skylight. Because of the 
effects of atmospheric scattering, skylight contains a high proportion of short 
wavelength blue light, giving it a colour temperature that is at least double the colour
39 Lynch and Livingston 2001: 31.
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temperature of equal energy white light. Consequently, in skylight, colours appear 
bluer than they really are.40
The light on a lightly overcast day (‘north daylight’), when there is neither 
direct sunlight nor skylight, comes closer to the equal energy ideal. Indeed, the 
instructions with the most widely used colour adas — The Munsell Book of Color— 
specify that its coloured chips should be viewed in either north daylight or its 
artificial equivalent, ‘scientific daylight’ with a colour temperature of 6500-7500K. 
There are certain practical considerations that favour this choice of illuminant. 
Munsell was himself a painter, and north daylight tends to be the preferred 
illuminant of painters because it minimises the problems caused by cast shadows. It 
is easier to paint naturally illuminated scenes on overcast days because objects do 
not cast strong shadows: paintings can take many hours to complete, during which 
time the shadows in a scene will have changed considerably. Even though it has 
since moved away from its artistic roots somewhat, at least part of the reason why 
the Munsell system of colour classification still uses north daylight is that good 
artificial approximations to this light are widely available. D65 — the C.I.E.’s fourth 
standard illuminant — is sometimes called an illuminant, rather than a light source, 
because of the difficulties associated with its physical realisation.41 Clearly it would 
be impractical to require people to only use the Munsell Book of Color for very precise 
purposes at around noon on clear days: it has to be possible to emulate this 
illumination at will.42
When it comes to revealing the real colours of objects, however, north 
daylight is still not perfect. The north daylight represented by the C.I.E.’s standard 
illuminant C, for instance, has a colour temperature of 6774K, with a peak in the 
short wavelength end of the visible spectrum — between about 440-490nms, the 
region that looks blue to blue-green — to match. The culprit, once again, is 
atmospheric scattering. Clouds are predominantly composed of larger water particles
40 The examples come from Shepard 1992: 511. Part of the reason why shadows sometimes appear blue is 
that the area in shadow, in the absence of direct sunlight, reflects the predominantly blue skylight. See 
Hardin 1988: 50-1.
41 Henderson 1977: 279, 289-90.
42 The preferred illumination in the graphic arts industry, in contrast, is light with a colour temperature of 
around 5000K (sometimes called D 50). The reason for this is that the products that graphic artists 
produce are seen under a variety of different illuminations with different colour temperatures. By picking 
an illuminant with a colour temperature that is intermediate between those of the more common 
illuminants, it is possible to reduce striking instances of metamerism, whereby objects that colour match 
under one illumination look very different in colour under another. See Henderson 1977: 290-2.
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than those that cause the generally blue appearance of the sky. Unlike smaller 
particles, larger particles scatter all light equally: this is the reason why clouds 
generally look white. Light cloud cover therefore dramatically reduces the Rayleigh 
scattering that occurs on clear days. But it does not eliminate it entirely. It is still a 
bit too blue.
Natural daylight which is a combination of direct sunlight and skylight -  
represented by the spectral power distribution of the C.I.E.’s fourth standard 
iUuminant, D65 -  is much better in this respect. Generally speaking, the effect of the 
slightly yellow sunlight cancels out the effect of the bluer skylight, the net result 
being that this phase of daylight is, to all intents and purposes, equal energy light.
The final two qualifications to the defence of natural daylight concern 
important limitations to the revelatory powers of even this illuminant. The second 
qualification is that natural daylight is only revelatory of the colours of reflective 
(and more generally light-modicative) objects. In response to the suggestion that an 
object’s ‘real’ colour is the colour that it looks to be to a normal observer in 
conditions of normal or standard illumination, for instance, Austin objects that there 
are a number of coloured things that this does not cover. What is the real colour of 
a bioluminescent fish that appears vividly multi-coloured at a depth of a thousand 
feet? Or what is the real colour of the sky, the sun or the moon: “We say that the 
sun in the evening sometimes looks red — well, what colour is it really? What are the 
‘conditions of standard illumination’ for the sun?”.43 With reference to this 
discussion, Hardin adds to this list stars and neon tubes, using the parenthetical 
rhetorical question, “Do some objects have their own special ‘standard conditions’ 
for viewing?”, to imply that he regards the project of specifying standard conditions 
with sufficient generality futile.44
This pessimism, however, is unfounded. For one thing, the class of light- 
modifying bodies is large enough, and of sufficient importance to us, for it to be 
significant that there is a non-arbitrary justification of our preference for natural 
daylight as an illuminant. From an ecological perspective, for instance, it is with 
naturally illuminated light-modifying material objects — food, drink, conspecifics, 
predators, natural landmarks — that we are primarily concerned. At the same time,
43 Austin 1962: 66.
44 Hardin 1988: 68-9.
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the other kinds of object do not anyway form as wildly a heterogeneous class as the 
remarks of Austin and Hardin suggest. Broadly speaking, objects can be divided into 
just two classes, depending upon whether they modify (reflect, refract, diffuse etc) 
or emit the light that reaches our eyes. The group of light-modifying objects 
contains medium sized dry goods, including the bioluminescent fish on the deck of 
the ship, the moon, the sky and clouds, along with transparent volumes. The group 
of light-emitting objects includes the stars, the sun, neon tubes and the 
bioluminescent fish in the sea at a depth of one thousand feet.
Generally speaking, light modifying objects need light to modify to exhibit 
their modificative behaviour. Moreover, for this behaviour to be revealed as it really 
is, the light that they modify should be equal energy white light (or else, as close to 
this as possible). The first group therefore pose no problems. Of course, we want to 
say that objects of the second kind can also be coloured. But this too is 
unproblematic. In particular, it does not require us to introduce as many different 
‘standard conditions’ as there are objects that emit light. An object’s propensity to 
emit light is revealed as it really is when the light that reaches the eye is the same as 
the light that the object emits. A light emitting object’s real colour is therefore that 
which it appears to have when the light that reaches the eye has not in anyway been 
distorted: when there is nothing in between the light source and the eye to modify 
the light, and no other competing light sources whose illumination can overpower, 
or otherwise interfere with, the light emitted by the object.
So, it makes sense to say that the sun is not really red when it is close to the 
horizon, for instance, because the light that it emits is modified by the intervening 
particles in the atmosphere; for the same reason, it is not really quite as yellow as it 
generally appears, either, as this is also the result of atmospheric scattering. The 
same holds for other light emitters. Night time is the best time at which to 
determine a star’s colour, for example, because during the day the light from a star is 
too weak to compete with the much more intense light from the sun. Similarly for 
neon tubes, and all other light emitters, including the bioluminescent fish.
The bioluminescent fish brings out the further point that the categories of 
light modifier and light emitter are not mutually exclusive: something can both 
modify light and emit it. But this is hardly any great cause for concern, either. The 
fact that objects can both emit and modify light does not show that the project of
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trying to specify standard conditions of perception for objects that do not modify 
light is fruitless. It just shows that there is more than one in which objects can be 
coloured. Qua light modifier, the fish is really a muddy sort of greyish white. Qua 
light emitter, it is really vividly multicoloured.
The third and final qualification concerning the defence of natural daylight is 
that even midday daylight on a clear day does not perfectly reveal an object’s 
colours. The spectral power distribution of natural daylight is neither perfectly 
smooth nor entirely flat. We therefore have to allow that there could be still better 
lighting conditions under which to determine an object’s real colour than natural 
daylight. This is not, however, a reductio of the naive view that colours are mind- 
independent properties. For instance, the situation is fundamentally disanalogous to 
the situation Berkeley argues we are in with respect to viewing distance. If nothing 
else, the non-arbitrary principle for deciding between different colour appearances 
does not render the majority of our ordinary colour ascriptions systematically false. 
The differences in colour appearance under natural daylight and actual equal energy 
white light will so negligible as to be practically irrelevant. Therefore, even if there 
was a slightly better illumination than natural daylight under which to determine an 
object’s real colour, this would not effect the truth of our ordinary coarse-grained 
colour judgments. But the fact that there could be a still better illumination than 
natural daylight under which to determine the real colours of objects is anyway to be 
expected. Accepting that some of our more precise colour judgements may be false 
is the price of accepting the common sense view that colours are mind-independent; 
it is the price we have to pay to avoid convicting common sense thought about 
colour of a much more pervasive error.
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[4] Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception
He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the Immensity 
of this Fabrick, and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable 
part o f it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Mansions of it, there 
may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties, he has as little 
Knowledge or Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath of the 
Senses or Understanding of a Man.
Locke 1690: II.ii.3
A non-negotiable commitment of the naive view that colours are mind-independent 
properties is that there is a sharp distinction between the colours objects really are 
and the colours they merely appear because of facts the situation in which they are 
perceived. The Argument from Perceptual Variation represents an attempt to 
undermine this distinction, and runs as follows:
Argument from Perceptual Variation
1. x appears to be F  and x appears to be G
2. x cannot be both F  and G
3. there is no non-arbitrary reason to regard either appearance as illusory
4. therefore, x is really neither F  nor G.2
So far I have argued that variations in the environmental conditions 
necessary for colour perception do not suffice to establish the argument’s 
eliminativist conclusion. Colour perception also varies dramatically, however, across 
both species and members of the same species. This profound variation across 
perceiving subjects should cause anyone who thinks that colours are genuinely 
mind-independent properties deep consternation. If colour perception varies so 
widely, who perceives colours as they really are?
I start in this chapter by considering between species variation. This kind of 
variation in colour perception is the most pronounced and will turn out to require 
different treatment to variations in perceived colour between members of the same 
species. Aside from contrasting inter-species variation with an extreme form of 
intra-species variation — colour blindness — in §4.3, consideration of differences in 
colour perception between human subjects is therefore postponed until Chapter 5. 
Details of differences in colour perception across the animal kingdom are spelt out 
in §4.1. In §4.2,1 argue that these variations do not threaten the common sense 
commitment to an appearance-reality distinction because the colours that members
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of different species perceive are determinates of different, mutually compatible, 
determinables. The contrast with extreme forms of intra-species variation in §4.3 
clarifies this response, underlining the difference between fauldess inter-species 
disagreements and cases of intra-species variation in which error occurs. This 
response is further clarified by contrasting it with relationist and New Realist 
responses to the inter-species variation in §4.4, where I suggest that we can avoid 
the revisionism of relationism and the excesses of New Realism by thinking of 
different perceivers as selecting different sets of mind-independent colour properties. 
Finally in §4.5,1 consider the sense in which the properties that different species 
select can properly be said to be colours at all.
1. Inter-Species Variation
Colour vision extends across the animal kingdom, differing dramatically from 
species to species. On the one hand, different species differ in the extent of their 
sensitivity to the electromagnetic spectrum. Humans are sensitive to light of 
between roughly 400 and 700 nanometres. The “visible window” for bees is shifted 
into the near ultra violet, ranging from 300 to 650nms. Still other creatures, like 
salmon, can perceive light in the infra-red region of the spectrum. And the visible 
window of some creatures, including diurnal birds like the pigeon, extends into both 
the ultra-violet and infra-red regions of the spectrum, spanning 350 to 720nms.
Cross-cutting differences in their sensitivity to regions of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, different species differ more fundamentally in the dimensionality of their 
colour vision. The human eye contains three types of retinal receptor, each sensitive 
to different, but overlapping, broadband spectral frequencies. As a result, humans 
are able to colour match any given spectral stimulus with just three appropriately 
chosen (visible-to-humans) spectral lights: usually lights of 460, 530 and 650 nms. In 
this sense, the human visual system is trichromatic. Human colour vision is not unique 
in being trichromatic — bees, macaque monkeys, and many other creatures also enjoy 
trichromatic colour vision. Trichromacy is, however, by no means standard. Cats, 
squirrels and rabbits, for instance are dichromatic, they have eyes that contain just two 
kinds of receptor, and so require just two appropriately chose spectral lights to 
match any given spectral stimulus. Monochromatic creatures lack chromatic colour
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vision entirely, being able to colour match any given spectral stimulus with any 
other. In contrast, pigeons, goldfish, and ducks have at least four types of retinal 
receptor. Consequendy, their colour vision is at least tetrachromatic, in the sense that it 
takes at least four appropriately chosen spectral lights to match any given spectral 
stimulus.1
In humans, the signals from the retinal receptors are processed in three 
neurophysiologically realised, opponentiy organised, psychophysical channels. The 
resulting colour experiences can be represented in a three-dimensional space, such 
that any colour sample a human perceives can be completely described in terms of 
the three values: hue, or how red, yellow, green or blue a sample is, saturation, how 
‘strong’ a colour is, and lightness, how black or white a colour is (§2.5). Although 
neither the physiology or psychophysics of colour vision in other species is known 
in as much detail, there is evidence to suggest that the signals from, for example, the 
pigeon’s retinal receptors are opponentiy processed in at least four 
neurophysiologically realised psychophysical channels, eventually giving rise to more 
kinds of colour experience than humans enjoy.
In the human case, for instance, the result of post-retinal opponent- 
processing is that human colours can be divided into two mutually exclusive classes. 
Corresponding to the three opponentiy organised psychophysical channels in which 
signals from the human retina are processed, human colour space contains six 
elemental colours: red, green, blue, yellow, black and white. The elemental colours 
enjoy a special psychological status. These colours admit of instances that are 
‘unique’, in the sense that they appear to contain no trace of any other colour. And 
taken together, the elemental colours are minimally sufficient for the description of 
any other colour sample: so, for instance, we can describe orange in terms of red 
and yellow, chartreuse in terms of yellow and green, pink in terms of red and white, 
grey in terms of black and white, and so on. N on-elemental colours — the binary hues 
orange, chartreuse, cyan and purple, the achromatic colour grey, and darkened or 
lightened hues like brown, olive, pink — do not enjoy the same landmark status. 
Non-elemental colours do not admit of instances that are unique; they are always 
perceived as a mixture of other colours. Moreover, the non-elemental colours are
1 For more details, see Jacobs 1981 and Thompson 1995: 141-60. Although for present purposes I 
assume that these details are correct, I sound a note o f caution later (§4.4).
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not generally sufficient for the description of all other colours: for instance, it is not 
so natural to describe red as a mixture of orange and purple as it is describe orange 
as a mixture of red and yellow.2
Corresponding to the extra psychophysical channel in which the signals from 
their extra kind of retinal receptor are processed, it is reasonable to suppose that 
pigeon colour space contains two more elemental colours than human colour space, 
bringing the total number of elemental colours that pigeons perceive to eight. This 
would bring with it a corresponding increase in the number of non-elemental 
colours that pigeons can perceive, and might even lead pigeons to perceive a 
completely different kind of colour, “ternary hues”, which are like our binary hues, 
but instead of being perceptual mixtures of two elemental chromatic colours, are 
perceptual mixtures of three elemental chromatic colours. Although I will suggest 
below that we need to be cautious about drawing direct comparisons between 
human colour vision and that of members of other species, at least for illustrative 
purposes, experiencing a ternary hue would be like experiencing something that is a 
perceptual mixture of red, green and blue.3
There is clearly something deeply unsettling about the thought that different 
species perceive colour so differently. If a human and a pigeon disagree about the 
colour of an object, the disagreement between them at least appears to be a 
disagreement about the colour of the very same object. To suppose otherwise would 
entail a deeply unattractive mind-dependence of objects, let alone colours. We 
therefore cannot deny premiss (1) of the Argument from Perceptual Variation. 
Moreover, neither is there obviously any non-arbitrary reason to prefer human 
colour vision to pigeon colour vision as revelatory of the real colours of objects. It 
therefore doesn’t look as though we can deny premiss (3) of the Argument from
2 The classification of green and brown within this framework raises questions. Probably as a result of 
familiarity with colour-mixing techniques, some Euro-American subjects refuse to class green as an 
elemental colour, maintaining that it can be further described in terms of yellow and blue. Goethe is a 
famous proponent of this view, claiming that “If yellow and blue, which we consider as the most 
fundamental and simple colours, are united as they first appear, in the first state of their action, the colour 
which we call green is the result”, 1810: §801; compare Berkeley 1707-8: §502 (discussed in §3.3). 
Conversely, subjects in some tests appear to class brown as an elemental colour. Given free use of colour 
terms, subjects tend to be unwilling to describe brown samples using any other terms than ‘brown’. The 
significance of these results is controversial, however, as subsequent tests by Quinn et al 1988 have shown 
that when told to describe a range of colour samples presented to them using only the terms black, white, 
red, yellow, green and blue, subjects consistently describe brown samples in terms of yellow and black. 
For more details, see §6.1.
3 Hardin 1988: 146, Thompson 1995: 158.
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Perceptual Variation, either. To privilege human colour vision would be chauvinistic 
and ad hoc, as it is a contingent fact that our visual system functions in the way that it 
does and not as the pigeon’s does. Indeed, if anything, it seems as though we should 
actually prefer the more colourful pigeon vision to human colour vision as 
revelatory of the true nature of colours, at least insofar as pigeons appear to perceive 
more colours than humans. To privilege pigeon colour vision, however, would be to 
give up in part what is attractive about the view that colours are mind-independent 
properties. Part of the motivation for defending the mind-independence of colour 
against the Argument from Perceptual Variation is to resist the perennially popular 
claim that our colour experience is inherently unreliable. Privileging the colour 
experience of pigeons is at least consistent with the general claim that colour 
perception is not necessarily misrepresentative. But this is hardly to the point. What 
we wanted was to justify the deliverances of our sensory experience.
Does it therefore follow that the colours members of different species 
perceive are in fact all equally apparent? Not yet. The Argument from Perceptual 
Variation requires that the properties ascribed to an object by different subjects are 
incompatible: it has to be the case that, contrary to appearances, the object cannot 
both be F and G. However, nothing has so far been said to suggest that the 
properties that pigeons and humans perceive are in fact incompatible in this way. If 
the colours that pigeons and humans perceive are mutually compatible, then the 
correct conclusion to draw from the argument from inter-species variation is not 
that both sets of colour appearance are equally apparent. It is that both sets of 
colour appearance are equally real.
2. Determinates and Determinables
Property ascriptions are only incompatible if the different properties ascribed are 
properties of the same kind. Properties of different kinds are not mutually exclusive. 
So, for instance, although objects cannot simultaneously be circular and square, they 
can be simultaneously red and square, moving and tall, beautiful and morally 
abhorrent.
The distinction between determinates and determinables represents a useful 
way of spelling this out. Associated with each determinable property are a number
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of, what Funkhouser has recently called, “dimensions of determination”.4 
Dimensions of determination are those respects in which determinates of a given 
determinable differ: in the case of human-colour, for instance, hue, saturation and 
lightness. The determination dimensions associated with a determinable property 
jointly define a property space in which any determinate of that determinable can be 
located. Incompatibility arises when the same object is assigned different sets of 
values along the same dimensions of determination, or, in other words, when it is 
ascribed properties that occupy different regions of the same property space.5
At least on the face of it, the property spaces in which the colours that 
members of different species perceive do indeed differ. Tetrachromatic pigeons 
perceive more colours than trichromatic humans, who, in turn, perceive more 
colours than dichromatic cats. The space defined by the colour properties that 
pigeons perceive is therefore larger than the space defined by the colours that 
humans or cats perceive. And by a simple application of Leibniz’s Law, it may now 
seem to follow that the properties that pigeons and humans perceive are just 
determinates of different determinables, and therefore mutually compatible.
As it stands, this is too quick. Bare difference in size of property space is not 
itself sufficient for sameness or difference of determinable property. All but the 
most general properties are determinate or determinable only relative to other 
properties. Properties that are themselves determinate relative to a more general 
determinable, however, are mutually incompatible. Take yellow and red, which are 
determinable relative to lemon yellow and scarlet respectively, but themselves 
determinate relative to human-colour. An object cannot simultaneously be yellow 
and red: determinates of the mid-level determinables yellow and red vary along the 
same dimensions of determination and consequently, the property spaces associated 
with the mid-level determinables yellow and red are both proper parts of the larger 
property space associated with the determinable property, human-colour. By parity 
of reasoning, there will therefore be a problem if it turns out that the determinable 
property human-colour is itself determinate relative to pigeon-colour, or perhaps, if 
both are determinate to a still higher-level super-determinable property, COLOUR. If 
human-colour is itself determinate relative to pigeon-colour, or both are determinate
4 Funkhouser 2005.
51 consider problems with less demanding ways o f spelling out sameness and difference of property-type 
in §5.1.
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relative to COLOUR, then an object could not be both human-coloured and pigeon- 
coloured, either. But is this the right way to think about colour?
For human-colour to determine pigeon-colour, and both to determine a 
super-determinable, COLOUR, human-colour space would have to be a proper subset 
of pigeon-colour space, and pigeon-colour space a proper subset of the space 
associated with COLOUR. Given that the property space associated with a 
determinable is defined by its dimensions of determination, this means that human- 
colours, pigeon-colours and colours more generally would all have to vary along the 
same dimensions of determination. On reflection, however, there is reason to 
suppose that the dimensions of determination along which, for instance, human- 
colours and pigeon-colours vary are actually very different. As such, it seems that the 
property spaces associated with human-colour and pigeon-colour are in fact wholly 
disjoint; in which case human-colour and pigeon-colour are themselves super- 
determinable properties.
Consider, first, hue. It is important to resist the often overwhelming 
temptation to think of pigeons simply perceiving the same hues that humans 
perceive plus some extras, consequent upon their increased spectral sensitivity and 
more complicated visual processing mechanisms. Even in the region of the 
spectrum to which humans and pigeons are both sensitive, the colours that humans 
and pigeons perceive differ markedly. Experiments by Wright and Cummings, for 
instance, suggest that pigeons perceive spectral light falling either side of 540nms as 
completely different in hue. Humans, in contrast, perceive 540nms light as green- 
yellow. Whilst 540nms therefore marks a boundary between pigeon hues, it doesn’t 
mark a boundary between human hues.6
To say 540nms marks a ‘hue boundary’ for pigeons already threatens to 
stretch the meaning of the word ‘hue’ to breaking point. Hue is standardly defined 
in terms of the human hues that lie around the human hue circle: the definition of 
hue standardised by the International Commission on Illumination (the C.I.E.), for 
instance, is that “Attribute of visual sensation that has given rise to the colour 
names, such as: blue, green, yellow, red, purple etc”.7 By this definition, a dimension
6 Wright and Cummings 1971. For discussion, see Jacobs 1981: 117-8, and Thompson 1995: 150-1.
7 See Hardin 1988: 212.
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of determination along which there are colours that have no location on the human 
hue circle is not a dimension of hue at all.
Of itself, this definitional point does not go very deep. The C.I.E. definition 
of hue is best seen as an attempt to regiment colour vocabulary for use in narrowly 
circumscribed situations, and cannot just be taken as an authoritative guide to its use 
outside of those contexts. Indeed, the C.I.E. definition betrays the scientist’s latent 
eliminativism, defining ‘hue’ as ‘an attribute of visual sensation’: but of course, this is 
not what the vulgar mean by this term, who use ‘hue’ to refer to an attribute of 
material objects. Still, there is an important underlying point that the C.I.E. usage, 
perhaps unwittingly, picks up on. This is that the circular structure of the dimension 
hue precludes the possibility of any extra hues being added along this dimension: 
there is no point on the human hue circle at which any extra hues could be simply 
slotted in. The hue circle is a closed space in which every region is occupied. The 
only way to accommodate the extra colours along the dimension of hue would be by 
widening the hue circle. But distances on the hue circle represent in extrinsic, spatial 
terms, internal relations of similarity between the colours: relations in which a 
property must stand to be that very property. By changing the distances between 
properties on the hue circle, you change the internal relations that the hue circle 
represents, and you thereby change the properties that lie on that circle. The extra 
colours that pigeons perceive therefore cannot be located on our hue dimension. If 
pigeon-colour space is a three-dimensional space, then its third dimension is not hue.
It is important to note in this respect that hue cannot just be identified with 
“dominant wavelength”, either: the colorimetric property which specifies the 
wavelength of the monochromatic light that would colour-match the object (or 
stimulus) when suitably mixed with a specified achromatic light. Dominant 
wavelength is a psychophysical property that is independent of the nature of the 
subject performing the colour match. Although we can therefore direcdy compare 
the dominant wavelengths of objects for members of different species, dominant 
wavelengths are not hues. Dominant wavelengths, for instance, do nothing to 
explain the circular structure of the hues. If dominant wavelengths were hues, then 
we should expect samples with dominant wavelengths of 400nms and 700nms, lying 
at either end of the human visible window, to look maximally different. However,
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dark blue and dark red, the human hues with which these wavelengths are 
associated, actually lie next to each other on the hue circle.
Ignoring the problems to which the experiments by Wright and Cummings 
point, it might at least seem possible that the extra colours pigeons are supposed to 
perceive should lie along a fourth dimension of determination, such that the pigeon’s 
colour space is a four-dimensional space in which three of the four dimensions are 
identical to those of human-colour space.8 It is certainly true that not all 
determinable properties come with a fixed number of determination dimensions. 
Consider shape. Triangles, squares and pentagons are all shapes. Because these 
figures all have different numbers of sides, each figure requires a different number 
of determination dimensions depending on how many sides it has. Again following 
Funkhouser, we can therefore say that at least some super-determinables come, not 
with a limited number of determination dimensions, but with “a schema for 
producing such determination dimensions”: in the case of shape, for instance, that 
for each side an object has there is another determination dimension that represents 
that side’s length.9 If this is the right model on which to understand the relationship 
between human-colour and pigeon-colour, then clearly the problem of 
incompatibility resurfaces: just as nothing can be simultaneously triangular and 
square, so nothing could be simultaneously human-coloured and pigeon-coloured.
Colour, however, is crucially unlike shape in this respect. In particular, there 
is no analogue of the determination dimension schema for shape in the case of 
colour. In the geometrical case, the schema for producing dimensions of 
determination allows us to move between mid-level determinables simply by adding 
in more dimensions of the same kind. When, for instance, we move from triangles to 
quadrilaterals, we simply add in an extra determination dimension for the extra side 
that quadrilaterals have. This determination dimension does not differ in kind to the 
dimensions that we are already working with, and in respect of which triangles vary: 
it is just an extra dimension of side length to correspond to the quadrilateral’s extra 
side.
8 This is how Thompson tries to make sense of the existence of novel colours: “whereas we are 
trichromats and have a colour space of three dimensions, Fred [who sees novel colours] is a tetrachromats 
and has a four dimensional colour-hyperspace”, 1992: 336.
9 Funkhouser 2005.
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We cannot move between multi-dimensional colour spaces in the same way, 
however. Just consider the three-dimensional human-colour space (Figure 2.4). The 
three dimensions of human-colour space each differ fundamentally in kind. Were we 
to try to move to three-dimensional chromatic colour space from a one-dimensional 
achromatic colour space by adding in more dimensions of the same kind, we would 
add in dimensions with absolute beginning and end points, like the achromatic 
dimension lightness that begins with black and ends with white. We cannot 
extrapolate the dimension hue in this way, however. The dimension hue is not 
conceptually bipolar, but circular: there are no absolute beginnings or endings, but 
rather each part eventually shades into every other. Unlike hue, saturation is at least 
a bipolar dimension of variation: colour samples vary from maximal saturation at the 
circumference of the hue circle to unsaturated at the central achromatic axis. 
Nevertheless, saturation is also a very different dimension of determination from 
both lightness and hue, something reflected in the fact that the dimensions of hue 
and lightness are conceptually much easier to grasp than saturation. Differences in 
lightness and hue are typically thought of as variations in ‘colour’, whereas 
differences in saturation are more usually thought of just as differences in one and 
the same colour. Indeed, saturation is defined as variation in the ‘strength’ of a 
colour.10
The extra colours that pigeons perceive therefore cannot be located on our 
hue circle, nor is there any obvious determination dimension schema that would 
allow us to generate extra dimensions on which to locate these properties, either. 
The determination dimension hue is, as such, unique to human colour space: 
whatever analogous dimension of determination pigeon colours may vary along, it is 
not hue. Clearly, given that saturation is defined in terms of hue, saturation is unique 
to human colour space if and only if hue is. But what about the third dimension of 
human colour space: lightness? Can’t we at least imagine a colour space that differs 
to ours in respect of hue and saturation, but still contains the achromatic colours: 
black, white and grey?
Even if we grant that there could be a colour space that differs from ours in 
all its dimensions of determination except lightness, this would fall short of
10 More precisely, it is defined by the C.I.E as “Attribute of a visual sensation which permits a judgement 
to be made of the proportion of pure chromatic colour [i.e. hue] in the total sensation”, Hardin 1988:
214.
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establishing outright the incompatibility of human-colours with colours of this other 
kind. It would not follow that human-colour space is a proper part of, for instance, 
pigeon-colour space, or that both occupy regions of a still larger space associated 
with a super-determinable property, COLOUR. At best, it would show only that these 
spaces share a common dimension of determination. And this is not so obviously 
problematic. Besides, it is not clear we should even concede this much. Just because 
the achromatic colours enjoy a greater conceptual independence from the chromatic 
colours, it doesn’t follow that they are therefore metaphysically independent. To 
suppose that there could be a colour space that differs from ours in respect of hue 
and saturation, but still contains the achromatic colours, begs the question against 
the view that the relations in which colours stand are logically necessary internal 
relations; that colours could not but stand in precisely the relations in which they 
actually stand. Perhaps all the act of conception amounts to is conceiving of certain 
human-colours that necessarily bear internal relations to red, green, blue and so on, 
without at the same time conceiving of these further human-colours. But this offers 
no support to the claim that black, white and grey could be internally related to other 
colours."
There is reason to suppose, then, that the dimensions of determination along 
which human-colours and pigeon-colours are just different. Given that determinable 
properties are defined by their dimensions of determination, this means that human- 
colour and pigeon-colour are themselves super-determinable properties: as W.E. 
Johnston, who coined the determinate-determinable terminology would say, they are 
distinguished by the complete “otherness” of their determinates.12 And if this right, 
then the colours that different species perceive are not, as the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation requires, incompatible. They are just determinates of different, 
mutually compatible, determinables.
11 Compare Hilbert and Kalderon 2000: 206ff. In saying that the relations between colours are internal 
relations, it does not follow that we can know what relations a colour stands in simply from prior 
acquaintance with that property. It is supposed to be metaphysically necessary that colours stand in 
certain similarity relations, not analytic.
12 1921 i: 175-6. It should be noted that Johnston himself simply assumes that human-colour is a super- 
determinable property, and does not consider whether there might be other colours that differ along 
different dimensions of determination.
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3. Colour Blindness
In advance of a more detailed discussion of inter-personal differences in colour 
perception in Chapter 5, it will help to clarify this response to the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation to compare inter-species variation with a pronounced case of 
intra-species variation: human colour blindness.
Ignoring more unusual cases of cortical colour blindness, colour blindness 
occurs because of defects in at least one of the three cone types found in the retinas 
of normal human observers. Red-green colour-blind deuteranopes, who comprise 
roughly 1.4% of the human population, for instance, lack pigments in their M cones 
(cones sensitive to medium-wavelength light of roughly 430-640nms). Red-green 
colour-blind protanopes, who comprise roughly 1.2% of the human population, in 
contrast, lack L cone pigments (cones sensitive to long-wavelength light of roughly 
450-675nms). The very rare yellow-blue colour-blind tritanopes, who only comprise 
about 0.0015% of the human population, lack S cone pigments (cones that are 
sensitive to short-wavelength light of roughly 400-520nms). Finally, monochromats, 
who comprise only about 0.005% of the human population, have either just one 
kind of functioning retinal cone — typically an S cone — or, more usually, lack any 
cone function at all, and rely solely upon the use of the retinal rods that are used in 
normal trichromatic subjects for night-time vision.13
Objects that on a given occasion are visually indiscriminable for a colour 
blind subject are not thereby absolutely indescriminable. The phenomenon of 
metamerism means that objects that appear identical in colour under one 
illumination can appear different in colour under another, if the different illuminants 
accentuate differences in the objects’s surface reflectance properties. This, in turn, 
can allow people who are colour blind to make many of the same colour distinctions 
as their trichromatic counterparts. Under illuminants whose spectral power 
distribution is weighted towards the higher wavelength red part of the visible 
spectrum (illuminants with a ‘low colour temperature’), for instance, colour blind 
subjects can often distinguish red and greens, and purples and blues, that are 
indiscriminable in full natural daylight, given that red objects typically reflect a 
greater proportion of long wavelength light than green objects, and purple objects
13 For details see Jacobs 1981, Hurvich 1981 and Boynton and Kaiser 1996.
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reflect a greater proportion of long wavelength than blue objects. Illuminating 
objects with light whose spectral power distribution is skewed in favour of the lower 
wavelength blue part of the spectrum (illuminants with a ‘high colour temperature’) 
has the same effect, but for the opposite reasons.14
Still, people who are colour blind cannot make all the same colour 
distinctions as their normal trichromatic counterparts. Even so, it does not follow 
that people who are colour blind thereby perceive colour properties that differ in 
kind to the properties perceived by normal trichromatic humans. Properties differ in 
kind if they are located in differently structured property spaces. Although colour 
blind subjects cannot make the same colour distinctions as their normal trichromatic 
counterparts, and so the properties they perceive define a smaller property space 
than full human-colour space, this doesn’t that they thereby differ in kind. Bare 
difference in size of colour space is not sufficient for difference of colour property. 
What sets these more extreme cases of intra-species variation apart from inter­
species variations is that colour blind subjects perceive properties that vary along the 
same dimensions of determination as the colours perceived by normal trichromatic 
subjects.
The term ‘colour blind’ is potentially misleading in this respect. It can seem 
to imply that people who are (to use what is perhaps a better term) colour deficient 
lack any perceptual access to the colours perceived by normal human subjects, just as 
subjects who are blind lack any perceptual access to the visual world. But we know — 
from people who acquire colour deficiencies later in life, cases of unilateral 
dichromacy in which subjects are born with one normal and one abnormal eye, 
reports from standard dichromatic subjects and educated guesswork — that this is 
just not the case. The colours that colour blind subjects perceive are a subset of 
those perceived by normal trichromatic subjects.15
The majority of colour blind humans — red-green colour blind deuteranopes 
— for instance, in fact appear to experience only a greater or lesser degree of 
‘collapse’ of the red-green dimension of normal trichromatic colour space. At least
14 Hurvich 1981: 250. At the 2005 European Society for Philosophy and Psychology Conference, Justin 
Broackes suggested that people who are colour-blind can therefore exploit differences in the spectral 
composition of (blue) skylight and (yellow) direct sunlight to perceive the colours of objects.
15 For discussion, see Kaiser and Boynton 1996: 452-5. Malebranche mentions something that sounds like 
it might be a case of unilateral dichromacy, suggesting that there are “people who see certain objects 
yellow with one eye and as green or blue with the other”, 1674-5: 66. Whether Malebranche was really 
aware of this condition, or whether he was just saying this for rhetorical force, however, is not clear.
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under favourable perceptual conditions, they do not even lack entirely the ability to 
distinguish between red and green: they lack merely the ability to make the full range 
of fine-grained red-green distinctions available to normal human subjects.16 Even 
human subjects whose colour vision is genuinely less than trichromatic, in the sense 
that they require less than three appropriately chosen spectral lights to colour match 
any given spectral stimulus, however, still see a subset of the colours perceived by 
normal human observers. Red-green colour blind protanopes, for instance, can at 
least see the same yellows and blues as normal trichromatic subjects. The much less 
common blue-yellow colour blind tritanopes can at least see the same reds and 
greens as normal trichromatic perceivers. And even wholly monochromatic subjects 
at least perceive the same achromatic colours as normal subjects.
This last point is worth stressing, as the achromatic colours typically receive a 
very bad press. Since the seventeenth century — and Newton’s work on light in 
particular — it has come to seem little more than scientifically ‘enlightened’ common 
sense to suppose that the achromatic colours black and white are not really colours 
at all. According to this way of thinking, black is said to be ‘the absence of all colour’ 
and white ‘the simultaneous presence of all colour’. The extent of the prejudice 
against the achromatic colours is revealed by even the briefest survey of the 
literature on Mary, Jackson’s omniscient scientist raised in an entirely achromatic 
environment. Lewis’s description of Mary’s predicament is wholly representative:
Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived from birth in a cell where everything is black or
white.. .But she doesn’t know what it’s like to see colour.17
Clearly, the only way that Mary could have been raised in a cell where 
everything is black and white and not know what its like to see colour is if black and 
white are not themselves colours.18 Whatever else might be wrong with this view of 
colour — and we shall see in §6.2 that there is a lot else wrong with this view of 
colour — it is at least false to the phenomenology of achromatic colour perception.
16 Shepard 1992: 333, 338.
17 Lewis 1988: 500.
18 Incidentally, it would be better here to say, not ‘know what its like to see colour’, but ‘know what the 
colours seen are like’. Generally speaking, it is odd that the knowledge argument should be thought to be 
an argument for the existence of intrinsic non-physical properties of conscious subjects, when what Mary has 
never before perceived are (seemingly non-physical) properties of material objects (i.e. colours). See also the 
discussion of spectral inversion in §6.5.
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When we say that monochromats do not perceive the colours that normal 
trichromatic subjects perceive, we are not saying that monochromats perceive 
objects as colourless. We are saying merely that they perceive some, but not all, of the 
colours that normal human subjects perceive.
The achromatic colours (the clue here is in the question: the achromatic 
colours) are perceived to bear the same relationship to the surfaces of material objects 
as the hues yellow, red, green and blue. Like these hues, they come in degrees (or 
shades). They can be mixed with the hues to create new colours: pink is whitened 
red, olive blackened green, brown blackened yellow. Indeed, we can even formulate 
a version of the knowledge argument for the achromatic colours. Consider Mary’s 
sister, Katy. Like Mary, Katy knows everything there is know about the physics of 
colour and colour perception. Like Mary, Katy has had a sheltered upbringing. 
Where Mary and Katy differ is just that, whereas Mary has only ever seen black and 
white, Katy has only ever seen the maximally saturated colours that lie around the 
circumference of the hue circle. If Mary learns something new when she leaves her 
purely achromatic environment, then surely Katy also learns something new when 
she leaves her purely chromatic environment.19
The important point to stress here is that the property spaces defined by the 
properties perceived by colour blind subjects and normal subjects are not disjoint in 
the way the spaces defined by the properties perceived by members of different 
species are. Intra-personal differences in colour perception, like those that arise in 
cases of colour blindness, cannot just be faultless disagreements. The colours that 
members of different species perceive are mutually compatible because they are just 
determinates of different determinables. The properties that members of the same 
species perceive, in contrast, vary along the very same dimensions of determination, 
and therefore occupy regions of the same property space. As such, they are 
determinates of the very same determinables. Consequently, the response to the 
Argument from Perceptual Variation made in relation to inter-species differences 
does not carry over to the intra-species case. We cannot just deny premiss (2).
19 Compare Locke’s response to Descartes’s claim that blackness is a mere ‘privation’ in objects: “A 
Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath the Ideas of White and Black, and other 
Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the 
Philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their Natures, and thinks he knows far either of  
them is in its cause positive or privative”, 1690: II.viii.3.
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The crucial difference between inter- and intra-species variations is that in 
cases of intra-species variation, the idea of error gets a grip. The question of how we 
should apportion error in more common or garden cases of intra-species variation is 
discussed in Chapter 5, but at least with respect to the extreme intra-species 
variation in colour perception that we get between normal and colour blind subjects, 
there is a clear a non-arbitrary reason to suppose that normal trichromatic perceivers 
have a better insight into the real colours of objects than their colour deficient 
counterparts: we can therefore deny premiss (3) of the Argument from Perceptual 
Variation instead. Although it is not an especially far reaching disability, colour 
blindness is not called colour blindness for nothing. There is nothing chauvinistic or 
ad hoc about this, either, as it is not just that people who are colour blind are 
deficient with respect to the normal colour perceiving population. People who are 
colour blind are deficient even by the standards of their own psychology.
In cases of colour blindness which are the result of retinal abnormalities, the 
higher level processing mechanisms associated with colour experience generally 
remain intact. As a result, the innate capacity for experiencing the full range of 
human-colours remains, even if this capacity is never actually realised. Experiments 
by Shepard and Cooper on the representation of colours in the blind, colour blind 
and normally sighted, for instance, show that colour blind subjects at least grasp the 
basic structure of normal human colour space, even if the colours that they actually 
perceive define a degenerate version of this space. Shepard and Cooper asked 
subjects to judge the similarities amongst different hues, first when pairs of those 
hues were actually presented, and second when those hues were merely named. 
Whilst in the first case the judgements of colour blind subjects (red-green colour 
blind deuteranopes and protanopes in particular) yielded a degenerate version of the 
hue circle, in which two of the sides were collapsed together, the results of the 
colour naming task were by and large the same across the colour blind and normal 
trichromats alike.
Although, as Shepard and Cooper themselves point out, it possible that the 
grasp of the structure of colour space that the colour blind display represents 
nothing more than a prolonged exposure to the linguistic practices of normally 
sighted trichromatic subjects, there is reason to resist so superficial an explanation. 
Even though colour blind subjects are unable to naturally perceive the range of
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colours that normal subjects perceive, they at least appear to still have the latent 
capacity to enjoy experiences of this kind. Otherwise unperceivable colour 
experiences can, for instance, be induced in colour blind subjects using Benham 
disks: half-black, half-white disks that when rotated (at about 6-8Hz) generate 
“subjective colours” which appear as desaturated bands of different hues, depending 
on the exact speed of the disk. Indeed, Shepard and Cooper even report that one 
particularly articulate protanope, although unable to distinguish between red and 
green objects that are presented to him, claimed to at least be able to imagine the 
vivid reds and greens that normal trichromatic subjects perceive.20
The reason why people who are colour blind do not form a different species 
of colour perceiver is that their colour vision is frustrated by defects in their 
physiology. Their colour vision is deficient with respect to the colours that they are 
designed more generally to perceive; or, to use a metaphor that I will explain in 
more detail in the next section, their visual system as a whole selects properties that 
deficiencies in their perceptual apparatus render them unable to perceive. By the 
standards of their own psychology, we should therefore prefer the colour experience 
of normal trichromatic subjects to that of subjects who are colour blind.21
4. Selectionism
In response to inter-species differences in colour perception, I have been arguing 
that we should reject premiss (2) of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, which 
states that the properties ascribed to an object by members of different species are 
incompatible. It will help to get a still clearer grasp of what this amounts to by
20 For details, see Shepard 1992: 338-9. It is therefore not necessarily true to say, as Hardin does, that “a 
true red-green dichromat...can form no notion of [red and green] beyond an appreciation of their 
functional role in the lives of others”, 1988:145.
21 It has been suggested that some female humans may, like pigeons, be tetrachromatic. On the basis of 
differences in spectral sensitivity (see §5.2), the long-wavelength cone in males is sometimes thought to be 
polymorphous; it is sometimes thought that there are, in effect, two different kinds of long-wavelength 
cone amongst the male population. If this is right, then it seems possible that there might be 
heterozygous women who possess four cone-types in total: both long-wavelength cone types, in addition 
to short- and middle-wavelength cones (Mollon 1992). If this were the case, then these ‘superwomen’ 
might stand in the same relation to normal trichromatic subjects that normal trichromatic subjects stand 
in to true dichromats: there would be colours that are forever hidden from the male sight. It should be 
stressed, however, that is all highly speculative. As things stand, there is no hard empirical evidence for 
the existence of human tetrachromacy. Indeed, it is debatable even whether there are two types of long- 
wavelength cone in the male population at all (see, for instance, Jordan and Mollon 1995). The jury is still 
out on this one.
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comparing this response to two other responses to the Argument from Perceptual 
Variation that deny the same premiss.
Premiss (2) of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, for instance, is the 
premiss that relatdonists about colour reject in response to all forms of variation. 
Does this mean that, at least with respect to inter-species variation, this view 
collapses into relationism? In his ‘Relationist Manifesto’, for instance, Jonathon 
Cohen argues cases of inter-species variation show that we should adopt “the 
ecumenical policy that both sorts of visual systems are right, and that one and the 
same object can have more than one color property”. According to Cohen, 
however, this is tantamount to treating colours as relational properties, properties 
that are “constituted in terms of relations between objects and subjects”.22 Cohen’s 
relationalism isn’t as strong as the relationism that Berkeley uses the Argument from 
Perceptual Variation to try to establish: whereas Berkeley thinks that a colour 
experience logically implies the existence of the property that it is an experience of, 
Cohen at least tries to allow for the possibility of colour illusion (whether he is 
actually able to accommodate it is another question; see §5.1). Still, if Cohen is right 
that to adopt an ecumenical policy towards colour is to be a relationist about colour, 
then we haven’t evaded the force of the Argument from Perceptual Variation after 
all.
Fortunately, saying that different species perceive determinates of different 
determinable colour properties is not inconsistent with the claim that these 
properties are genuinely mind-independent. To call a property mind-independent is 
to say at least that we can make sense of its unperceived existence: that we can make 
sense of its persistence through gaps in our observation of it because, for example, 
the conditions necessary for its perception do not hold. What this requires is that we 
have a way of thinking of the property that is at least one step removed from our 
sensory experience of it: as Evans puts it, that we are able to recognise the “implicit 
duality” of our experiences of it (§2.1). Saying merely that different species perceive 
determinates of different determinable colour properties is not to say that these 
properties could not exist unperceived. Quite the opposite. It is grasping the fact 
that these properties are determinates of different determinables that puts us in a 
position to grasp their mind-independent existence in the first place.
22 Cohen 2005.
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As we have already seen, our grasp of mind-independent existence depends 
in part upon our grasp of the internal relations of similarity and difference in which 
determinates of a determinable stand, and which marks them out as determinates of 
that very determinable. We can think about shapes at one step removed from our 
sensory experience of shape, for instance, by thinking abstracdy about the internal 
relations of similarity and difference that hold between determinates of the 
determinable shape. For example, we can think about shapes in terms of the 
equations of analytic geometry, representing similarities and differences between 
shapes in the similarities and differences in the equations that we use to describe 
these shapes: the greater similarity between circles and ellipses than between circles 
and squares, for example, can be represented by the greater similarity between the 
equations used to describe circles, ellipses and squares. Similarly for colours. At least 
in part what grounds our conception of colours as mind-independent properties that 
are there to be experienced is our grasp of the similarities and differences between 
determinates of the determinable, colour. We can think in fairly abstract terms about 
determinate colours in terms of the relations of similarity and difference in which 
different determinate colours stand: that, for instance, yellow is more like orange 
than red. As with shape, this gives us the way of thinking of colours at one step 
removed from our sensory experience of colour necessary for grasping the 
continued existence of colours in the absence of the enabling conditions of colour 
experiences. In other words, it is by grasping the relations constitutive of what it is 
for properties to be determinates of the same determinable that at once allows us to 
recognise that different species perceive determinates of mutually compatible 
determinables, and that these properties are robustly mind-independent.
This is something that a traditional way of pointing to a disanalogy between 
colour and shape tends to obscure. For instance, following a suggestion by 
Johnston, Wright suggests that the crucial difference between shape and colour is 
reflected in how we read biconditionals of the form:
x is F iff x would look F to standard observers in normal conditions.
When the value of ‘F’ is ‘square’, Wright suggests that we should accord priority to 
the left hand side of this biconditional, so that it follows from something’s being
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square that it is such as to look square in normal conditions. Wright calls this a 
detectivist reading of the biconditional: looking square in normal conditions represents 
a way of detecting whether or not squareness is present. When the value of ‘F’ is 
‘yellow’, however, Wright suggests that the priority should be accorded instead to 
the right hand side of the biconditional, so that it follows from something’s such as 
to look yellow in normal conditions that it is yellow. This is called a projectivist 
reading of the biconditional: looking yellow in normal conditions is just what it is to 
be yellow.23
What difference there is between colour and shape, however, is not 
adequately captured by the detectivist-projectivist distinction. Crucially, these 
options are not exhaustive: there is a third way between detection and projection, 
selection. According to the selection view, colours are not projected because they exist 
in the absence of the relevant kinds of response. But neither are they just detected, 
because they are not properties that just anyone can perceive. Instead they are 
selected, in the sense that which kind of colour property a subject perceives is 
determined by facts about the nature of that subject.24
The key to the selection metaphor is not to think of colours as somehow 
‘springing into existence’ in the presence of appropriate perceiving subjects. If a 
necessary condition of the existence of colours is the existence of subjects to 
perceive them, this would make colours strongly mind-dependent. But this is not 
how the selectionist thinks of colours. On the selection view, colours exist 
independent of human subjects: even if there never had been, nor ever would be any 
human perceivers, colours would still exist; they would just never have been 
perceived. To borrow an Aristotelian analogy used by Pritchard, the relation of 
colour to perceiver is less like that of patient to doctor, and more like that of sick 
person to doctor. Whilst the existence of a patient implies the existence of doctor 
whose patient he is, the existence of a sick man implies only the possible existence of 
someone to doctor him. Likewise, the existence of colours does not imply the actual
23 1992: 108-39.
24 The selection metaphor is explicitly employed by Hilbert and Kalderon 2000. In his discussion of 
Hilbert and Kalderon, Shoemaker 2003 is at least sympathetic to the idea. Wiggins 1987 can perhaps be 
read as proposing a kind of selectionism, and, despite his insistence that colours are relational properties, 
Thompson’s 1995 “enactive” theory of colour at least has a certain theoretical affinity.
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existence of an appropriate colour perceiver, but only the possibility of an appropriate 
colour perceiver.25
Avoiding the spectre of relationism, however, raises a different worry. 
Relationists about colour are not the only section of the philosophical community to 
reject premiss (2) of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, the claim that the 
different colours objects appear to have are incompatible. In response to the so- 
called ‘brick-bat’ conception of reality, for instance, the New Realists of the early 
twentieth century suggested that objects might really have as many colours are there 
are colours that they appear to be. For the New Realists, what exists is just what we 
experience to exist. As T. Percy Nunn, a British sympathiser of the New Realist 
movement, puts it: “Only empirical experience can decide what qualities it is 
possible, and what it is impossible, for a body to wear together”.26
The highly inclusive conception of reality with which New Realism ends up 
is ultimately too extravagant to be taken seriously (§3.4). But the same might appear 
to be true of the current response to the Argument from Perceptual Variation. 
Doesn’t this also over-populate the material world with as many different types of 
colour property as there are species to select them? It would be churlish to deny that 
there are points of contact between the current proposal and New Realism, 
especially with respect to the suggestion that perceptual experience can reliably 
function as criterion of ontological commitment. But this should not blind us to 
what are nevertheless substantial differences.
The first thing to stress is that the selection view is in general far less excessive 
than its New Realist counterpart. Like relationism, New Realism offers a wholly 
general response to the Argument from Perceptual Variation. All kinds of variation 
are treated in exactly the same manner; the difference between the relationist and the 
New Realist is just that the New Realist does not think it necessary to denigrate in 
any way the properties objects really have when they appear a certain way. Because, 
in contrast, selectionism is only presented as a response to the inter-species version 
of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, however, it lacks this generality. 
According to the selectionist, objects do not in general have as many colour (or
25 1909: 129.
26 1909-10: 208.
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appearance) properties as there are ways in which they appear. They have a more 
limited stock of properties that sometimes appear other than they really are.
With more specific reference to inter-species variation, the excesses of the 
selectionist proposal are not necessarily so wild. For one thing, the extent to which 
colour vision actually varies across the animal kingdom is something of an unknown 
quantity, and so could turn out to be a lot less than initially expected. Comparative 
ecology is not an exact science. Short of actually perceiving the world from another 
creature’s perspective, we cannot definitively know what that experience is like: 
outside of fairytales, for instance, no creatures subsequently acquire the colour 
vision enjoyed by other species in the way that human subjects can acquire colour 
vision defects later in life. The best that we can do to determine how other species 
perceive colour is to hazard a guess based on certain kinds of third personal 
information. The stock of information on which we can rely, however, radically 
underdetermines the answers to the questions in which we are interested.
Consider the dimensionality of colour vision: the feature of vision that is 
determined by the number of types of retinal receptor the perceiver possesses, and is 
operationally defined in terms of the number of spectral lights it takes to a subject to 
colour match any given spectral stimulus (§4.1). I have followed the majority of 
visual scientists in assuming that, for instance, pigeon colour vision is at least 
tetrachromatic. But as Shepard points out, this assumption raises serious 
methodological questions. Direct anatomical investigation of other colour perceivers 
is hampered by significant physiological differences in all but the most closely 
related species. The retinal receptors of pigeons, as well as some fish, amphibians 
and reptiles, for instance, contain oil droplets in addition to the pigments also found 
in mammalian retina, the functional significance of which can only be indirectly 
inferred. Even assuming that we have correctly identified all the relevant receptor 
types, the discovery of types of retinal receptor is anyway only an imprecise guide to 
the dimensionality of vision. On the one hand, the signals from two or more 
different types of retinal receptor may subsequently be combined in just one post- 
retinal channel. On the other hand, there may be types of retinal receptor than have 
no relevant functional significance at all. Indeed, the trichromatic human retina itself 
contains not three, but four kinds of retinal receptor -  three types of cone, plus rods 
that are traditionally thought to form part of distinct visual system for low-
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illumination vision. More direct psychophysical techniques for determining the 
dimensionality of a pigeon’s colour vision face more practical difficulties. For 
instance, we can hardly ask pigeons to themselves adjust a number of different lights 
to create a colour match for a spectral stimulus. At best we can only train them to 
respond appropriately when presented with colour samples that are indiscriminable. 
And, if nothing else, this makes accurately determining the dimensionality of 
another creature’s vision an exceptionally laborious task.27
Moreover, it is not anyway with low-level features of colour vision that we 
are ultimately concerned, but with the psychology of the colour experiences to which 
these low-level mechanisms give rise. It is the phenomenobgy of experience that 
determines whether or not two appearances conflict: whether an object 
simultaneously appears to have two properties that have a location in the same 
phenomenologically defined property space. For all we know, there may be 
countless ways of realising phenomenologically identical colour experiences. 
Differences in lower-level mechanisms, for instance, may simply be cancelled out by 
higher-level processing; certainly amongst human perceivers, there indeed appears to 
be a considerable amount of functional plasticity in the neurophysiological 
realisation of our processing mechanisms (for more details, see §5.3). Just because 
different species differ physiologically, it doesn’t necessarily mean that their 
experiences differ phenomenologically. Indeed, the bare presence of low-level 
perceptual mechanisms probably does not guarantee the existence of perceptual 
experience at all. It seems reasonable to suppose that some of the more basic creatures 
that are sensitive to variations in light lack any phenomenology at all.28
More generally, the selection view is not just a license to print money where 
colours are concerned. Different species select different sets of properties to be 
colours depending on the nature of their perceptual system. The human perceptual 
system is such that it selects properties that differ along the dimensions of hue, 
saturation and brightness. Maybe the pigeon’s perceptual system is such that it 
selects a different set of colours. But the choice of perceptual system is probably 
not, in the first place, wholly unconstrained. The kind of perceptual system an 
animal has is not a purely arbitrary matter, but itself depends in part upon the nature
27 Shepard 1992: 334-6.
28 Hilbert 1992. John Campbell made a similar point in a paper at the 2005 European Society for 
Philosophy and Psychology Conference.
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of the environment in which it evolves. As Shepard stresses, it is unlikely that the 
distinctive phenomenology of colour experience is simply a product of accidental 
features of the human visual system. It is much more plausible to suppose that it 
represents an adaptation to regularities in the terrestrial world. Indeed, in the case of 
trichromatic colour vision in primates, for instance, it is widely believed that colour 
vision evolved in response to, and in conjunction with, the evolution of coloured 
fruits such as mangoes, bananas and fruits in the citrus family.29 If so, then there is a 
dual dependence of subjects and objects. Which properties are selected will depend 
upon the nature of the selecting perceptual system. The nature of the selecting 
system will in turn depend upon the nature of the properties in their evolutionary 
environment that are there to be selected. In effect, the two will, to use David 
Wiggins’s term, be coeval,I30
5. The Unity of Colour
I have been arguing that differences in colour perception across species are faultless 
disagreements because the colour properties that members of different species 
perceive are just determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. But 
if the properties that different species perceive really are determinates of different 
determinables, then why say that they are colours at all?
Wittgenstein remarked of someone who could perceive novel colours that “it 
is by no means clear that we must say of them.. .that they know other colouri\ With 
this in mind, it is often suggested that it is constitutive of a property’s being a colour 
that it bear some internal resemblance relation to a property that has a location 
within human-colour space.31 According to Hardin, for instance, to speak 
meaningfully of alien colours — “sensory qualities that may be said to have a hue, but 
a hue that is not identical with red, yellow, blue, green, or any of their binaries” — the 
alien colour must have an “appropriate resemblance relation” to human hues; the 
alien hue and at least one of the standard hues must “occur within the consciousness
29 Mollon 1989: 390.
30 Wiggins 1987.
31 1977: §42. Wittgenstein is actually himself more cautious, adding that “we could imagine circumstances 
under which we would say, These people see other colours in addition to ours’”.
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of an individual”.32 Thompson similarly requires that for a property that lies outside 
our colour space to be a colour, there must be “some resemblance route from our 
colour space to the novel colour space”.33
In saying that human-colours and the colours perceived by members of 
different species are determinates of different determinables, the existence of an 
internal resemblance between these colours is precisely what is being denied: 
whereas human-colours bear internal relations of similarity to each other, and, for 
instance, pigeon-colours internal relations of similarity to each other, there are no 
internal relations of similarity between human-colours and pigeon-colours. Yet, at 
the same time, it is not entirely plausible to suppose that other species do not 
perceive colours. Although comparative ecology is not an exact science, it wouldn’t be 
possible at all if other species did not have perceptual mechanisms that are at least in 
some sense similar to those found in humans. And it seems incredible to suppose 
that other species should use these essentially similar perceptual mechanisms to 
perceive properties that differed fundamentally in kind to the properties that 
humans perceive.
The solution to this problem is to recognise that there are similarities 
between different families of property that justifies the description of them as 
colours even though these similarities are not internal relations of similarity between 
their determinates. The similarities in the low-level perceptual mechanisms of 
humans and pigeons, for instance, point to a similarity in the properties that is the 
function of these low-level perceptual mechanisms to detect: the physical light- 
affecting properties of material subjects. At this point we have not decided whether 
colours are identical with the physical light-affecting properties of objects, and 
indeed I shall argue later that they are not (Chapter 6). But even if colours are 
distinct from an object’s physical light-affecting properties, this does not disbar us 
from appealing to underlying physical properties to forge a connection between 
different families of colour property. As we shall see, naive realists about colour do 
not generally think that colours simply ‘float free’ from physical properties. Indeed, 
there is good reason to suppose that even though they are suigeneris properties, 
colours nevertheless bear a particularly intimate relationship to the light-affecting
32 1988: 145.
33 1992: especially 334-7.
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properties described by physical science: typically, that the former are metaphysically 
determined by, and so supervene on, the latter (§7.1). If colours do supervene on 
reflectances then at least this relationship offers a necessary condition for grouping 
properties together as colours: a family of determinate properties will count as 
colours only if it is metaphysically necessary that they supervene on an object’s light- 
affecting properties.34
Is the relationship of the properties different species perceive to the physical 
light-affecting properties of material objects all there is to being a colour? Perhaps 
not. Similarities in the perceptual mechanisms that realise colour experiences suggest 
that it may be possible to forge a still closer tie between human-colour and pigeon- 
colour than their relations to physical properties. In human colour vision, signals 
from the retinal receptors are opponently processed in three distinct psychophysical 
channels, realised by three distinct neurophysiological pathways. This opponent 
processing explains some particularly salient features of the phenomenology of 
colour experience, including the opponent structure of the colours and the related 
elemental/non-elemental distinction. Whilst a lot less is known about the 
neurophysiology of other species, there is some psychophysical evidence that the 
retinal signals in, for instance, honeybees, goldfish and pigeons are also opponently 
processed. Although the determinate colours represented in the colour experiences 
to which that this opponent processing gives rise may differ qualitatively to the 
human colours, it at least seems reasonable to suppose that these properties still 
exhibit the same structural properties as human colours: that they are opponently 
organised and can be divided into exclusive elemental and non-elemental categories.
It is unclear whether exhibiting structural features of this kind is a necessary 
condition of being a colour. It may be nothing more than a contingent fact of the 
colour properties that humans (and these other species) perceive that they are 
opponently organised. To the extent that we can conceive at all of what it would be 
like to experience colours other than those we actually experience, it seems that we 
can at least conceive of creatures perceiving properties that bear the relevant relation 
to the underlying physical properties, but which exhibit neither opponent 
organisation nor the related distinction between unique and derivative colours.
34 Contrast Byrne and Hilbert Forthcoming, who object that: “unlike reductive realists (physicalists, in 
particular), there is no lower-level description of the colour properties that [naive realists] can use to 
establish a kinship between the properties detected by [for example] goldfish and human vision”.
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But even if opponent organisation is not a necessary feature of colour 
properties, there is another feature of the phenomenology of colour experience that 
much more plausibly is: the perceived constancy of colour through changes in the 
conditions necessary for its perception. The value of colour perception for humans 
lies primarily in the relationship that it bears to our thought about a world populated 
by reidentifiable material objects. As I argue in Chapter 2, the perceptual constancy 
of colour is essential to our grasping the mind-independent existence of material 
substance. It is the perceptual constancy of colour that allows us to reidentify 
objects through gaps in our perception of them. Given the importance of this aspect 
of colour, it is reasonable to require that for a property to be a colour is for its 
perception play a comparable role within the cognitive economy of the perceiving 
subject. By this reckoning, different species do not count as perceiving colours 
unless the light-related properties that they perceive are constant throughout 
changes in the illumination, background, and so on; that is, unless those properties 
are implicitly regarded as mind-independent properties. Happily, many of the species 
to which we want to attribute colour vision — including bees, fish, and pigeons — do 
indeed appear to exhibit signs of colour constancy.35
Generally speaking, the view that there is no way of grouping together 
properties as colours except via internal relations of resemblance belies an overly 
simplistic view of colour. It overlooks the essentially bipartite nature of colour: that, 
on the one hand, there are the internal relations in which colours stand and, on the 
other hand, the external relations that colours bear to other kinds of property.
Setting aside possibly contingent structural similarities amongst the qualitative 
aspects of different types of colour, although the determinate colours that different 
species perceive may occupy distinct property spaces, they still deserve to be called 
colours if they occupy a similar functional role with respect to perceiving subjects.
35 For an overview, see Neumeyer 1998.
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[5] Intra-Species Variation in Colour Perception
if hy the different Structure o f our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should 
produce in several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet 
produced in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produced in 
another Man’s, and vice versa.. .he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his 
Use by those Appearances...I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas in 
other Men’s Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike.
Locke 1690: II.xxxii.15.
It follows from the naive view that colours are mind-independent properties that 
there is a sharp distinction between the colours objects appear and the colours they 
really are. Over the last two chapters I have been arguing that certain well-known 
facts about variation in colour perception do not undermine this commitment. Only 
differences in perceived colour between members of the same species now remain.
Intra-species variations in colour perception have long featured prominently 
in eliminativist arguments for the conclusion that no object is really coloured. 
Malebranche, for instance, argues that since people differ in the constitution of their 
sense organs, “it cannot be guaranteed that there are two people in this world having 
completely the same sensations of the same objects”, suggesting that this might even 
explain variety in aesthetic taste.1 The standard philosophical response in the face of 
the eliminativist threat is no less well-known. This response is to regard variations in 
colour perception between humans as faultless disagreements in which there is no 
question of apportioning error. Relationists about colour do not hold the monopoly 
on this line of response, but the view that colours are relations between objects and 
perceiving subjects that differ depending upon the nature of their relata is by far the 
most popular version of this strategy.2
Consistent with the naive conception of colours as mind-independent 
properties, however, we cannot accept the relationist’s response to eliminativism. 
More generally, I argue in §5.1 that the eliminativist is right at least in thinking that 
intra-species variation involves error, that these differences are not just faultless 
disagreements. §§5.2-3 therefore consider the problem of apportioning error whilst
1 1674-5: 64-6, 441; although it should be noted that intra-species variation is not the only argument that 
Malebranche offers for this conclusion. Similar arguments are found amongst the ancient atomists, and 
more recendy feature prominendy in Hardin’s arguments for eliminativism.
2 Hilbert and Kalderon 2000 propose a non-relationist theory of colour according to which intra-species 
variations are fauldess disagreements: for discussion, see §6.5. The view is more usually associated, 
however, with relationism. See, for instance, Locke 1690, and more recendy McGinn 1983, McLaughlin 
2003, Cohen 2005.
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avoiding undue chauvinism. In effect, I argue that all colour perception within a 
certain range is equally unreliable on the grounds that the natural function of colour 
perception is really just to perceive mid-level determinable colours: inter-personal 
disagreements about super-determinate colours therefore arise when we use our 
colour perception in a way that transcends its natural function. The idea of the 
‘natural function’ of colour perception is spelt out in more detail in §5.4, and §5.5 
considers extreme cases of intra-species variation in which colours and colour 
experiences are systematically permuted. I suggest that we can resist the permutation 
argument if we clearly distinguish between conceptual and metaphysical distinctions: 
the distinction between colours and the way they appear is not a ‘real distinction’, 
but instead a mere ‘distinction of reason’.
1. Intra-Species Variation
For intra-species differences in colour perception to be faultless disagreements, the 
properties that different members of the same species perceive have to differ in 
kind. The problem for standard philosophical responses to inter-personal perceptual 
variation is to explain in what sense this is so. Consider, by way of illustration, a case 
of inter-personal variation in which one subject’s spectrum is shifted relative to 
another’s. Suppose, for instance, that Jack systematically locates the unique hues 
5nms lower than Jill: whereas Jack locates unique blue — a blue that is neither 
reddish nor greenish — at 480nms, Jill locates it 475nms; whilst Jack locates unique 
green at 510nms, Jill locates it at 505nms; and so on. In what sense can we say that 
the properties that Jack and Jill perceive differ in kind?
These properties do not differ in kind in the way that I have argued that the 
colours perceived by members of different species differ in kind. The determinate 
colours Jack and Jill perceive both vary along the dimensions of determination, hue, 
saturation and lightness: the only difference between Jack and Jill is where in the 
visible spectrum they locate these colours. The properties they perceive therefore 
occupy different regions of the same property space. Assuming that sameness or 
difference of property-type is determined by sameness or difference of associated 
property space, this means that the properties that Jack and Jill perceive are
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properties of the same kind: they are both determinates of the same determinable 
and so, it seems, mutually incompatible.
Given the role played by the similarity relations colour space represents in 
grounding our conception of colours as mind-independent properties in the first 
place, it is important that sameness or difference of property space should be 
sufficient to determine sameness or difference of property-type. I argued in Chapter 
2 that it is essential to our conception of colours as mind-independent properties 
that we are able to think in relatively abstract terms about the internal relations of 
similarity and difference in which colours stand. But if properties that differ in kind 
can be located in structurally isomorphic property spaces, then thinking about the 
internal relations of similarity between colours will not uniquely fix the reference of 
our colour thoughts: it will not uniquely determine which properties it is that we 
ordinarily suppose objects to instantiate.
Now this might just show that the robust understanding of sameness or 
difference of property-type is too stringent, and therefore that colours are not mind- 
independent after all: at this point, it would beg the question to simply suppose 
otherwise. But can we substitute any weaker understanding of sameness or 
difference of property-type that can sustain the thought that the properties members 
of the same species perceive differ fundamentally in kind?
One possibility would be that sameness of difference of colour is determined 
by sameness or difference of the colour experiences with which they are associated. 
On this view, colours would differ in kind just in case the corresponding colour 
experiences differed in kind. But now the question is in what sense do the colour 
experiences of the spectrally shifted subjects like Jack and Jill differ in kind? They 
cannot be different simply in virtue of being experiences of different subjects, as this 
slices sameness or difference of experience-type too fine. Jack’s colour experiences 
are not colour experiences of a different kind to Jill’s simply because Jack and Jill are 
distinct perceiving subjects, any more than rain in Liverpool differs in kind to rain in 
London simply because Liverpool and London are different places. There has to be 
a relevant difference between the experiences themselves.
At this point, we cannot simply fall back on the claim that their experiences 
differ in kind because these experiences are experiences of colour properties that 
differ in kind. The relevant difference in the experience of the two subjects cannot
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simply be an extrinsic difference in the properties that it is the function of their visual 
system to track. Whether we can make sense of the idea that Jack and Jill track 
different families of property is precisely what is at issue.
Any difference in their experiences sufficient to sustain the claim that the 
properties they perceive differ in kind has to be intrinsic to Jack and Jill. Now, their 
experiences do not themselves differ qualitatively: Jack has exactly the same kind of 
experience as Jill when he sees a spectral light that is neither reddish nor greenish, 
they differ just in which spectral light produces this experience. But there is at least a 
difference in the physiological mechanisms that realise Jack and Jill’s experiences: 
perhaps there is a difference in the absorption characteristics of their retinal 
receptors, or in the way the signals from their retinal receptors are subsequently 
processed. Could it therefore be this difference in their physiological makeup that is 
the relevant difference between Jack and Jill? Unfortunately, this too raises 
problems.
For one thing, it also seems to slice sameness or difference of experience- 
type too fine. Just as rain in Liverpool does not differ in kind from rain in London 
merely as a result of subde differences in the topology of Liverpool and London, it 
seems implausible that subtle differences in the physiological mechanisms that 
realise colour experience should produce colour experiences that differ 
fundamentally in kind. Differences in the perceptual mechanisms that explain the 
differences in the colour experiences of otherwise normal subjects do not seem 
significant enough to justify the description of these experiences, and the properties 
they are experiences of, as different in kind. It is much more natural to suppose 
instead that different subjects perceive, in slightly different ways, the very same 
property.
Besides, there is a deeper problem with the suggestion that the relevant 
difference between Jack and Jill lies in a difference in the physiological mechanisms 
that realise their experiences. To suppose that physiological differences are sufficient 
to generate a difference in the property-type that a subject perceives generates a 
problem about accommodating systematic misperception. Whether or not we want 
to treat differences in the location of the unique hues as cases of faultless 
disagreement, at least some inter-personal differences are clear-cut cases of 
misperception. Colour blindness is a case in point. Colour blindness is, in an
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important sense, a genuine disability. It is not an especially far reaching disability, 
but it does impair an individual’s performance. The inability to clearly distinguish 
reds and greens, for example, makes it difficult to discriminate objects from their 
backgrounds. In an ecological context, this makes finding food difficult, and in the 
modern world it effectively rules out careers in fashion, design and the armed 
services.3
The challenge for views that regard inter-personal variations in colour 
perception as faultless disagreements is to accommodate deficiencies in colour 
perception of this kind. If normal trichromatic subjects with shifted spectra perceive 
different kinds of colour property because of differences in the absorption 
characteristics of their retinal receptors, then why don’t colour blind subjects also 
perceive different kinds of colour property? If a difference in a subject’s retinal 
receptors is sufficient for a difference in the kind of colour property they perceive, 
then subjects who lack the relevant pigment from at least one of their types of 
retinal receptor altogether should also perceive colours that differ in kind. But this 
just seems wrong. The view that people who are colour blind perceive colours that 
differ in kind to those perceived by normal trichromatic subjects is political 
correctness gone mad.
The flip side of the problem about accommodating disagreement is a 
problem about acknowledging inter-personal agreement. It is not just the amount of 
inter-personal disagreement in colour perception that is striking, but the extent to 
which our colour perception accords with that of other people. Although normal 
trichromatic subjects often disagree about super-determinate colour properties, they 
far less frequently disagree about the mid-level determinables under which objects 
fall. Jack may see a certain Munsell chip as green, and Jill see the same chip as a 
slighdy bluish-green, but Jack and Jill at least agree that they see a Munsell chip that 
falls under the mid-level determinable green. The view that different members of the 
same species perceive colours that differ in kind, however, threatens the very 
possibility of this sort of agreement. If the colours that Jack perceives differ in kind 
from those perceived by Jill then why aren’t these properties simply incomparable?
3 Although Mollon 1989: 382 mentions the case o f a red-green colour blind protanope who, after colour 
blindness put pay to his career in the textile industry, decided to become an orchardist instead! For a 
more extended discussion of colour blindness, see §4.3.
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This generates a knock-on problem for Jack and Jill’s ability to communicate 
about colour. If sense is even at least in part determined by reference, then Jill will 
mean by ‘green’ something different to Jack: Jill will use ‘green’ to refer to the 
property that she perceives Irish post-boxes to be, whilst Jack will use ‘green’ to 
refer to a property of Irish post-boxes that differs in kind from the property 
perceived by Jill. How, then, can Jack and Jill communication about the colour of 
Irish post-boxes at all?
Generally speaking, the more the difference between the properties that 
different members of the same species perceive is stressed, the more difficult it 
becomes to understand comparisons between, and communication about, the colour 
experiences that different subjects enjoy. Playing down differences in the colours 
that different members of the same species perceive avoids this problem. But it does 
so at the expense of making it difficult to sustain the thought that the properties 
these subjects perceive really differ in kind at all. And if they do not really differ in 
kind, then inter-personal differences in colour perception cannot just be faultless 
disagreements. The different colours objects appear to different members of the 
same species will after all be incompatible.
2. Sexism, Racism and Ageism
The fundamental difference between inter- and intra-species variation appears to be 
that questions of error arise in the latter case but not in the former. Whereas 
disagreements between members of different species are faultless, disagreements 
between members of the same species are not. It is, however, at this point at which 
things start to become uncomfortable.
Variations in the colour perception of otherwise normal members of the 
same species depend on differences in physiological makeup that are systematically 
determined by age, sex and race. As we get older, for instance, the lens of the eye 
gradually absorbs more short-wavelength light, preventing this light from striking 
the retina. The result is that we become progressively less sensitive to blues and 
greens: purples, for instance, begin to look redder as the amount of blue they are
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perceived to contain is reduced.4 Independent of this, the peak sensitivities of the 
three types of human retinal cone vary depending upon the genetic makeup of an 
individual in a way that is systematically linked to sex. Across the male population, 
the long-wavelength cones vary in their peak sensitivity by between 5-7 nms. The 
average peak sensitivity of long-wavelength cones in women is intermediate between 
these extremes. Although the relationship between retinal absorportion rates and 
colour experiences is not straightforward, given that differences at the retinal level 
can be off-set by subsequent differences in the processing of the retinal signals, 
these differences can be detected using Rayleigh tests, in which subjects use an 
anomaloscope to colour match two halves of screen lit by two different lights, one a 
mixture of red and green, the other yellow or orange: subjects who differ in the peak 
sensitivities of their cones make different colour matches in these tests. Still further 
differences, this time linked to race, occur in the spectral sensitivity curves of 
different subjects’s retinal receptors.5 Can we apportion error in light of these 
differences whilst avoiding undue chauvinism?
The first thing to say is that these cases are not all on a par. Variations in 
perceived colour that are linked to age are the least worrying. It is a common place 
that many of our natural faculties deteriorate as we age, and our perceptual faculties 
are no exception. I am myopic. Because my eyeballs are too long, my lenses too 
strong, or possibly both, the lenses in my eyes bring light rays to a focus in front of 
my retina. As a result I am unable, unaided, to clearly perceive objects that are any 
more than a few feet away from me. This condition is not one that I had when I was 
a child, and is one that has worsened as I have grown older. Indeed, if this condition 
does not continue to worsen as I grow still older, this will only be because it 
happens to be corrected by a different visual defect: presbyopia. As ageing occurs, 
most lenses lose their elasticity, making them unable to bring the light entering the 
eye from short distances into focus on the retina: the light is brought to focus 
behind the retina instead. The result of this defect is that unaided near vision 
becomes almost impossible.6
Given that in general our visual system deteriorates as we age, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that it will also deteriorate with respect to fulfilling its colour
4 Kaiser and Boynton 1996: 459-60.
5 For an overview, see Block 1999.
6 Palmer 1999a: 28.
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perceiving function. If so, then it is not unreasonable to treat as a defect the change 
in colour perception that occurs when increasing amounts of short-wavelength light 
are absorbed by the lens. It is hardly ageist to acknowledge that as we get older, we 
are no longer able to do, to the same standard, many of things that we were once 
able to.
The problems of sexism and racism, however, can be dismissed so easily. 
When it comes to variations between normal trichromatic human subjects that are 
systematically determined by sex and race we seem genuinely unable to privilege the 
colour perception of one section of the human population over any other without 
simply playing favourites. There appears to be no reason to regard any section of the 
community as the correct colour perceivers. Still, this problem does not establish the 
eliminativist conclusion that no object is really coloured at all; that the colours we 
perceive are all equally apparent.
For one thing, the naive view that colours are mind-independent only entails 
that there is a sharp appearance-reality distinction, not that the distinction is one that 
we should expect to be able to draw. If colours are genuinely mind-independent 
properties, then there has to be a fact of the matter about which super-determinate 
colour property an object instantiates. We might even expect at least some members 
of the species that track the determinable of which this property is a super- 
determinate to sometimes perceive objects to be the super-determinate colours they 
really are. But it does not follow that we must be able to know of any given 
perceiving subject that their super-determinate colour perception is veridical. This 
may just be an unknowable fact.
Postulating the existence of unknowable facts about colour may seem like an 
ad hoc attempt to save the mind-independence of colour in the face of an insuperable 
problem.7 But this overplays the problem. It is, for instance, consistent with the 
existence of unknowable facts about colour that there are plenty of colour facts that 
we can know. Although we might not know what super-determinate colours objects 
instantiate, we might at least be able to know under which higher-level 
determinables these objects fall. Indeed, there may even be reason to suppose that it 
is only a more or less narrowly circumscribed class of colour facts like these that we
7 In response to a similar suggestion made by Byrne and Hilbert, for instance, Hardin remarks that “there 
is at least a whiff o f ether here, the electromagnetic ether whose undulations were supposed to be 
mechanical basis o f electromagnetic phenomena”, 2003: 32.
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should expect to be able to know. Perhaps making judgments about the super- 
determinate properties of objects employs the visual system in a way that transcends 
its naturalfunction.
A system’s absolute functional limit is that point beyond which the system 
cannot fulfil its intended function to any greater degree. For instance, if my car 
cannot travel at more than 120 miles per hour in optimal conditions, then 120mph is 
its absolute functional limit. Optimal functional limits, in contrast, are those points 
after which a system just ceases to work efficiently in the manner intended. Even 
though 120mph may be car’s absolute functional limit, for instance, if after 70mph 
there is a marked deterioration in its road handling, it starts to shake violently, or if 
bits of it begin to fall off, then 70mph is my car’s optimal functional limit as a safe, 
comfortable, reusable means of transport. Carrying this distinction over to colour 
perception, we can say that the absolute functional limit of the visual system is 
represented by the total number of super-determinate colours a subject can perceive 
in optimal conditions, and hence the total number of colour distinctions the subject 
is able to make in those circumstances. The optimal functional limit of colour 
perception, however, may lie well within this range. Indeed, the optimal functional 
limits may lie just at the level of determinable colours like scarlet, cherry red and 
vermilion, or perhaps even red, yellow, green and blue: although we may reliably 
perceive objects as falling under mid-level determinable colour properties like these, 
perhaps our perception of the super-determinate properties that fall within the 
extensions of these mid-level determinables is just inherently unreliable.
To take a concrete example, suppose that the extension of the mid-level 
determinable scarlet is the set of super-determinate properties, redi-redis. By virtue 
of perceiving an object that is really red? as instantiating any of the super-determinate 
properties in this range, you veridically perceive the object as scarlet. Clearly, this is 
consistent with misperceiving its super-determinate colour: if, for instance, you 
perceive the object as red3. Indeed, even if you perceive the object as falling under 
both the determinable scarlet and the super-determinate red? — and hence you 
experience is veridical both at the level of determinables and determinates — this 
experience may still be essentially unreliable. If in perceiving the object to be red? 
you go beyond the optimal functional limit of your visual system, your beliefs about 
the object’s super-determinate colour are true only by good fortune. The nature of
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your visual system does not warrant these beliefs, because consistent with your 
having this kind of visual apparatus you could have perceived the object as some 
other super-determinate property in the relevant range.8
The crucial question is just whether it makes sense to think of the visual 
system in this way. Is it plausible to suppose that the visual system is accurate just to 
the level of mid-level determinables like scarlet or red? If it is, then this will offer a 
response to intra-species version of the Argument from Perceptual Variation.
3. The Limits of Colour Perception
The proposal that colour perception amongst otherwise normal trichromatic 
subjects is even accurate to the level of determinables may seem to be blown out of 
the water at the very outset by striking variations in the location of the unique hues: 
hues that appear to contain no trace of any other colour. In a study into the spectral 
location of unique green by Schefrin and Werner, for instance, subjects located 
unique green anywhere between 486nms and 535nms, with some otherwise normal 
subjects seeing as unique green a spectral light that other subjects perceive to be 
unique blue. Does this mean that there is inter-personal disagreement even at the 
level of colour determinables?9
We need to approach these findings with caution. For a start, the study by 
Schefrin and Werner into the spectral location of unique-green is intended to show 
the variation of the location of unique green with age, and so the study includes data 
from subjects aged between 13-74 years. We have already seen, however, that colour 
perception deteriorates with age, especially in the shorter wavelength region of the 
visible spectrum in which unique green is located. More importantly, we have 
already suggested that there is a non-arbitrary reason to prefer the colour perception
8 Suppose, by analogy, that I am able to assign essays into broad classes, but am unable to accurately 
grade essays within these boundaries. So, for instance, suppose I can tell whether or not an essay deserves 
a 1st class mark, but am unable to tell specifically whether it deserves a mark of 71%, 72%, or 73%. Now I 
can assign it one of these marks, indeed I may have to assign one of these marks because of the nature of 
the marking enterprise, and what’s more, I might even assign it the right mark. But if I do happen to 
assign it the right mark, this is down to luck, not judgement. Although my judgement is not as a matter of 
fact erroneous, neither is it reliable. In assigning the essay the mark that I do, I go beyond the limits of my 
optimal functional capacity to grade essays: as an ‘essay grading system’, I am accurate only to the level of 
class marks.
9 Schefrin and Werner 1990. This study is referred to by both Hardin 1988: Preface to Second Edition 
and Block 1999.
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of younger perceivers in this respect (§5.2). We can therefore disregard the more 
extreme variations in the location of unique green that Schefrin and Werner report. 
Unsurprisingly, studies into the spectral location of unique-green based on a more 
restricted sample, though still shocking, are much less so. In a classic study by 
Hurvich, Jameson and Cohen, for instance, subjects located unique green anywhere 
between 490nms and 517nms, which only (!) represents 9% of the visible spectrum, 
in contrast to the 13% across which Schefrin and Werner’s subjects located it.10
Unique green is anyway a special case. On the one hand, unique green and 
unique blue are much more similar to each other than either is to the adjacent 
unique hue (see §6.1). This means that less variation is needed for their spectral 
locations to overlap. On the other hand, even amongst the unique hues inter­
personal variation in the spectral location of unique green is uncharacteristically 
extreme. Discounting unique red, which is a non-spectral colour, inter-personal 
variations in the location of unique blue and yellow are far less pronounced. In 
Schefrin and Werner’s study, for instance, subjects located unique blue between 462- 
496nms and unique yellow between only 566-588nms: this represents less than 9% 
of the visible spectrum for unique blue and less than 6% of the visible spectrum for 
unique yellow, compared to the near 13% they found for unique green.”
At least in part the explanation of why unique green is a special case is that 
the region from around 510nms to 550nms is a region of poor hue discrimination, 
in which differences in wavelength do not translate into differences in perceived 
colour. For instance, 494-557nms — a difference of 63nms — corresponds to seven 
equally spaced Munsell chips: chips between which there are approximately equal 
differences in colour. In contrast, 572-586nms — a difference of just 14nms — 
corresponds to five perceptually equally spaced Munsell chips.12 This averages out to 
9nms per Munsell chip in the green part of the visible spectrum, in contrast to just 
2.8nms in the yellow part. The comparative paucity in hue discrimination in this 
region is reflected in the fact that subjects tend to be more sensitive to departures 
from unique green at shorter wavelengths than at longer wavelengths: the light most 
frequently identified as unique green is therefore usually closer to the lower-limit
10 For details, see Hurvich 1981: Chapter 16.
11 These results are subject to the same qualification as the results for unique green: the sample base 
includes subjects whose colour vision has been detrimentally affected by the aging process. This would 
affect the results for unique blue in particular.
12 Hardin 1988: 160-1.
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than the upper-limit. In the original Hurvich et al study, for instance, unique green 
was most frequently located at around 503nms, with a lower limit of 490nms (- 
13nms) and an upper limit of 517nms (+14nms). In a more recent study by Jordan 
and Mollon, unique green is most frequendy located between 505-1 Onms, with a 
lower limit of around 485nms (-20 nms) and an upper limit of about 560nms 
(+45nms)!13
Differences in the spectral location of the unique hues raise a more general 
point. It is only under controlled conditions that inter-personal variations in colour 
perception are evident. The standard way of identifying differences in the peak 
sensitivities of the three human cone types mentioned in §5.1, for instance, is by 
using an complicated and expensive instrument called an anomaloscope, in which 
subjects make two halves of a screen match in colour using different lights: one a 
mixture of red and green, the other yellow or orange. Tests to determine where a 
subject locates the unique hues are carried out under equally strict conditions, using 
equally sophisticated instruments. Indeed outside of the laboratory, even the very 
significant variations between trichromatic and dichromatic colour perceivers can go 
unnoticed for a very long time. Why this should this be?
There are reasons specific to the location of unique hues why inter-personal 
differences generally go unnoticed. In the natural environment it is actually highly 
unusual to perceive the kind of monochromatic light used in unique hue 
experiments.
Most natural light is full spectrum light, in the sense that it is composed of light 
from each and every visible spectral wavelength. Correspondingly, most material 
objects reflect at least some light from every part of the visible spectrum, and so 
most of the light that reaches the eye is broadband spectral light (see §3.4). One 
explanation of why differences in the spectral location of the unique hues should 
only be evident in carefully controlled conditions is therefore that widespread 
variation in these non-standard conditions is consistent with more general 
agreement under normal conditions.
Jordan and Mollon, for instance, found that variations in the location of 
unique green are correlated with differences in the lightness of a subject’s iris, 
something which is usually thought to be linked to the amount of pigmentation in
13 Jordan and Mollon 1995.
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the fundus of the eye, behind and between the retinal receptors. Eyes with heavier 
pigmentation in their iris tend to absorb more short wavelength light, changing the 
spectral composition of the light striking the retinal receptors. Jordan and Mollon 
suggest that the visual system normally compensates for these differences in its 
subsequent processing, and that this habitual compensation might explain the 
differences in the spectral location of unique green that we find. If, for instance, two 
subjects with differently pigmented eyes both perceive a real world object as unique 
green, there will be a difference in the ratios of the signals emitted by their retinal 
receptors consequent upon the difference in the light striking these receptors. 
Although there will be no difference in their output ratios when they perceive a 
monochromatic green light — the heavier pigmentation only affects the shorter 
wavelength light that enters the eye — if their visual systems are already differently 
calibrated then they will respond to this identical output differently, resulting in the 
differences in the spectral location of unique green that we find in the laboratory. 
Differences in the location of unique green in non-standard conditions will therefore 
be a consequence of the visual system’s attempts to veridically perceive the colours 
of more common broadband stimuli.14
There is a more general reason — not specific to the spectral location of the 
unique hues — why inter-personal variations in colour perception are only evident in 
highly circumscribed conditions. This is because it is only under carefully controlled 
circumstances that an individual’s colour perception, and the judgements they make 
on the basis of this colour perception, are sufficiently exacting to ground colour 
judgements that conflict in the first place. Hardin, for instance, estimates that a 
trained, normal observer, can discriminate up to ten million surface colours in 
optimal conditions.15 In the less than optimal perceptual conditions found in the real 
world, however, the number is nowhere near this amount: it may even be less than a 
few thousand.16
Colours that are discriminable to a subject under specially circumscribed 
conditions can be indiscriminable to the very same subject in other conditions. The 
strength of the illumination, the viewing distance, the distance between the samples, 
the angle of the samples with respect to both the viewer and the illumination all
14 Jordan and Mollon 1995.
15 1988: 182. Others put the figure slightly lower than this, although it is generally over 1 million.
16 Sivik 1997: 163.
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make a difference to our discriminative abilities. Colours between which there is a 
just noticeable difference when juxtaposed, for instance, immediately appear 
identical in colour when we move them apart by even a few centimetres: as the 
distance between the colour samples increases, so does the difference in the colour 
of the samples necessary to distinguish them.17 Our ability to discriminate colours 
also decreases with the intensity of the illumination. In low intensity illumination, for 
instance, red is indistinguishable from blue. Nagel, in an Appendix to Helmholtz’s 
Treatise on Physiological Optics, for instance, notes that “In dim twilight the cap of a 
German infantryman, which is blue with a red band, does not look different from 
that of sanitary officer with its dark blue band”.18 Indeed, if you look at a magazine 
or newspaper in still lower intensity moonlight, it is difficult to tell whether its 
pictures are chromatically coloured (whether they are ‘in colour’) at all.19 Given this 
range of factors that affect our discriminative abilities, it is therefore no accident that 
the Munsell Book of Color— the most famous colour atlas, and often used for testing 
inter-personal variations colour perception — comes with very strict guidelines for 
the conditions under which its coloured chips should be viewed. Samples, for 
instance, should be perceived against a dark achromatic background, using “north 
daylight” (daylight from a lightly overcast north sky) or its artificial equivalent 
(scientific daylight with a colour temperature of 6500-7500K). The samples should 
be viewed at 90° (i.e. perpendicular to the line of sight) and illuminated at 45°, or the 
exact opposite, and so on.20
Facts about the perceiving subject are no less important when it comes to 
colour perception and discrimination. Although it is a perfectly natural ability, as 
with most natural abilities, our capacity for discriminating colours improves with 
practice: it improves ‘as we get our eye in’. The normal observer that Hardin 
estimates can discriminate up to ten million surface colours, for instance, is 
“trained”. But just as a sommelier will be able to distinguish tastes in wines that to 
the untutored palate are indiscernible, someone who works, for example, in the
17 Sivik 1997: 163.
18 1911: 357. This is called the Purkinje Phenomenon.
19 Kaiser and Boynton 1996: 38. The spectral power distribution of moonlight is broadly similar to that of 
direct sunlight (perhaps a little yellower), but a lot less bright: a full moon on a clear night has a luminance 
that is only just over half that of a 40W fluorescent tube. Henderson 1977: 228-30.
20 For details, see Hardin 1988: 68.
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design industry will be able to make much finer colour distinctions than someone 
whose everyday life does not involve poring over colour samples.
Cross-cutting questions about training are issues about attention. When 
performing psychological studies designed to test colour perception, subjects pay 
much greater attention to an object’s colour than is usually called for in everyday life. 
The Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue Test, for instance, in which subjects are asked to 
arrange (as it happens) 85 different hue samples to form a continuous series of 
colours, takes between 15 and 30 minutes to administer.21 The attention to colour 
that this involves is therefore much greater than that which is involved when, for 
instance, glancing out of my window, I see that there are two red cars and one silver 
car parked on the other side of the road.
Although inter-subjective differences in our very precise judgements about 
super-determinate colour properties can have important consequences for industry 
and commerce, the industrial and commercial uses of colour vision are not the uses 
for which our colour vision evolved. Colour vision evolved in a natural 
environment, to fulfil certain practical needs of perceiving subjects. But these 
practical needs do not in general include the ability to make accurate judgements 
about an object’s super-determinate colour. Consider again the uses of colour vision 
discussed in arguing that our conception of colour is a conception as of a mind- 
independent property in the first place (§2.3).
One of the uses of colour perception is to partition the visual scene into 
discrete material objects. The common colour of different parts of a visual scene 
serves as the basis for treating these parts as parts of the same object. Glance at an 
article of clothing that you are wearing. On the basis of this experience, you form a 
belief about the colour of the article that pardy serves to individuate the garment: 
roughly, you perceive the garment as extending as far as its colour does. For the 
purposes of fulfilling this function, however, it is best that your colour perception is 
not too precise. Look at the garment again, this time in more detail. Where the 
fabric creases, parts of the garment will be in shadow, causing clearly perceptible 
differences in the colour the different parts of it appear to be. What looked at first 
glance to be homogeneously coloured, looks on closer inspection to have a more 
variable appearance.
21 Kaiser and Boynton 1996: 431-3.
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If, as a matter of course, we perceived super-determinate colours, then we 
would not expect to generally see objects as homogenously coloured. But clearly we 
do. It is only by focussing our attention that we even notice the differences in colour 
appearance. It is partly this that makes painting so hard: you have to train yourself to 
perceive detailed differences in the colour appearance of an object that otherwise go 
unnoticed; you have to train yourself to discriminate between parts of the visual 
scene that are at first blush indiscriminable. As the art theorist Baxandall says in 
attempting to attend to the shadows on the walls of his study:
What I do not do, or would not be doing but for a special interest, is to attend to the 
individual microshadows as shadows or as objects of perception in their own right. If I 
attend to part of a wall I get a sense of its surface quality and that seems enough. Even 
with a special interest, it takes an effort of will, a decree of the mind, to attend to the same 
area of wall, to categorise its shadow types, and read the bearing of their light... [to do so] 
seems to go against the grain of the perceptual process.22
Baxandall is right that it ‘goes against the grain’ of the perceptual process to 
discriminate local variations in colour appearance. If our colour perception was 
generally this precise, then it could not fulfil its segregative function.
A similar point applies when we move from the segregation of the perceptual 
scene to the identification of objects within the scene. One of the advantages of 
colour vision is that it facilitates the detection of objects against their background: as 
we have already seen, one of the things that people who are colour blind bemoan is 
that their inability to discern objects with the same ease as their normal trichromatic 
counterparts. In an ecological context, for example, trichromatic human colour 
visions allows us to perceive red apples against the background of green foliage. For 
apples to ‘pop out’ from their background, however, it is at best unnecessary to 
perceive the super-determinate colour of either: it is sufficient to perceive a bare 
difference at the level of determinables between the green foliage and the red apple. 
To perceive the super-determinate colour of either may even be a positive
22 Baxandall 1995: 125-6. Compare Merleau-Ponty’s description of the way the sheets of paper lying on 
the table in his study appear when some are in the light and some in shadow: “If I do not analyse my 
perception but content myself with the spectacle as a whole, I shall say that all the sheets of paper look 
equally white. I decide to look more closely. I fix my gaze upon them.. .the sheets change their 
appearance: this is no longer white paper over which a shadow is cast, but a grey or steely blue 
substance.. .If I once more look at the general picture, I notice that the sheets over which a shadow is 
thrown were at no time identical with the sheets lying in the light, nor yet were they objectively different 
from them. The whiteness of the shaded paper does not lend itself to precise classification within the 
black-white range. It appeared as no definite quality”, 1945: 262-3.
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distraction: it is information about the environment that is irrelevant to the task at 
hand.
It is interesting in this respect to note that the spectral sensitivity of the cone- 
types that determine the signal in the red-green opponent channel overlap 
substantially: M cones are sensitive to light from roughly 430-640nms, and have a 
peak sensitivity at 530nms, whilst L cones are sensitive to long-wavelength light, 
from roughly 450-700nms, with a peak sensitivity at 560nms. The close spacing of 
these receptors minimises the available information about the reflective behaviour 
of objects in this region of the spectrum: it takes a larger difference between an 
object’s reflectance in the middle and high ends of the spectrum to make a 
difference to the signal in the red-green channel. This facilitates the detection of 
objects that differ markedly in their reflectances in these parts of the spectrum — as 
red and green objects do — by obscuring differences between objects that vary less 
dramatically. As Nagle and Osorio suggest, differences between green objects may 
therefore be a kind of ‘spectral noise’ that our colour vision has even evolved to 
ignore.23
Colour vision is not just valuable in allowing us to distinguish objects from 
their background, but is useful in visual search tasks more generally. Colours greatly 
improve our abilities in visual search tasks where the aim is to identify one object, or 
group of objects, amongst many that lie in the same plane. But again, it is not by 
perceiving differences at the level of their super-determinate colour that we are able 
to distinguish objects in this way. Considering the use of colour displays in aircraft 
cockpits, for instance, Krebs and Wolf caution designers to resist the temptation to 
use the full gamut of available colours, finding that the more colours are used the 
harder it becomes for the operator “to make a decision about the colour of a given 
symbol”. Krebs and Wolf suggest that in fact no more than five colours should be 
used — preferably just three or four — and that the colours should be widely spaced 
across the visible spectrum: for instance, blue, green, yellow, red, with orange as a 
possible fifth.24 The implication of this is that when our attention is focussed 
elsewhere we perceive colours only ever so broadly speaking: we are insensitive to 
differences at the level of super-determinate colour.
23 Nagle and Osorio 1993.
24 Krebs and Wolf 1979.
144
Nor does the importance of colour in assigning already identified objects 
into categories typically depend upon the possibility of maximally determinate 
colour perception. Consider the use of colour as a guide to the internal constitution 
of an object, as when we judge whether or not a piece of fruit is ripe on the basis of 
its colour. We don’t need to know what specific shade of yellow a banana is to know 
that it is ripe: its enough to be able to see that it instantiates a determinate of the 
determinable yellow, and not a determinate of the determinable green.
The same is true when it comes to the role of colour in the reidentification 
of material objects. If we want to know whether an object persists through time, 
then one of the ways that we can do this is by reference to its colour: if, for instance, 
a piece of paper on the floor is the same colour as the piece of paper that I left on 
the table before, then this may be sufficient to ground my belief that it is the same 
piece of paper, but that it has fallen off the table in the meantime. But again it is not 
with reference to an object’s super-determinate colour that we determine whether or 
not it persists through time. There is a significant and systematic phenomenon called 
colour memory shift, whereby subjects appear to remember only the determinable 
property that objects instantiate. Bodrogi and Tarczali conducted experiments in 
which subjects were presented with a colour stimulus, and after an interval of time t 
— generally a few seconds, although at least more than one second — during which 
the stimulus was removed, were asked to identify which, of a number of colours, the 
colour they perceived was. Bodrogi and Tarczali found a systematic shift during 
interval /, with observers choosing a more prototypical version of the colour that 
they originally perceived. Particularly pronounced was the shift towards ‘focal 
colours’: colours that are generally named in the shortest possible time and with 
consensus by many different observers, and which are located within the regions of 
colour space occupied by the eleven basic colour categories with monolexical colour 
names, red, pink, purple, blue, green, yellow, orange, brown, white, grey and black.25
The cognitive significance of these broad colour categories is further 
reflected in the linguistics of colour terms. The words used to name the eleven basic 
colour categories form a hierarchy famously described in Berlin and Kay’s Basic 
Colour Terms. In their evolution, all languages pass through the hierarchy via a
25 Bodrogi and Tarczali 2002, Wyszecki and Stiles 1967: 400. Monolexic colour words are those words 
whose meanings are not a function of that of their parts. So, whereas ‘dark blue’ is polylexic, ‘blue’ is 
monolexic.
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“permissible route”. They start with the two colour terms black and white; red 
comes next; the fourth and fifth colour terms in either order are green and yellow; 
then comes blue; this is followed by brown; and finally, in no particular order, we 
get purple, pink, orange and grey.26 As languages continue to evolve the number of 
colour terms they accrue multiplies, reflecting the changing needs of the members of 
the linguistic community. The terms that name the basic colour categories, however, 
retain their centrality. Indeed, from a communicative point of view, this is precisely 
what we should expect. As Locke stresses, the point of general terms is to facilitate 
communication. They cannot do this if they are too numerous: in this case, ‘the 
multiplication of words would perplex their use’.27
Reflecting this, Corbett and Davies found in a study of colour word usage 
that the list of the most frequently used colour terms in the one million word 
Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen corpus for British English by and large follow the 
evolutionary hierarchy for basic colour terms. In order, the top ranking colour terms 
are white, black, red and green. Skipping yellow which is ranked eighth, blue comes 
next, followed by grey and brown in seventh place. The last three are pink, purple 
and orange. The three non-basic colour terms used most frequently — silver, bronze 
and scarlet — all beat the lowest ranking basic colour term, orange, and silver also 
beat the next lowest ranking basic colour term, purple. Corbett and Davies note that 
the results for silver and bronze may anyway be overestimates of their use as colour 
adjectives. Still, with just 22 uses, the most frequently occurring non-basic colour 
term silver comes nowhere near the top ranking basic colour terms, the first six of 
which all score over 80, with the top ranking term, white, occurring no less than 247 
times.28
An increasingly popular sub-personal explanation of the salience of 
determinable colours is that the output of early colour processing is classified into 
cognitive or internal colour categories. Cognitive colour categories occupy discrete 
regions of perceptual colour space — although jointly they need not cover the entire 
colour space -  and they differ in number depending upon the nature of the visual 
task. In total they may number no more than thirty, but they generally include the 
eleven basic colours, or at least some subset of these. The classification of the
26 Berlin and Kay 1969; for recent discussion, see Corbett and Davies 1997.
27 1690: III.i.1; cf Ill.iii.
28 Corbett and Davies 1997.
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output from the visual processing mechanisms at a sub-personal level into cognitive 
categories determines the information that is available downstream, and ultimately at 
the personal level. If, for instance, the cognitive categories into which the output 
from the visual processing mechanism feeds are very broad, then only very limited 
information about the object’s colour will be available to the subject. In effect, the 
storage of signals from the early visual processing mechanisms in this way 
dramatically reduces the information about an object’s colour that is available to the 
subject. It is like storing the class marks to a group of essays without storing the 
percentage marks on which these class marks are based: once you have assigned the 
essays into classes and dispensed with the original percentages, there is no way of 
distinguishing between different essays within a class short of going back and 
remarking them in the more precise terms.29
In controlled conditions, then, the absolute functional limit of colour 
perception is about ten million colours. In everyday life, the number of colours that 
we can perceive drops sharply, with the absolute functional limit in these conditions 
standing at just a few thousand. The optimal functional limit of colour perception, 
however, is even lower still: it is probably just somewhere between 11 and 30. The 
colour properties that have cognitive significance for colour perceivers are relatively 
high-level determinable properties that occupy large regions of colour space. From 
the perspective of the colour perceiver, individual differences in super-determinate 
colours that are located in the same region of colour space are not generally 
important and even tend to be obscured in the cognitive process itself. So long as 
we perceive objects as correctly falling into the broad colour categories that have 
cognitive significance for us, it is irrelevant whether or not our very specific colour 
perceptions are veridical. Crucially, there is this broad inter-subjective agreement 
about the determinable colours of material objects: at the level of determinable 
colour properties, variation amongst otherwise normal trichromatic humans is 
negligible.
29 In response to the phenomenon o f memory colour shift, for instance, Bodrogi and Tarczali 2002 
suggest that a “discrete recoding” of colour perception may be taking place, in which the perceptual 
colour is assigned to a colour category and only the category is remembered. For a recent, very useful, 
discussion of cognitive colour, see Derefeldt et al 2004.
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4. The Natural Function of Colour Perception
I have been arguing that inter-personal variation in our very precise colour 
experiences arises because it goes beyond the natural function of our colour vision 
to perceive the super-determinate colours of objects: the function of colour vision is 
only to assign objects into broad colour categories; it is only to discover the general 
colour properties that they instantiate. This avoids the problem raised at the 
beginning of §5.2: the problem of acknowledging error whilst avoiding chauvinism. 
At the level of super-determinates colour perception is equally unreliable across the 
entire species. At the level of determinable colour there is no substantial inter­
personal disagreement.
This, however, helps to bring into sharper focus an underlying worry that we 
might have. The response to inter-personal variations in colour perception relies 
heavily on the idea of the naturalfunction of colour perception. In order to know what 
the natural function of colour perception is, however, we need to know what 
properties it is the function of colour perception to track. But unless we already 
know that the visual system is functioning correctly, we have no way of knowing 
which properties it is the natural function of colour perception to track. There is a 
circularity: the proper functioning of the visual system is assessed in terms of the 
properties it is the function of the system to track and the properties it is the 
function of the system to track in turn determined by the nature of the visual 
system. How, on this view, could we ever step outside the circle to find out that a 
visual system was functioning correctly in the first place?
It appears to be something like this problem that underlies Michael Smith’s 
objection to John Campbell’s naively realistic ‘Simple View’ of colour, according to 
which colours are categorical properties whose nature is “transparent” to us. Smith 
writes:
what vindicates our ordinary classification o f shape and size as categorical properties is the 
fact that we can canonically determine the shape and size of an object by (correctly) 
measuring its various sides and angles. It is this that guarantees the independence of facts 
about shape and size from facts about shape and size appearances. But what is the 
analogue of this kind of canonical method in the case of colour? More to the point, what is 
the analogue if the ‘real nature’ of colour is supposed to be ‘transparent’ to us in colour
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experience: that is, if ordinary perception is supposed to be enough to know which 
properties are referred to by our colour terms?30
Smith’s specific worry is that there will be no way of verifying the deliverances of 
colour experience if, like Campbell, we suppose that colours are mind-independent 
properties whose entire nature is revealed in visual experience. The objection, 
however, has wider application. The most plausible physical candidates for the 
colours are types of reflectance property, identified with reference to visual 
experiences of colour (see §6.3). Although we can at least measure reflectance 
properties using a spectrometer, if the only way of delineating these reflectances into 
kinds is with reference to visual experiences of colour, then there will be no 
independent way of checking the deliverances of experience in this case either. If 
colours are mind-independent properties of any kind, then there will be no other 
means of settling disputes but by appealing to the best judgements of perceiving 
subjects.
But then why is this a problem? Smith claims that there is no canonical 
method of determining an object’s colour in the way that there is for determining an 
object’s shape: there are, for instance, no chromatic equivalents of set-squares. But 
why can’t there be different canonical methods proper to different properties? 
Consistent with the mind-independence of colour, for instance, why couldn’t 
looking in optimal conditions just be the canonical method for determining an 
object’s colour? As Warnock remarks in response to Berkeley’s use of the Argument 
from Perceptual Variation:
If a piece of paper looks red in a strong red light and green in a green one, and if it looks 
white when held near a plain glass window at midday, then undoubtedly that piece of paper 
is white... there is a difference in the methods o f drawing the distinction [between 
appearance and reality in the case of primary and secondary qualities]... In some cases we 
measure or count, in others we look again in standard, ordinary normal conditions.31
The objection against the naive view that colours are mind-independent 
suggests a deeply ingrained suspicion of the senses. It is only insofar as we think of
30 1993: 272. Similarly, Cohen complains that although ovoid objects can look round, we have criteria for 
ovoidness that is independent of the way ovoids look: “In stark contrast to these cases, we lack (non- 
stipulative) perception-independent criteria for the colors of things; therefore, unlike the case of 
perceptual variation with respect to being ovoid. . .the case of perceptual variation with respect to color is 
unresolvable without ad hoc stipulation”, 2005: §2.4.
31 1953: 98-9.
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the senses as inherently unreliable that the absence of an independent means of 
determining an object’s colour really represents a cause for concern: it is because of 
a deep-seated mistrust of sensory experience that we feel the need for something, as 
Smith puts it, to “guarantee” the deliverances of our otherwise wayward sensory 
faculties. The limits with respect to our most precise colour judgements 
notwithstanding, however, why accept this assessment of our epistemic situation? It 
begs the question to simply take it as a datum that the senses are inherently 
unreliable, as whether humans at least veridically perceive an object’s determinable 
colour is precisely the point at issue. Moreover, we have already seen that there is -  
at least as a matter of empirical fact — broad inter-subjective agreement about the 
determinable colours of objects.
It is clearly true that if we lack any means of determining colour other than 
looking in optimal conditions then we can never conclusively verify that the colours 
objects appear in daylight at a viewing distance that is neither too near or too far are 
the colours they really are. But as Descartes’s method of doubt teaches us, if what 
we want is conclusive verification, then size and shape are ultimately on no better a 
footing than colour. The canonical method for determining an object’s size and 
shape described by Smith is no less subject to hyperbolic doubt than the canonical 
method for determining an object’s colour. Suppose that we want to know whether 
an object that looks square really is square, and so we follow the procedure 
suggested by Smith of measuring its various angles and sides. If we are seriously 
entertaining doubt about the deliverances of our senses, then perceiving that the 
square has four angles that are each 90° when we measure them with a set-square 
should not be sufficient to satisfy our curiosity. What if it the square only appears to 
have four sides, or its angles only appear to measure 90°?
It is important to bear in mind the extent to which the standing 
presupposition against the reliability of the senses is just an artefact of the post- 
Cartesian outlook. It hasn’t always been this way. Suspicion of the senses, especially 
with respect to secondary quality perception, is largely a legacy of seventeenth 
century mechanism, and contrasts, for instance, with earlier Aristotelian views of 
perception. According to Aristotle, properties like colour and sound are always, at 
least in the relevant conditions, veridically perceived. Because colour and sound are 
special sensibles — they are properties which are perceived only by one sensory
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modality — colour and sound are the properties it is the specific function of our 
visual and auditory sensory modalities to perceive. It is therefore precisely because 
there is no way of determining an object’s colour other than looking and seeing that 
we are entitled to assume that our colour perception, under normal conditions, is 
veridical. If these senses are functioning correcdy, then in the natural circumstances 
optimal to their performance, they are incorrigible: there is no better standard by 
which to judge of colour or sound, and no other method is even necessary. Special 
sensibles contrast, in this respect, with common sensibles like shape and size that we 
can perceive via more than one sensory modality. The very fact that we can perceive 
these properties via more than one sensory modality shows, according to Aristotle, 
that error in our perception of the properties is possible. Indeed, it is precisely 
because our visual perception of these properties is liable to error that independent 
checks and balances are needed.32
All this changed in the seventeenth century. In part the motivation for this 
sea-change were the more or less scientific considerations discussed in Chapter 1, to 
which I will return in Chapters 6 and 7. The theological motivation for this shift 
cannot, however, be underestimated. The late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries saw a renewed interest in Platonism. Given the prevailing Christianised 
Aristotelianism of the Schools, it was important that neo-Platonism was shown to 
be consistent, indeed more consistent than Aristotelianism, with the teachings of the 
Church. The denigration of the senses, and the possibility of explaining their 
weakness in terms of the Scriptures, lay at the heart of this project. This is especially 
clear in one of the most important pieces of seventeenth century philosophy, 
Malebranche’s Search After Truth. After four short introductory chapters — and before 
he proceeds to detail any specific errors associated with the misuse of the senses — 
Malebranche seeks to justify scepticism with regard to the senses on Biblical 
grounds. The “corruption of the senses”, he thinks, can be traced to no less an event 
than the Fall, when Adam:
voluntarily turned himself away from the presence of his God by allowing his mind’s 
capacity to be exhausted by the beauty and anticipated sweetness of the forbidden fruit, or 
perhaps by the rash joy excited in his soul by the contemplation of his natural perfections, 
or finally by his natural fondness for his wife and the inordinate fear of displeasing her.
32 See, for instance, DeAnima 418a, 428b. For a general discussion, see Gaukroger 1990: 4-10.
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Having tasted the forbidden fruit, Adam’s senses and his passions “revolted against 
him.. .they enslaved him, as they do us, to sensible things”. To remedy the 
predicament in which we find ourselves as a result of Adam’s Original Sin, we 
therefore need to “struggle continually against our senses”. About this, Malebranche 
thinks, “reason is in perfect agreement with the gospel”.33
This curious theological justification for rationalism underlines the point that 
it is not just obvious that we should take as our starting point the assumption that 
there is a case to be answered against the senses. That our colour perception is 
unreliable — that it does not veridically reveal the real colours of objects — is 
supposed to be the conclusion of the Argument from Perceptual Variation, not an 
assumption of it.
5. Spectral Inversion
Is the fact that normal trichromatic subjects accurately perceive the determinable 
colours of material objects anything more than a happy coincidence? We certainly 
seem able to imagine more or less far fetched situations in which colour perception 
goes awry as a result of changes in either our constitution or environment. Imagine, 
for instance, that the vitreous humour between the retina and the lens is replaced by 
a fluid that absorbs light from the yellow part of the visible spectrum, or a gas 
released into the atmosphere to similar effect. At the limit, imagine that genetic 
mutation or ‘Z-rays’ in the atmosphere brings about a complete and systematic 
permutation in colour appearance, making colours appear the exact opposite of the 
colours they currently appear.34
If the relationship between colours and our colour experiences is ultimately 
contingent in this way, then this raises a serious problem. Colours are supposed to 
explain our colour experiences. They cannot explain our colour experiences, 
however, if the very same colour could have produced in us quite different colour 
experiences. Although the precise nature of the relationship is controversial, there is 
at least some connection between causation, causal explanation and counterfactuals. 
An object’s being green cannot explain its appearing green if the very same object
33 1674-5: 23-4. It should, of course, be noted that it is not our senses, but the improper use o f our freedom 
in making judgements on the basis of our senses that according to Malebranche is the cause of our error.
34 These examples are from Averill 1992, Chalmers Forthcoming and Edwards 1997.
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could have been a different colour and still appeared green: its being green would 
simply be irrelevant to the explanation of why it appears green.
For the purposes of this objection, it does not matter whether the systematic 
permutation of colours and our colour experiences is detectable. A systematic 
permutation of colour appearance is certainly much easier to imagine than a 
situation in which the sizes and shapes that objects visually appear to be are 
systematically misrepresentative of their real nature. If square towers systematically 
looked round, the permutation is one that we could soon detect: we would realise 
that something was wrong when we tried to walk around these towers, staying a 
constant distance wrong from the walls without making any 90° turns; or, tracing 
our hands around the tower, we noticed four sharp, equally spaced, corners; or so 
on. Colours, in contrast, lack the wide cosmological role of shape and size: they are 
mind-independent properties of objects that cause our colour experiences, but not 
much else besides. It therefore does not take a great leap of imagination to conceive 
of situations in which the experiences that colours produce are systemically 
permuted. The impact of permutation of this kind on the rest of our lives would be 
at best minimal. So long as the permutation was stable, it would not greatly affect 
the primary uses to which we put colour vision: we could still use colour vision to 
segregate the visual scene, and identify and reidentify material subjects. As 
Malebranche remarks:
sensations of colour are given to us only for the purpose of picking out one body from 
another and it would do as well to see the grass as red or green as long as the person seeing 
it as red or green always saw it in the same way.35
Of course, if we’re supposing that the colour perception of one section of 
human society is permuted with respect to another, then the permutation may yet be 
detectable. The property space that human colours define is asymmetrical: it does 
not contain any axes of symmetry along which its elements can be inverted, such 
that this inversion would not be noticed. Consider, by way of illustration, the blue- 
yellow axis. Blues look blue at all lightness levels, whereas yellows only appear 
yellow at high levels of lightness: if a yellow sample is darkened, this induces a hue
35 1674-5: 66. Locke, in the quotation at the start o f the chapter, agrees with Malebranche that a stable 
spectral inversion would not affect the uses that we make o f colour perception, but disagrees with 
Malebranche that this kind of inversion is rife.
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shift, and the sample ceases to look yellow and appears brown instead. Therefore if 
the colour perception of a community of otherwise normal human subjects was 
permuted along the blue-yellow axis, this permutation would be readily detectable. 
Watching the Oxford-Cambridge boat race, for instance, a member of the permuted 
community would judge that the two teams were wearing tops whose colours 
differed in kind, whereas we would say that their tops were both shades of the same 
colour: hence the names, Oxford blue and Cambridge blue.^
Still, to get the explanatory problem going it is sufficient that an object could 
be really dark blue and yet appear brown. If blue things could be exactly as they are 
and yet look brown, then this threatens the availability of blueness in explanations of 
our blue experiences. The current discussion of colour permutation therefore differs 
from more standard discussions in which spectral inversion figures: in relation to 
behaviourist, functional, or physical theories of the mental, where the inversion has 
to be undetectable. If anything, however, this difference actually makes the current 
problem more intractable. If the inversion has to be undetectable for the argument in 
which it features to work, then this at least leaves open responses based on the 
asymmetrical — or more controversially, necessarily asymmetrical nature — of colour 
space. Although, for reasons that I come back to in §6.5, this kind of response may 
not be ultimately successful, at least it is not foreclosed at the very outset.
Can we resist the argument against the mind-independent reality of colours 
in some other way? The argument depends crucially upon the claim that it is 
conceivable that, contrary to empirical fact, colours and the colour experiences that 
they are properties to produce could be systematically permuted. This suggests two 
different strategies we could employ: deny either the conceivability claim or the 
inference from conceivability to possibility.
Questions about conceivability raise a number of thorny issues. But the 
prospects for the first strategy — denying the conceivability claim — do not seem 
especially promising. Something will have gone very badly wrong with our account 
of conception if it turns out that we cannot at least conceive of the systematic 
permutation of our colour experiences: if we cannot conceive of marigolds looking 
like violets, and vice versa.
36 See Palmer 1999b for a discussion of asymmetries in colour space.
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The second option — denying the inference from conceivability to possibility 
— is therefore much more promising. First of all, consider in more detail the 
scenarios in which permutation is supposed to occur. Although it is very easy to 
gesture at situations in which the systematic permutation of colour experiences 
could arise, more sober reflection on the details of these situations raises serious 
doubts about their cogency. Consider, for instance, Averill’s claim that, “the human 
eye could change, in certain physically possible ways, so that after the change a few 
objects would appear to be different in colour to normal observers”: for instance, 
that the vitreous humour in the eye could be replaced by a fluid that absorbs light in 
the yellow part of the visible spectrum.37
Even if the kind of change in the eye that Averill describes were physically 
possible, the first thing to say is that it is not simply obvious that there would be a 
corresponding change in the colours objects appear. Consider, by way of 
comparison, actual physiological differences amongst normal human perceivers. 
According to the simplified opponent-process model used by Hardin, the signal in 
the yellow-blue opponent psychophysical channel is determined by summing the 
output of the L and M retinal receptors, and then subtracting the output of the S 
cones. Given this, it seems natural suppose that substantial differences in the ratios 
of L and M cones in the eye should dramatically alter individual subjects’s 
perception of yellow. In fact, however, the ratio of L to M cones in subjects who do 
not differ substantially in their location of unique yellow can range from anything 
between 10:1 to 0.4:1. Neitz etal explain this finding by suggesting that colour 
perception is mediated by a “plastic neural mechanism” that compensates for low- 
level differences in a subject’s perceptual apparatus.38 But if in general there is this 
adaptive ability, perhaps a difference in the vitreous humour of the eye would not 
lead to a significant difference in colour appearance after all.
The fact that the visual system has this incredible adaptive ability in the first 
place raises a deeper point. There has to be some reason why the visual system goes 
to the trouble of normalising the output of its retinal receptors in this way. It must 
confer upon it some tangible advantage. Assuming that evolution represents an 
adaptation to features of the environment, a natural suggestion is that the advantage
37 1992: 552.
38 Neitz et al 2002: 784. We have already encountered the functional plasticity of the neural mechanisms 
that realise colour vision in explaining differences in the spectral location of unique green (§5.3).
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that this normalisation confers is that of enabling the visual system to veridically 
track mind-independent properties of material objects. Evolution may not be part of 
fundamental physics, but it is surely, in some suitably inclusive sense of the word, a 
‘physical theory’. But if so, then consistent with the evolutionary fitness of humans 
to track colours in their environment, perhaps it is not in fact physically possible for 
our eyes to undergo the changes that would result in a systematic permutation of 
colour experience after all.
These considerations raise difficult questions for the inference from 
conceivability to possibility on which the permutation argument rests. But they do 
not yet fully vindicate the naive view that colours are mind-independent properties. 
The thought that colours could be systematically permuted is a very natural one: 
talking about colour to the folk, you invariably encounter some variation on ‘I’ve 
often wondered whether what I see as green is the same as what everyone sees as 
green’. This very common intuition does not rely on any complicated thoughts 
about genetic mutation or changes in the vitreous humour. It relies just on the 
simple idea that you can imagine marigolds appearing the colour that violets 
currently appear, and vice versa. Given that the motivation for defending the mind- 
independence of colour was in the first place to respect our naive thought about 
colour, it therefore seems somewhat duplicitous at this point to dismiss in so 
perfunctory a way the common sense intuition that my colour experiences might 
have been different.
The problem is not so much that spectral inversion is inconsistent with the 
naive view that colours are mind-independent properties: it seems unreasonable to 
demand of any theory that it at no point come into conflict with common sense. It 
is rather that nothing has been done to mitigate the intuitive pull of the objection 
against the mind-independent reality of colours. A satisfactory response to the 
objection needs to explain away the conceivability. It needs to explain why, even 
though it is clearly conceivable that our colour experiences could be systematically 
permuted, the inference from conceivability to possibility fails.
To this end, we need to consider in more detail why the problem arises in 
the first place. The permutation problem gets a grip because in trying to accurately 
capture the phenomenology of experience we drive a wedge between colours and 
our colour experiences. To say that colours are mind-independent is just to say that
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we can make sense of these properties existing in the absence of our experience of 
them. I have argued that we are able to conceive of the unperceived existence of 
colour in virtue of thinking about the internal relations of similarity and difference in 
which colours stand. The permutation objection now works by severing the tie 
between these two different aspects of our conception of colour: by holding fixed 
our grasp of the ‘internal relations’ in which colours stand and varying the ‘external 
relations’ the objects that instantiate them bear to perceiving subjects. In other 
words, the permutation problem exploits our bipartite conception of colour. That we can 
conceive of colours producing different experiences to the experiences they actually 
produce reflects the fact that we have the conceptual resources to think about 
colours and the colour experiences that they produce in relative independence of 
each other. Indeed, the fact that the permutation objection is such an intuitive 
objection supports the original claim that we conceive of colours as mind- 
independent properties: the objection would not be so intuitive if we did not, at least 
implicitly, think of colours in this way.
The important point to stress here, however, is that it does not follow from 
the relative conceptual independence of the internal and external aspects of colour that 
there is a corresponding metaphysical distinction. Perhaps, to use Cartesian 
terminology, the distinction between the internal and external aspects of colour is 
not a real distinction', it is not a distinction between entities that are actually, or even 
counterfactually, capable of independent existence. The distinction may just be a 
mere distinction of reason. The internal and external aspects of colour may be distinct 
only in the sense that we can think about them in relative conceptual 
independence.39
Using this distinction between distinctions, we can explain why it is that we 
can conceive of spectral inversion and at the same time deny its possibility. In effect, 
the mistake the permutation objection makes is akin to that which Descartes accuses 
the Scholastics of making in treating colours as ‘real qualities’ (§1.1): we confuse 
conceptual with metaphysical independence. In conceiving of a situation in which 
yellowness has the power to produce blue experiences, for instance, we rightly
39 On the difference between real distinctions and mere distinctions of reason, see 1644:1.51-61, and 
1641, First Keplier. 85. Descartes actually uses the term ‘distinction of reason’ to refer to the distinctions 
between substances and properties and different properties of the same substance, not aspects of the 
same property. Hopefully, though, the extension of this term to the latter case is clear enough.
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appreciate the conceptual independence of the internal and external aspects of 
yellowness, but illicitly draw from this the metaphysical conclusion that yellowness 
could produce in us blue experiences, and therefore that it is merely a contingent fact 
about yellowness that it produces blue experiences. But the conceivability of 
systematic permutation does not entail its possibility. The distinction between 
colours and their powers to produce experiences may be nothing more than a mere 
distinction of reason.
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[6] Physicalism
Why Yellow holds a sympathy, or symbolical relation with Vermillion and Green, and Green 
with Sky-colour and Yellow.. .is no other but the Affinity of their respective Causes.
Charleton 1654: 192.
PHILONOUS. .. .are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?
HYLAS. I am.
PHILONOUS. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to 
motion.
HYLAS. It may.
PHILONOUS. It is then good sense to speak of motion, as of a thing that is loud, sweet, acute, 
ot grave.
Berkeley 1713:172.
The mind-independence of colour is consistent with different accounts of what 
colours are. According to phjsicalists, colours are properties that have a hidden 
essence only revealed by physical theory: typically, they are surface reflectance 
properties in virtue of which material objects modify incident light.1 Although this 
kind of physicalism about colour is consistent with the common sense view that 
colours are mind-independent properties, it does not fully vindicate the deliverances 
of our ordinary colour experience, as colours turn out to be properties who essential 
nature is hidden from view. Physicalism about colour contrasts in this respect with 
the view that colours are suigeneris mind-independent properties: mind-independent 
properties that are distinct from the light affecting properties described in physical 
theory. If colours are sui generis properties, then colour experience is itself sufficient 
for us to know what these properties are.
Whether colours are physical properties is the subject of this chapter. In §6.1, 
I argue that there is no short cut to the conclusion that colours are sui generis mind- 
independent properties via 'Revelation, the thesis that colours are properties whose 
entire nature is revealed in visual experience. Although I will eventually argue that 
revelation is (at least in some sense) true, its truth is not enshrined in common sense 
thought about colour; indeed, it follows from the naive view of colours as mind- 
independent that whether colours transcend our experience of them is an open 
question. Whether colours are physical properties depends instead on whether there
1 This is so far a stdpulative definition of physicalism, albeit one that coheres with the way in which this 
term is generally used. I discuss what is meant by ‘physical’ in more detail in Chapter 7. In advance, 
however, it should be noted that the denial o f physicalism should not simply be equated with the denial 
of naturalism, broadly construed.
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are any physical properties that can explain distinctive features of the 
phenomenology of our colour experience. Although common sense does not 
require that colours have only those properties that they appear to, it does at least 
assume that they have all the properties that we perceive them to.
The general problems for physicalism in this respect are illustrated in §6.2 by 
considering Newtonian theories of colour, whilst §6.3 considers more recent 
attempts to identify colours with light-affecting properties. In each case these 
theories fail to respect the naive intuition that colour experiences simply inherit their 
phenomenology from the properties that they are experiences of. Particularly 
problematic is the identification of physical properties that stand in the internal 
relations of similarity and difference characteristic of the colours. Consistent with 
there being no physical properties that stand in these relations, two attempts to deny 
that colours are perceived to stand in any relations of similarity and difference at all 
are considered in §6.4, whilst §6.5, in contrast, considers an attempt to employ the 
selection metaphor encountered in §4.4 to identify physical properties that stand in 
the right internal relations after all. Ultimately, however, I will suggest that we can 
only accept the phenomenological inheritance thesis if colours are sui generis 
properties.
1. Revelation
To decide whether our ordinary conception of colour is consistent with physicalism, 
we first need to determine quite how much is implicit in our common sense thought 
about colour. It is, for instance, sometimes suggested that we ordinarily conceive of 
colours as properties whose entire (or intrinsic) nature is revealed — or, substituting 
one metaphor for another, laid bare — in visual experience. In his influential 
discussion of this question Johnston, for instance, claims that Revelation -  which 
Johnston states as the thesis that “the intrinsic nature of [for example] canary yellow 
is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as of a canary yellow thing”— is one 
of five core common sense beliefs about colour. In other words, according to
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Johnston it is part of our ordinary thought that colours have not just all, but only 
those properties that they appear to have in visual experience.2
If this is right, then it represents a short cut to the conclusion that 
physicalism is inconsistent with the truth of our ordinary colour thought. According 
to the physicalist, colours are properties whose nature outruns the conception of 
them that we are able to form on the basis of visual experience: they are properties 
that have a hidden essence it is the role of physical science to uncover. If it is part of 
our naive thought about colour that colours are properties whose entire nature is 
simply laid bare in visual experience, then physicalism necessarily convicts ordinary 
thought of error from the very outset.
But as a descriptive metaphysical claim — a claim about the actual structure of 
our conceptual scheme — is this correct? Leaving to one side the question of 
whether Revelation is actually true, do we at least ordinarily take colours to be 
properties whose entire nature is revealed in visual experience?
Answering this question is not a straightforward matter, as it is not 
immediately clear even what it means to say that colours appear to be properties 
whose entire nature is revealed in visual experience. In no small measure, the 
problem lies in the unclarity of the key terms: ‘entire’ or ‘intrinsic’, and ‘visual 
experience’. Johnston is himself acutely aware of this problem, and at this point 
defers to the great and the good for assistance. If anything, however, the great and 
the good to whom Johnston appeals actually undermine his claim that Revelation is 
part of our common sense thought about colour. Consider, for example, the 
following remarks from Russell:
the particular shade of colour that I am seeing.. .may have many things to say about 
it... [but] so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of 
truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it and no further 
knowledge of it is even theoretically possible.3
Johnston uses this passage to try to explain the thesis of Revelation that he 
attributes to common sense. The first thing to say about this remark, however, is 
that it is not even clear that the contrast that Russell has in mind is the contrast in 
which Johnston is interested. Russell makes this remark in the course of
2 Johnston 1992: 1389. For discussions of Revelation that follow Johnston, see McLaughlin 2003: 97-8
and Byrne and Hilbert Forthcoming.
3 1912: 25.
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distinguishing between knowledge by acquaintance, which is grounded in ‘direct 
awareness’ of a thing, and knowledge by description, which is grounded in intermediary 
processes of inference. The distinction that Russell is trying to track is therefore the 
distinction between things of which we are directly aware and things to which we 
have only intermediate access. But of itself, the mediate-immediate distinction is not 
even co-extensive with the distinction between things whose nature we know 
entirely and things whose nature our experience leaves in any way indeterminate. We 
can, so the joke goes, be indirectly aware of an elephant in the fridge by seeing 
footprints in the butter. But this does not mean that by (immediately) seeing the 
footprints in the butter we thereby come to know what butter is ‘perfectly and 
completely’. Visual experience does not, for instance, suffice to tell us anything 
about the chemical composition, or even the taste, of butter.
Part of the problem here is that Russell’s contrast between knowledge of 
‘colour itself and ‘truths about colour’ is itself left somewhat vague. Insofar as the 
surrounding context helps to determine this unclarity, however, it does so by 
underlining Russell’s distance from common sense thought at this point. Russell’s 
remark is made within the context of arguing for a theory of perception according to 
which the immediate objects of perception are not persisting mind-independent 
material objects and their abiding properties, but fleeting mind-dependent sense-data. The 
mind-dependence of sense-data offers a clear rationale for the view that colours are 
properties whose entire nature is laid bare in visual experience. If sense-data and 
their properties depend for their existence on our experience of them, then it is a 
natural thought that their nature cannot transcend this experience; there can be 
nothing more to these experience-dependent properties than those features of which 
we are aware. But equally clearly — at least unless we are Berkeley — a sense-datum 
theory of perception is no part of our common sense thought, and Russell himself 
does not himself claim otherwise: that mind-independent objects and their 
properties are the objects of perception is one of the things that Russell thinks we 
assume to be certain in daily life but which, “on a closer inspection, is found to be 
so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to 
know what it is that we really may believe”.4
4 1912: 1. In trying to elucidate Revelation, Johnston also refers to Galen Strawson’s remark that “colour 
words are words for properties which are of such a kind that their whole and essential nature as
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At this point, things get even worse for Johnston. Not only does Russell not 
attribute Revelation to our ordinary thought, but if Russell does think that anything 
like this thesis is in fact true it is not because he thinks that there is anything special 
about colour perse. It is because he holds the more general view that the objects of 
experience depend for their existence on our perception of them. For Russell, 
Revelation is as true of primary qualities like shape and hardness as it is of secondary 
qualities like colour, as the sentences immediately preceding that quoted above make 
clear:
We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without 
the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the 
presence o f my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of 
my table — its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are things of which I am 
immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my table...
At this stage, Russell still thought that we could infer the nature of persisting 
mind-independent material substance from the mind-dependent direct objects of 
experience. As Russell himself later came to realise, there are, of course, serious 
problems with this view: the mind-independent world becomes at best a nouminal 
‘ something-we-know-not-what’, the unknowable causes of our experience. The 
possibility of determinate thought about a mind-independent world therefore 
involves denying precisely this kind of view of our primary quality concepts. We 
cannot simply be thought to have a “purely sensory conception” of an object’s 
primary qualities. Possessing a conception of a mind-independent world requires 
richer concept forming mechanisms than empiricists like Berkeley and Russell allow 
for. As Evans, for instance, puts it:
it does not appear to be possible to regard the conception of the shape of a material thing 
— with all the propositions about its characteristic behaviour and interaction with other 
bodies that this implies — as the same as whatever shape concepts might be grounded in 
the colour mosaic thought to be given in immediate visual experience.5
We need to suppose instead that the sense of our shape concepts is determined in 
part by the primitive theory that we bring to sensory experience. In other words we
properties can be and is fully revealed in sensory-quality experience given only the qualitative character 
that that experience has”, 1989: 224. These remarks are made within the context of arguing that the 
immediate objects of colour perception are mind-dependent sensational properties of a pixelated visual 
field.
5 1980: 270.
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need to suppose that Revelation, as it is stated by Russell, is false of the primary 
qualities.
The moral of the earlier discussion of Evans, however, was that if Revelation 
is false of the primary qualities, then it is also false of the secondary qualities. With 
respect to secondary qualities like colour, Evans accepts that Revelation as it is 
formulated in the Berkeley-Russell tradition is implicit in our ordinary thought. 
Evans’s mistake, however, is to assume that the concept forming mechanisms 
licensed by empiricists like Berkeley are sufficient even to account for our secondary 
quality concepts. The sense of our secondary quality concepts, no less than the sense 
of our primary quality concepts, is determined at least in part by a primitive theory 
that we bring to sensory experience. It is only if we reject the poverty of the 
secondary quality concept forming mechanisms admitted by empiricists that we can 
respect our common sense belief in the mind-independence of colour, and 
acknowledge the role that this belief plays in grounding our conception of mind- 
independent material substance (see §2.3).
Once we accept this sufficiently rich understanding of ‘visual experience’, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to attribute to ordinary thought the view that the 
entire nature of colour is revealed in ordinary visual experience. If colours are, as 
they appear to be, mind-independent properties, then there is no obvious reason 
why their nature could not outrun our conception of them. To say that colours are 
mind-independent is just to deny that their existence depends on our experience of 
them. And if colours do not depend for their existence on our experience of them, 
then there is no obvious reason to suppose that there couldn’t be aspects of their 
nature about which we are ignorant. Indeed, to at least some extent, this is precisely 
what we find.
Despite lacking an especially wide cosmological role, colours are still capable 
of conferring surprising causal powers on their bearers. Nor do we think that there 
is anything absurd in this, as we should if it was part of our ordinary thought about 
colour that the entire nature of colour is simply revealed in visual experience. The 
relationship between colour and light, for instance, is not simply laid bare in 
experience. In the post-classical West, it was not until the resurgence of mechanism 
in the seventeenth century that the idea of a close link between colour and light 
really gained currency at all: up until this point the predominant view was still the
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Aristotelian view that colours literally separate themselves from material objects, fly 
through the air and imprint themselves on the sensory organs.
The more specific relationship between colour and light was not known until 
much later still. It is only by experimenting with differently coloured lights that we 
discover relatively robust correlations between colours and their propensity to 
reflect these lights. White objects, for instance, reflect equally and in good measure 
light of any colour, thereby taking on the appearance of the light under which they 
are illuminated. Black objects also reflect light of any colour equally, but do so in 
each case poorly, and so take on the colour appearance of no light. Chromatically 
coloured objects, in contrast, reflect to a greater or lesser extent light of any colour, 
although generally fail to reflect in any substantial way light of their complement. 
Complementary colours are the colours of coloured lights that yield an achromatic 
colour when the two are additively mixed: red, for instance, is the additive 
complement of green and vice versa, yellow the additive complement of blue and vice 
versa, and so on.6
This is not the only surprising effect that objects can have in virtue of being 
coloured. The effect on perceived colour of simultaneous contrast can also be 
unexpected. Chevreul’s weavers, for instance, were certainly surprised to be told that 
it was the juxtaposition of black with red on their calicos that caused the black to 
appear slightly greenish, and not the inferior quality of the dyes used in the Gobelin 
tapestry factory. Indeed, we are liable to find even very simple simultaneous contrast 
effects, like Figure 3.1, shocking when we first see them.
No less surprising can be the higher-level effects of colour on our mood and 
aesthetic sensibility. For instance, it is only once you realise that red makes people 
eat faster that you understand the rationale behind the colour schemes in fast food 
restaurants. The aesthetic effects of different colours are similarly something that we 
need to discover through experience: colours that in the abstract sound as though 
they will be terrible in combination can be surprisingly effective, and vice versa.
What about the other aspect of colour: the internal relations of similarity and 
difference in which colour stand? Given the role that I have argued grasping these 
relations plays in our conception of colours as mind-independent properties,
6 These facts form the basis of Westphal’s general account of colour. Westphal identifies colours in terms 
of the coloured light that objects fail substantially to reflect. Westphal 1987: especially 80-6. For 
discussion, see Broackes 1992: 211-18.
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ordinary visual experience must in general be sufficient to ground knowledge of 
these relations. By and large, this is clearly correct. We do not, for instance, need to 
go to great lengths to discover that yellow is more like orange than red, or that blue 
is more like cyan than green. These facts are just obvious: they simply force 
themselves upon us in the relevant circumstances. But is the entire nature of this 
aspect of colour known in this way?
Brown is at least potentially problematic. With no direction, it is not 
unnatural to class brown amongst the elemental colours: red, yellow, green, blue, 
black and white. Whereas dark blue clearly appears to be a perceptual mixture of 
blue and black and pink a perceptual mixture of red and white, brown can seem 
much more difficult to place. Fuld et al, for instance, found that given free use of 
ordinary colour vocabulary most subjects require ‘brown’ in addition to ‘yellow’ and 
‘black’ to describe samples from this region of colour space. Subsequent 
experiments by have cast doubt on whether brown really is an elemental colour: 
when directed to name colour samples using just the names of the standard six 
elemental colours, Quinn et al found that subjects do not hesitate to describe brown 
samples in terms of yellow and black — indeed, once you hear this, it can be difficult 
not to the see the previously obscure affinity between brown, yellow and black. But 
still, this at least suggests that there can be non-obvious facts about colour space.7
Similarly surprising can be the discovery of internal relations of similarity 
between the elemental colours themselves. When the differences between samples 
are too great, direct judgements of similarity tend to collapse. This can make it 
difficult to determine directly similarities between the elemental colours.8 As a rough 
illustration, line up — with the spine facing towards you and in this order — the green 
Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition of Hume’s Enquiries, the blue Ayers edition of 
Berkeley’s 'Philosophical Works and the red Kemp Smith’s edition of Kant’s Critique. 
Are any two of these more similar to each other in respect of colour than either is to 
the other? This question may seem difficult to answer with any great certainty; 
certainly much more difficult than if you replace the Berkeley with the green 
Lennon-Olscamp edition of Malebranche’s Search After Truth. Yet we know from 
empirical investigation into human colour space that Berkeley and Hume actually
7 Fuld et al 1983, Quinn et al 1988.
8 Indow 1988: 461.
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more closely resemble each other than either resemble Kant (maybe you can judge 
some books by their covers after all!).
Human colour space is asymmetrical: it is not possible to map just any point 
of this space onto any other whilst at the same time preserving the structure of the 
space. This manifests itself in a number of ways, although for present purposes just 
consider the dimension hue. According to the Munsell system of colour 
classification, which divides the hue circle up into 100 perceptually equal steps 
judged at the level of just noticeable differences, there are not four, but five basic hue 
groups: the four elemental hues identified by Hering — red, yellow, green and blue — 
plus purple. The reason for this is that the number of perceptually equal hue steps 
between the between the unique hues in the Munsell system varies considerably: 
from red to yellow it is 23; from yellow to green, 18; from green to blue 28; and 
from blue to red 31. Purple is identified as a basic Munsell hue so that the basic hues 
can be equally spaced around the perimeter of the hue circle.9
It is important to exercise caution when approaching the Munsell data, as the 
samples in the Munsell colour atlas are spaced according to colorimetric rules of 
additive colour mixture using photometers and Maxwell disks, rather than direct 
visual observation. As a result, multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) studies on the 
Munsell system of colour classification have since revealed slight anomalies: along 
the hue axis, for instance, in the blue-purple region, unnoticed during the Munsell 
renotation of 1943, whereby colours between Munsell-Blue (‘5B’) and Munsell- 
Purple-Blue (‘5PB1) look comparatively too similar to each other.10 Still, these MDS 
studies vindicate Munsell’s basic partition of the hue circle into five, a feature 
preserved in the isotropic Optical Society of America (OSA) colour space, which 
unlike the Munsell system does give a strict preference to colour appearances over 
psychophysical data.11
This means that we need to add to the most commonly cited similarity and 
difference relations, similarity and difference relations between the elemental colours 
themselves-, according to the recalibration of the Munsell system suggested by MDS
9 Although this requires slightly adjusting the locations of the other unique hues: although Munsell- 
Green, Yellow and Red correspond quite closely to unique green, yellow and red, Munsell-Blue is quite a 
long way from unique blue, and looks like a blue-green. See Sivik 1997: 170.
10 There are also slight anomalies along the axis o f saturation (“Chroma”): the first step tends to be much 
larger than any of the others whilst, conversely, the last steps tend to be much smaller than the rest. See 
Indow 1988.
11 Indow 1988: 463, Jameson and d’Andrade 1997: 299-301.
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studies, for instance that blue and green are more similar to each other than either is 
to the adjacent elemental hue. This certainly explains some striking linguistic 
phenomena. If blue and green are more similar to each other than either is to the 
adjacent hue, then it makes perfect sense, for instance, that most languages contain 
the so-called “composite basic colour terms” ‘warm’ and ‘cool’, the former referring 
to red and yellow, and the latter to blue and green.12 Indeed, this also explains the 
fact that in some languages green and blue can even be used interchangeably: in 
Japanese, for example, it is at least rhetorically acceptable to use the phrase “blue 
leaves”.13
What these examples show is that we can be surprised both by the causal 
powers associated with colours and the internal relations of similarity and difference 
in which colours stand. Now of course, as it happens, these are all cases in which 
colour experience is itself necessary to discover the initially recalcitrant phenomena. 
It is, for instance, by using our colour vision to arrange coloured chips into a 
similarity ordering that we realise that blue and green are in fact closer to each other 
than either is to the nearest elemental colour. Similarly, it is by perceiving the effects 
of shining coloured lights at objects that we discover that, for example, white objects 
take on the appearance of the incident light, and so on. But there is no obvious 
reason why all novel facts about colour must be discoverable in this way. If colours 
are, as common-sense dictates, mind-independent properties, then it seems 
reasonable to suppose that colours might turn to have causal powers of some wholly 
different kind; causal powers that impact in no way upon conscious experience. If 
so, then there is no way of ruling out in advance the possibility that colours are 
identical with physical light-affecting properties of objects.
2. Wavelength-Physicalism
It follows from the common sense view that colours are mind-independent 
properties that there is no reason to suppose that they must instantiate only those 
properties that visual experience can discover. Far less negotiable, however, is the 
thought that colours at least have all the properties that we can perceive them to.
12 Berlin and Kay 1969.
13 Indow 1988: 464.
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Common sense dictates that experience is generally the way that it is because of 
facts about the world: things appear thus-and-so is because things are thus-and-so.
In the case of colour, this means that it is natural to suppose that the character of, 
for example, a yellow experience is explained by the way yellowness actually ir, it is 
explained by the qualitative character of what that experience is an experience of, 
yellowness itself. As Campbell puts it, the natural thought is that colour experiences 
inherit their qualitative character from the colours they are experiences of.14 In effect, 
this just falls out of the simple theoiy of perception that we need to grasp in order to 
conceive of mind-independent existence in the first place. To grasp a simple theory 
of perception is to grasp the distinction between our experiences and that of which 
our experiences are experiences, and thereby grasp the thought that our experience 
is responsive to features of the world (§2.1).
To decide whether colours are physical properties we therefore need to 
determine whether there are any physical properties that are consistent with this 
Phenomenological Inheritance Thesis. If there are not, then physicalism will be 
incompatible with our common sense thought about colour. Of itself, this will not 
show that colours are sui generis properties. Still, in advance of addressing the 
problem of locating sui generis mind-independent colours within the natural world, 
this will at least give us a defeasible reason for thinking that colours are not physical 
properties.
How well, then, does physicalism fare at respecting the Inheritance Thesis? 
The range of material world entities perceived to instantiate colour is spectacularly 
diverse. It includes lights, liquids, gases, and all kinds of solid material object, from 
transparent stained glass to opaque coffee tables and mugs. Amongst coloured 
things there are at least fifteen standard causes of colour experience, from 
incandescence, molecular vibration and excitation, transitions between molecular 
orbitals, to dispersive refraction, diffraction and scattering.15 Given this diversity, the 
prospects for identifying a non-disjunctive microphysical property shared by things 
that are all perceived to instantiate a common colour, let alone explaining the 
perceived internal relations between the colours in terms of these heterogeneous 
properties, are not especially promising.
14 Campbell 1993: 189. For a discussion of the ‘inheritance’ metaphor, see Shoemaker 2003.
15 For more details, see Nassau 1983.
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Much more promising are the properties of objects to modify light: by 
reflecting, refracting, diffusing, scattering or emitting this light in a specific way. This 
is a point that has long been appreciated. The Cartesians, for instance, identified 
colours with dispositions of objects to affect the rotational motion of light particles 
(“globules of the second element”). On the Cartesian view, white bodies reflect light 
without affecting its nature, black bodies entirely “break up the light-rays that meet 
them and take away all their force”, whilst chromatically coloured objects affect the 
light particles in way analogous to the way in which ‘grazing’ a ball affects its 
motion. As Descartes explains in the Description of the Human Body, for instance, if the 
speed at which particles of light rotate is smaller than that of their rectilinear motion 
(their local motion towards the eye), then the body appears blue; if, on the other 
hand, the rotational speed of the light particles that a body reflects is greater than 
their rectilinear motion, then the body appears red.16
A significant failing of the Cartesian account of colour, however, is the 
imperspicuous nature of the relationship between the disposition of objects to affect 
the rotational motions of light particles and the colour that these objects are thereby 
perceived to be. In the case of the achromatic colours, there is at least a fairly 
intuitive connection between light interaction and perceived colour: the less the 
body affects the motion of the light particles, the more intense the motions of the 
corpuscles that a body is disposed to reflect, and hence the more intense the 
sensation of white; in contrast, the more the body ‘takes away’ the motion of the 
particles, the less intense their force, and hence the less intense (i.e. the greyer) the 
sensation.17 When it comes to the chromatic colours, however, the relationship 
between the way in which a body affects the light and the colour it is perceived to be 
is wholly opaque. Why should objects that reflect light particles whose rotational 
motion is greater than their rectilinear motion look precisely red? And how is this 
model supposed to generalise to the other chromatic colours in such a way as to 
explain the internal relations in which these colours are perceived to stand? Even the 
usually optimistic Descartes held out little hope of discovering an intuitive 
relationship between perceived colour and dispositions to affect light, suggesting
16 cl 648: 323; cf 1637:1, CSM i: 156.
17 Even Malebranche, who thought that would only be “through the most remarkable luck in the world” 
that everyone had the colour sensations when perceiving the same objects at least thought it “never, or 
almost never, happens that people see black or white other than as we see them”, 1674-5: 63-6.
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that the relationship could only be determined experimentally, and not a priori.™ To 
say that the relationship between physical properties and colours is wholly 
imperspicuous, however, is just to give up on the Inheritance Thesis, the common 
sense thesis that experiences simply inherit their qualitative character from the 
properties that they are experiences of.
Newton’s detailed investigations into the heterogeneous nature of daylight, 
as composed of “rays differently refrangibli\ seemed to at least offer a promising 
solution to this problem.19 According to the Newtonian picture, different colours are 
associated with each of the different rays that compose daylight. Taking these 
‘colours’ of the (‘pure’) monochromatic spectral lights as basic and generalising, 
Newton was able to forge at least some connection between the colours objects 
appear and the colour of the light that they reflect, suggesting that:
Every Body reflects the Rays of its own Colour more copiously than the rest, and from
their excess and predominance in the reflected Light has its Colour.20
So, for instance, yellow objects are yellow because, it is said, they reflect light 
predominantly from the ‘yellow’ part of the visible spectrum, circa 575nms, green 
objects are green because they reflect light from the ‘green’ part of the spectrum, 
circa 550nms, and so on.
The Newtonian ‘wavelength’ conception of colour dominated the scientific 
landscape well into the twentieth century, and is still the view of colour ingrained in 
scientifically tutored common sense to this day. Even leaving to one side its 
empirical inadequacies, however, the problem with the Newtonian conception of 
colour is that it too fails to respect the Inheritance Thesis.
In the first place, the Newtonian view tries to explain all colour appearance 
by generalising from monochromatic spectral lights that stand in a 1-1 relation with 
perceived colour. But the spectral colours are only a subset of the colours that we 
can actually perceive. The generalisation from monochromatic spectral lights to
18 1637:1, CSM i: 156.
19 Note, Newton did not discover the heterogeneous nature of daylight. Rainbows had long been known of, 
and at least since the thirteenth century man-made spectra — produced using globes of water and later, 
prisms — had been used in attempting to offer explanations of rainbows. Indeed, Descartes proposed an 
account of the production of rainbows in Discourse 8 of the Meterology (1637), illustrating his account by 
reference to the divergent paths of rays from the sun when passed through a glass prism. For a brief 
overview, see Henderson 1970: 4-8.
20 Newton 1730:1.2.2, Def.
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colour is therefore just not general enough: it does not explain the colour 
appearance of objects that appear different in colour to monochromatic spectral 
lights. This problem arises in relation to hue, saturation and lightness.
Of all external stimuli, monochromatic spectral lights are perceived at the 
highest level of saturation. Polychromatic (‘mixed’) lights and surface colours are 
always perceived to be less saturated: in the latter case, for instance, because some of 
the incident light that strikes them is always absorbed. Right from the outset, 
therefore, the most that can be hoped for from the simple wavelength conception of 
colour is an account of perceived colour in terms of hue matching which overlooks 
variations in saturation.21
The Newtonian account of colour is similarly insensitive to variations in 
lightness. Objects that appear to be lightened or darkened hues, for instance, fall 
outside of the scope of the Newtonian account. There are no spectral pinks (a 
perceptual mixture of red and white) and no light blues (a perceptual mixture of blue 
and white). Indeed, not only are there no spectral browns (yellow-orange plus black), 
but there are no brown lights at all. Brown lights are impossible. To be perceived, a 
light must be brighter than its environment: consider, for instance, trying to see 
whether an electrical appliance’s red standby light is on when the appliance is bathed 
in sunlight, and you have to shield the light from the ambient illumination with your 
hand. Browns, however, can only be perceived if they are dark relative to their 
surroundings. Brown is ‘pure contrast colour’ that in the absence of the relative 
contrast cannot be perceived: so, for instance, if you view a chocolate bar through a 
reduction screen (or velvet lined tube) thereby eliminating the contrast effects, the 
chocolate bar does not appear brown, but orange-yellow. But a light cannot both be 
lighter than and darker than its background. Against the darker background 
necessary to perceive a light, a brown light therefore appears yellow-orange.22
Accommodating the pure achromatic colours — colours that vary only in 
lightness — is no less problematic. According to Newtonian lore, white is the 
simultaneous presence of all colour, and black the complete absence of all colour:
21 Additive colour mixture creates a saturation mismatch, as monochromatic light always appears more 
saturated than polychromatic light. To further match the perceived saturation of two colour samples, it is 
necessary to mix a third light with the original source light, and thereby decrease its saturation. For 
example, mixing a specific proportion of green and blue light provides a hue match for a spectral light of  
485 nms; for an exact colour match, however, a red light also has to be mixed with the original spectral 
light in order to reduce its saturation. Hurvich 1981: 99-112.
22 For a discussion of brown, see Westphal 1987: 40-56.
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white light is composed of light of ‘all’ colours (more accurately all spectral colours) 
whereas black is the complete absence of all coloured light. Even ignoring the fact 
that it is actually sufficient to produce a white light that we mix just three 
(appropriately chosen) spectral lights, and not all spectral lights, however, there are 
serious problems with this account. Black and white come in degrees: black objects 
can be blacker than others, and white objects whiter than others. Can presence and 
absence of colour also come in degrees? And how does grey fit into this account? 
Grey appears to be a perceptual mixture of white and black. Is grey therefore the 
simultaneous presence and absence of all colour?
Indeed, the Newtonian account of colour is not even able to fully account 
for hue. Unique red is the reddest red: it is a red which appears to be neither 
greenish nor yellowish. Yet unique red is not a spectral colour. Neither are many of 
the colours that lie in the purple region of the hue circle. On the Newtonian account 
we therefore we cannot even explain why prototypically red things appear red, or 
purple things appear purple: there is no unique red spectral light for unique red 
things to be disposed to most copiously reflect, and no purple spectral light for 
purple things to reflect most copiously either.
Even if it were possible to explain all the colours objects appear in terms of 
the limited subset of spectral colours, however, the Newtonian account of colour 
would still fail to respect the Inheritance Thesis. First, and overlooking the fact that 
unique red is not even a spectral colour, the Newtonian account of colour cannot 
accommodate the special landmark status that we accord to the unique hues. There 
is no distinction corresponding to the unique-binary distinction at the level of 
wavelengths. Indeed, the very idea that uniqueness is able to mark any distinction 
amongst monochromatic light wavelengths is strained to say the least. By definition, 
all /^//achromatic lights are unique.23
More importantly — given the fundamental role that I have argued these 
relations play in our thought about colour — the identification of monochromatic 
lights with perceived colour does nothing to explain the internal relations of 
similarity and difference in which colours stand. Monochromatic wavelengths only 
poorly approximate to perceived colour throughout the visible spectrum. Generally 
speaking, equal differences in wavelength do not correspond directly to perceptually
23 Westphal 1987: 72.
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equal differences in colour. We have already seen that in the green part of the visible 
spectrum, for example, hue changes slowly in comparison to wavelength: in the 
‘green’ part of the visible spectrum (494-557nms) there is an average of 9nms for 
each perceptually equally spaced Munsell chip, whereas in the ‘yellow’ part of the 
visible spectrum (572-586nms) the average is just 2.8nms (§5.3). A similar 
phenomenon occurs at either end of the visible spectrum.24 Indeed, a purple-blue 
light of circa 400nms and a deep-red light of circa 700nms are, in terms of their 
wavelength, as different as any two lights from the visible spectrum can be. 
Phenomenologically speaking, however, they are in fact very similar, as represented 
by their location on the hue circle.
Worse still, there is not anyway anything about light-reflecting objects that 
according to the Newtonian account can explain why they reflect precisely the 
coloured light they do. Why, for instance, yellow objects reflect yellow light most 
copiously is simply left as a brute fact: no further explanation, in terms of properties 
of yellow objects, is offered. Indeed, once we take into account Newton’s 
qualification that properly speaking even “the Rays.. .are not coloured”, any 
pretence at respecting the Inheritance Thesis dissipates entirely. According to the 
official Newtonian view, there are objects that, for some arbitrary reason, most 
copiously reflect light of a certain wavelength which, for some arbitrary reason, 
produces colour sensations in the sensorium. Outside of the sensorium, nothing is 
really coloured at all. Colour is, as Eddington put it, “a mere mind-spinning”.25
3. Reflectance-Physicalism
At this point the physicalist has a get out jail free card. Wavelength-physicalism is 
not just conceptually flawed, but empirically flawed as well. Perceived colour is not 
correlated with the reflection or emission of light in the way that the wavelength 
conception of light predicts.
It is incorrect for polychromatic lights because the perceived hue of any 
given monochromatic light can be hue-matched by an indefinite number of
24 Helmholtz 1911:126-7.
25 Eddington 1929: 94. In Newton’s words: “Colours in the Object are nothing but a Disposition to 
reflect this or that sort of Light more copiously than the rest; in the Rays they are nothing more but their 
Dispositions to propagate this or that Motion into the Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are 
Sensations of those Motions under the Forms o f Colours”, 1730: 1.2.2, Def.
174
polychromatic lights composed of monochromatic lights from radically different 
parts of the visible spectrum: a monochromatic ‘yellow’ light of 580nms, for 
example, can be matched by mixing a ‘chartreuse’ light of 570nms with a ‘yellow- 
orange’ light of 590nms, a ‘green’ light of 550nms with an ‘orange’ light of 610nms, 
and so on. What matters is merely that the light entering the eye is of the fight 
overall composition.26
The same true of surface colours. Most material objects reflect light at all 
spectral wavelengths. Whilst achromatic objects tend to reflect roughly the same 
amount of light at each spectral wavelength, chromatic objects reflect differing 
amounts of light across the visible spectrum. In each case, however, as with 
polychromatic lights, it is only the overall composition of the light entering the eye 
that is important. So, for instance, although chromatic bodies often do reflect more 
light from their ‘own part’ of the visible spectrum than from any other, it is not 
necessary that this is the case. Objects can reflect light most copiously from other 
parts of the visible spectrum. Consider, for instance, the surface reflectance profile 
of the yellow lemon represented in Figure 6.1. The two regions of the visible 
spectrum in which the lemon reflects the highest proportion of the incident light are 
around 640nms (roughly 67%) and from 690-700nms (roughly 74%). Neither of 
these parts of the spectrum is the ‘yellow’ part: 640nms is a fairly typical red, and 
690-700 is a very dark crimson-red. In fact, in the ‘yellow’ part of the spectrum 
(roughly 580nms), the lemon only reflects about 63% of the incident light.
26 Hurvich 1981: 89-98.
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Figure 6.1: Sample Surface Reflectance Profiles
Source: Byrne and Hilbert 2003.
The obvious physicalist response in light of these empirical facts would be to 
identify colours, not simply with the properties of objects to reflect light most 
copiously from a certain part of the visible spectrum, but to identify colours instead 
with the properties of objects to reflect different proportions of light at every spectral 
wavelength: in other words, to identify colours with their overall reflectance 
property. But this can’t quite be right either. An object’s colour cannot simply be 
identical with its reflectance, because reflectances cut too fine. To uniquely specify 
an object’s colour it is only necessary to determine the three values: hue, saturation, 
and lightness. To uniquely specify its reflectance, however, requires determining the 
proportion of the incident light that the object reflects at each wavelength of the 
visible spectrum. Even sticking to the whole numbered wavelengths, this is roughly 
300 values, and becomes an indefinite number if we include all the wavelengths in 
between. Although in practice it is generally sufficient to determine far fewer values 
than this to uniquely determine an object’s reflectance — at least for naturally 
coloured objects with smooth reflectance profiles -  there is still a significant 
reduction in dimensionality when we move from reflectances to colours: the very 
least we need are between 5-7 values, although somewhere nearer 30 is generally 
more reliable.27
27 Todorovic 2002: 66.
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Because there is this reduction in dimensionality in the move from 
reflectances to colours, objects that have different reflectances can, and often do, 
appear identical in colour under certain circumstances, a phenomenon known as 
metamerisrrr. the surface reflectance profiles of two objects that are metamers in 
natural daylight are illustrated in Figure 6.2. Metamerism arises from the fact that the 
human visual system contains just three types of retinal receptor, that register only 
the total amount of light entering the eye across the broadband wavelengths to 
which they are sensitive: S cones to short-wavelength light, from roughly 400- 
520nms with a peak sensitivity at 440nms, M cones to medium-wavelength light, 
from roughly 430-640nms with a peak sensitivity at 530nms, and L cones to long- 
wavelength light, from roughly 450-700nms with a peak sensitivity at 560nms. 
Because the retinal cones are insensitive to variations of wavelength within these 
bands, any objects that reflect the same overall amount of light across each band 
width produces the same response in the retinal receptors, and (at least typically) the 
same colour perception in the subject. The result is that information about 
individual reflectance properties is lost in the very first stages of visual perception 
and cannot subsequently be regained.
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Figure 6.2: Metamerism
The spectral reflectance profiles of two objects that appear identical green to standard observers in 
natural daylight. Source: Hurvich 1981: 207.
The problem of metamerism leads most physicalists to distinguish 
reflectances in a more coarse-grained way than by straightforward identity or 
difference. Because it is colour as it is perceived by normal human observers in
177
which we are interested, physicalists therefore attempt to delineate reflectances into 
kinds with reference to the responses of normal human subjects. So identified, 
reflectance-types are not in any sense ‘natural’ from the perspective of physical 
science: they are not the kinds of properties that, without reference to human 
subjects, there would be any reason to single out. But so long as we understanding 
‘physical’ in a sufficiently distended sense, to include not just the properties 
quantified over in physical theory but disjunctions of these properties, these 
properties are still physical properties. More to the point, they are physical 
properties that are still robustly mind-independent. Even though these properties 
are type-identified with reference to human responses, they would still exist even in 
the absence of these responses: they are just one set of reflectance-types amongst 
indefinitely many sets of reflectance-type, all of which supervene on the total set of 
reflectances, but not all of which enjoy even the limited anthropocentric privilege of 
those identified to be the colours.
The important question is rather whether reflectance-physicalism fares any 
better than simple wavelength-physicalism when it comes to respecting the 
Inheritance Thesis. Ultimately, it turns out that it does not.
It is natural to suppose that the facts about perceiving subjects the physicalist 
uses to delineate reflectances into anthropocentrically defined kinds should 
themselves be physical facts. Generally speaking, whatever motivation there is to 
think that colours are physical properties is likely to be a motivation to think that 
our colour experiences are also physical: if, for instance, there are any doubts about 
the causal intelligibility of suigeneris colours, then there should be parallel doubts 
about the causal intelligibility of sui generis colour experiences. More specifically, 
wedding physicalism about colours with a non-physical theory of colour experience 
does not sit happily with the Inheritance Thesis. If mind and matter differ 
fundamentally in kind then it is difficult to see how the Inheritance Thesis could be 
true: how, that is, colour experience could simply inherit its qualitative character 
from that of which it is an experience if colour and colour experience are really that 
different. As we saw in §1.5, this combination of views is much more naturally 
associated with the well-worn strategy of ‘kicking the qualitative upstairs’: it is most 
naturally associated with the idea that there is some reason, given their qualitative 
nature, why colours cannot reside in the extradermal material world. To kick the
178
qualitative into the mind, however, is just to admit that colour experiences do not 
inherit their character from that of which they are experiences after all.
With these kinds of consideration in the background, the most popular 
versions of reflectance-physicalism delineate reflectances into kinds with reference 
to the visual processing mechanisms that underlie colour experience, and opponent- 
processing mechanisms in particular: the two chromatic and one achromatic 
neurophysiologically realised psychophysical channels in which the signals from the 
three types of retinal receptor are processed. The rationale for this is simple. These 
processing mechanisms are obviously themselves physical. Moreover, they hold out 
the prospect of explaining many distinctive features of colour experience, including 
for instance the opponent structure of the hues as well as the related unique-binary 
distinction. The reason why red and green, and blue and yellow, are incompatible, 
for example, is that the chromatic channels can code for only either red or green and 
only either yellow or blue: they cannot code for both red and green, or both yellow 
and blue. Hence, there cannot be red-green or yellow-blue colour experiences. In 
contrast, the mutual independence of the two chromatic channels means that there 
can be experiences of the binary hues: orange, cyan, chartreuse and purple. At the 
same time, just as activity in the yellow-blue channel does not preclude activity in the 
red-green channel, neither does activity in one channel presuppose activity in the 
other. The result of activity in just one channel is the experience of a unique hue: a 
hue that appears to be a perceptual mixture of no other colours.
With this in mind, it is common for physicalists to identify colours with 
those properties in virtue of which objects reflect light that issues in the relevant 
opponent-processing. Using as an illustration the over-simplified model of 
opponent-processing that has entered the philosophical consciousness through 
Hardin, for instance, an object is unique red according to this account if the light 
(from an equal energy light source) it reflects in the region of the spectrum to which 
L cones are sensitive (call this region L*) is (significantly) greater than the light it 
reflects in the region to which M cones are sensitive (M*), and the sum of these 
values is equal to the amount of light the object reflects in the region of the 
spectrum to which S cones are sensitive (S*). The first condition entails that the red- 
green opponent channel codes for red: if, in contrast, M*>L* then it codes for 
green, and if M*=L* then it codes neutral. The second condition entails that the
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yellow-blue channel codes neutral: if, in contrast, (L*+M*)-S*>0 then the yellow- 
blue channel codes for yellow and if (L*+M*)-S*<0 then it codes for blue.28
The reflectance-physicalist’s appeal to opponent-processing mechanisms to 
delineate reflectances into anthropocentrically defined kinds raise specific problems; 
more general problems with this approach are considered below. The specific 
problems centre around the fact that opponent-processes are relatively low-level 
processes, the output of which correspond only imperfecdy to full-blown colour 
experiences. Type-identifying reflectances in terms of opponent-processes therefore 
makes it difficult to avoid convicting visual experience of systematic error, thereby 
making violations of the Inheritance Thesis difficult to avoid.
Opponent-processing corresponds roughly to processing that occurs at what 
Marr calls “the image-based stage”. At this stage of visual processing, properties are 
not yet represented as properties of surfaces located in three-dimensional space (the 
so-called 12VtD  Sketch5), let alone as properties of three-dimensional objects.
Instead, colours can be thought of as represented occupying a two-dimensional 
plane perpendicular to the line of sight, lacking texture, and at no depth from the 
eye.29
We can therefore get an insight into what is lost, if in trying to delineate 
surface reflectance properties into anthropocentrically defined kinds, we restrict our 
attention to low-level colour processing mechanisms, by considering colours'. 
colours seen in aperture mode. Depending in part on the conditions under which they 
are seen, and in part on the kind of entity of which they are a property, colours 
differ in their mode of appearance. Most of the colours that we see are object colours, and 
surface colours in particular: they are seen in surface mode, as properties of solid 
opaque objects, or entities like clouds which are at least perceived as opaque objects. 
Surface colours are perceived as spatially located properties with a certain ‘texture’ -  
they follow the contours of the body they are a property of. They offer, as Katz puts 
it, “resistance” to the eye, presenting “a barrier through which the eye cannot pass”.
28 See, for example, Tye 2000 and McLaughlin 2003. The views of Byrne and Hilbert discussed in below 
§6.4 are in many ways similar. Something like this idea is also canvassed by Smith 1987, although Smith’s 
proposal differs in identifying colours as dispositions to produce the right kind of psychophysically 
characterised experience, rather than dispositions to reflect the light in such a way as to issue in the right 
kind of psychophysically characterised experience. For completeness, I should also mention that if 
L*+M*>0 then the achromatic channel codes white, if L*+M*<0 then the achromatic channel codes 
black, and if L*+M *=0 then the achromatic channel codes “brain grey”.
29 See Marr 1982, and for discussion, Palmer 1999a.
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Object colours contrast in this respect with aperture or film colours, that are perceived 
under reduction screens and in uniform expanses of colour like clear blue skies. Film 
colours are generally perceived as textureless properties that lie in a plane 
perpendicular to the direction of vision -  as Katz puts it, they do not lose their 
“essentially frontal-parallel character” — and are perceived either at no depth, or at best 
no determinate depth, from the eye.30
Film colours at least vary in hue, saturation and brightness: it is for this 
reason that it seems reasonable to call them colours at all. Yet there are important 
differences between colours perceived in surface mode and aperture mode. If 
nothing else, not every colour that has a location in colour space can even be seen in 
aperture mode. The perception of the ‘pure’ contrast colours, black, white, grey and 
brown, in particular depends upon organisational properties of the perceived scene 
that are generally eliminated by viewing colours under this mode of presentation. To 
perceive something as brown or black, for instance, requires perceiving it against a 
lighter background. Conversely, to be seen as white, objects needs to be perceived 
against dark backgrounds.
Identifying colours with reference to low-level opponent-processing 
mechanisms leads naturally to the position popular amongst visual scientists that an 
object’s real colour is the colour it appears to have in aperture mode, after the 
effects on perceived colour of properties of the visual scene have been eliminated; 
accordingly, that our experiences of pure contrast colours in particular are almost 
always illusory.31 Tye exemplifies this tendency. Tye identifies black, white, grey and 
brown with their opponently-processed surface reflectance properties, and the 
colours that we normally see with compound, partly relational properties whose 
existence depends in part upon the obtaining of factors extrinsic to their bearers. 
According to Tye, something is really black, for example, if it reflects about 5% of 
the incident light that strikes it at each spectral wavelength. It is the pure contrast 
colour BLACK, however, just in case it is black and darker than its surroundings. 
The property BLACK — the property that we normally perceive — is therefore 
parasitic on the real colour, black, a property which we only veridically perceive 
when we eliminate the contrast effects which partly constitute the compound pure
30 For a more detailed taxonomy of the modes o f appearance of colour, see Katz 1911: especially 7-28.
31 In a recent textbook on colour perception, for instance, Kaiser and Boynton describe the colours that 
objects appear as a result o f this kind of simultaneous contrast as “subjective colours”; 1996: 33-5.
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contrast properties. Furniture in an unlit room is therefore black, but not BLACK.
By parity of reasoning, an enveloping light brown fog is brown, but not BROWN. 
And so on.32
If only from the perspective of Tye’s wider project, there is something deeply 
puzzling about this attribution of widespread perceptual illusion to visual experience. 
Part of Tye’s own argument for an intentionalist (“representationalist”) theory of 
perception is that it is “just not credible” to suppose that visual experience is 
systematically misleading in the way required by sense-datum theories of 
perception.33 The kind of error postulated by sense-datum theories of perception 
differs from that required by Tye to explain our perception of the contrast colours: 
the first case involves the necessary confusion of one object for another, whilst in the 
second case the error lies in the almost inevitable confusion one property for another. 
But if, as Tye appears to suggest, the argument against the sense-datum theories is 
merely an inference to the best explanation — it is much more plausible to suppose 
that visual experience is not systematically misrepresentative — then the argument 
should generalise. If it is more plausible to suppose that visual experience is not 
systematically misleading in the one case, then the same should hold across the 
board.
There is also something odd about this kind of response more generally. The 
physicalist is trying to delineate reflectances into anthropocentrically defined kinds 
on the basis of certain types of human response. We are, however, working with a 
carte blanche, we could carve the reflectance properties of objects in any number of 
ways. Why, then, carve them in a way that has the result of convicting perceptual 
experience of widespread, systematic error? On this view, the human visual system is 
found guilty of typically misperceiving properties that are, in the first place, 
anthropocentrically defined: it is found guilty of misperceiving properties that are 
such as to be perceivable only using peculiarly human perceptual apparatus. If we’re 
already sorting reflectances into gerrymandered kinds in order to guarantee the 
veridicality of colour experience, then it least seems that we should get these kinds 
right.
32 Tye 2000: 150-162.
33 2000: 46.
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The odd position in which we find ourselves at this point is symptomatic of 
the fascination with low-level processing mechanisms. And it is not just 
accommodating contrast effects that this excessively narrow focus renders 
problematic, either. Opponent-processing mechanisms do not even explain why 
colours typically appear to us in surface mode, as properties of objects spatially 
localised in three-dimensional space. At best, the perceived distance of film colours 
from the eye is indeterminate, like the perceived distance of the blue of a clear sky. 
At worst, film colours are perceived at no depth whatsoever. If colour processing 
terminated after opponent-processing at roughly the image-based stage, we could 
expect that colours would be seen as merely overlaying objects, and not as 
properties of those objects. We might, for instance, expect our colour perception to 
be like that of the subject with a cerebral lesion reported by Gelb. For this subject, 
the colours of objects effectively assumed the character of unlocalised film colours: 
the patient reported having to reach ‘into’ the colours of objects in order to touch 
their surfaces.34 But clearly, this is not how the rest of us perceive colours.
Now this is not to say that the existence of opponent-processing 
mechanisms are inconsistent with the phenomenology of colour experience: that 
opponent-processing entails that colours should be perceived as overlaying objects, 
and therefore that opponent-process theory must be false. The problem is rather 
that of itself, opponent-process theory is neutral as to many of the features that 
colours are perceived to have. Further colour-processing occurs subsequent to the 
opponent-processes touted by many reflectance-physicalists. And if so, then it is 
unsurprising that the physicalist who delineates reflectances simply with reference to 
opponent-processes mis-identifies colours as they are actually perceived.
The natural response in light of these problems is to sort colours into 
reflectance-types, not on the basis of low-level visual processing mechanisms, but 
instead with reference to visual processing more generally construed, or indeed, 
perhaps just colour experiences themselves; at least so long as we are sure that these 
experiences are physical. At this point, however, a more fundamental problem with 
reflectance-physicalism rears its head. The problem is that in whichever reflectances 
are type-identified, they do not seem to respect the thesis that colour experience 
inherits its qualitative character from that which it is an experience of.
34 For discussion, see Katz 1911: 14.
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Figure 6.3: Sample Surface Reflectance Profiles
Object (a) is blue, (b) green and (c) purple.
Source: Hurvich 1981: 43.35
Consider, by way of illustration, the similarity relations between the colours. 
The reflectances with which the reflectance-physicalist identifies colours do not 
obviously themselves stand in anything like the relations of similarity the colours 
that we perceive do. Consider the surface reflectance profiles for blue, green and 
purple, illustrated in Figure 6.3. The reflectance profiles for blue and green are 
almost structurally identical. Both have a single peak at which they reflect roughly 
60% of the incident light, and both reflect very little light in the higher part of the 
visible spectrum. The main difference between them is just in the location of their 
peak: blue objects tend to reflect more light in the ‘blue’ part of the visible spectrum, 
circa 450nms, whilst the peak for green objects is shifted slighdy towards the ‘green’ 
part of the visible spectrum, circa 500nms. This differs markedly from the 
reflectance profile of purple objects. Like typically blue objects, characteristic purple
35 The profiles Hurvich gives are actually profiles for blue, green and purple lights, but material objects 
with isomorphic reflectance profiles would look the same.
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objects reflect around 60% of the incident light in the ‘blue’ part of the visible 
spectrum, circa 450nms. Unlike both blue and green objects, however, a standard 
purple object has another, even sharper peak, in the ‘red’ part of the visible 
spectrum, by the time it reaches 700nms reflecting around 80% of the incident light 
that strikes it. Judging from their reflectances, it would natural to suppose that the 
blue object is more similar in respect of colour to the green object than it is to the 
purple object. Yet this is false. In fact, blue is more similar to purple than to green: 
indeed, purple is a binary hue of which blue is a component.
With this problem in mind, some reflectance-physicalists effectively just 
despair of ever recovering the relevant similarity relations from reflectance 
properties, claiming instead that the truth of similarity claims about colours are 
ultimately just parasitic upon the truth of the corresponding claims about colour 
experience. As McLaughlin puts it, the similarity claims are true “de dicto, not de r f:  
they are true of the physical properties that produce colour experiences only insofar 
as they produce colour experiences of which these claims are true, they are not true 
of these properties essentially.36
But this raises even more problems. For one thing, it is incumbent upon the 
physicalist to explain how the truth of similarity claims about the colours could be 
parasitic upon the truth of perceived similarities in a way that is consistent with the 
original requirement that colours experiences be themselves physical: it would, 
remember, be an odd combination of views to hold that colours are physical 
reflectance properties and yet also hold that the colour experiences with reference to 
which we type-identify reflectance properties are themselves non-physical. A natural 
thought is that we can explain colour perception as the perception of certain 
physical properties under a subjectively determined mode of presentation. But note 
that this talk of modes of presentation cannot just be a way of sneaking in through 
the back door the kind of intrinsic non-representational properties of experience 
that are generally considered to be inconsistent with a physicalistically acceptable 
theory of perception.37
A deeper problem, however, is that this response simply renounces any 
pretensions that we might have of respecting the Inheritance Thesis: it is just to
36 2003: 111-16. See also Jackson 1998: 111.
37 Shoemaker 2003 argues that representatdonalist theories of perception are actually consistent with the 
existence of what he calls “functional qualia”, but this is a minority position.
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concede that colour experiences do not inherit their qualitative character from the 
properties that they are experiences of after all. If nothing else, this makes the 
physicalist’s position surprisingly non-naturalistic. It involves calling into question 
the deliverances of an absolutely basic natural cognitive faculty. In contrast, the 
guiding assumption of computational theories of vision like those proposed by 
Marr, whose insights physicalists are generally keen to exploit, is that the 
representations in which the computational process culminates are largely veridical. 
Clearly, if the computational task of vision is to determine “what is present in the 
world, and where it is”, then the visual system succeeds in this task only if the 
representation of the objects, events and their properties that the mind produces is 
accurate: if the way the world is presented as being is the way it really is.38 
Renouncing the Inheritance Thesis just non-naturalistic. It violates a wholly 
common sensical explanatory constraint. Although this ultimately may not be a 
damning indictment of reflectance-physicalism, it would clearly be preferable if our 
theory of colour did not have this rather unfortunate consequence.
4. The Similarity Phenomena
Assuming for the time being that reflectance-types do not in fact stand in anything 
like the right relations of similarity and difference — the assumption is one that I will 
actually return to §6.5 — we need to consider in slightly more detail the datum that 
needs explaining. It has been suggested that we can account for similarity phenomena — 
the sorting of coloured chips, assenting to propositions such as ‘yellow is more 
similar to orange than either are to blue’, and so on — without assuming that we 
actually perceive colours as themselves standing in the relevant relations of similarity 
and difference. Rather, the suggestion goes, the similarity phenomena have their 
footing in perceptual experiences of some other kind. If this is right, then it offers a 
way of squaring reflectance-physicalism both with the Inheritance Thesis and the 
assumption that reflectance-types do not stand in the right relations of similarity and 
difference. These claims will not be in direct conflict, because there will be no 
reason to suppose that the colours genuinely stand in the relevant relations at all.
38 Marr 1982: 3.
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According to one version of this strategy, for instance, the similarity 
phenomena have their basis in the perception of anthropocentrically identified 
reflectance-types of differing levels of generality. Reflectances can be 
anthropocentrically type-identified in a number of different ways. We can, for 
instance, type-identify reflectances at the level of the superdeterminable coloured, the 
determinables reddishyellowish, blueish, greenish, whiteish or blackish, the determinates 
yellow, green, olive, chartreuse, or the superdeterminates je//0«'7j, pinks4, ideal black, Munsell 
Blue-Purple. With this in mind, Byrne and Hilbert have suggested that it may be 
possible to explain the similarity and difference relations that we judge to hold 
between the colours in terms of the perception of common properties of these 
kinds: coloured objects — and therefore derivatively colours — are more similar the 
more of these properties they are perceived to instantiate. Take, for example, a 
slightly orangey-yellow, which we can call yellowy. An object that instantiates the 
super-determinate property yellown also instantiates the determinate property yellow, 
the determinable properties yellowish and reddish, and the superdeterminable property, 
colour. Yellown therefore turns out to be more like unique yellow than unique blue 
because unique yellow and yellown co-instantiate more of the same properties than 
unique blue and yellown: the former share determinate, determinable and 
superdeterminable properties, whereas the latter share only superdeterminable 
properties.39
Byrne and Hilbert have since rejected this proposal because it does not 
explain the similarity phenomena in the right way. The problem is that what is doing 
the work are not facts about how coloured objects look, but further facts about 
perceiving subjects. For instance, the similarity phenomena depend not only on 
subjects registering the comparative number of colour properties that coloured 
objects instantiate in the first place, but then making their similarity judgements on 
this basis. If either of these further conditions failed to hold, then subjects should be 
able to abstain from making similarity judgements, or perhaps even make the wrong 
similarity judgements, in a way that we do not think is possible. There does not seem
39 Byrne and Hilbert 1997b. My terminology differs slightly from that of Byrne and Hilbert in two 
respects. First, Byrne and Hilbert talk of perception in terms of ‘representation’. Here, as elsewhere, I am 
neutral on theories o f perception, and so substitute ‘perception’ for ‘representation’. Second, Byrne and 
Hilbert refer to reddish, whiteish etc as superdeterminable properties, whereas I reserve this term for 
colour — or more strictly speaking human-colour, given that different species can perceive determinates of  
different determinable colour properties (§4.2).
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to be this room for error or hesitation: when we are presented with yellow, orange 
and blue Munsell chips we have no option but to judge that the yellow and orange 
chips are more similar to each other than either is to the blue chip.40
In a more recent variation on this proposal, Byrne and Hilbert therefore 
identify colours instead with immediately perceived types of ‘magnitude’. On this 
view, (determinable) colours are thought of as properties like lengths that constitute 
sets or magnitudes, the members of which can be ordered in a way that reflects the 
relationship between the distinct elements. Take, by way of illustration, a range of 
hue samples of constant saturation and lightness. These hue samples can be ordered 
to reflect the proportions of each of the phenomenologically basic hues — red, 
yellow, green, blue — that they are perceived to contain. A perfect orange, for 
instance, will be judged to contain 50% red and 50% yellow. A slightly redder 
orange, perhaps 75% red and 25% yellow. And, at the limit, a unique red will be 
judged to contain 100% red and 0% yellow. By taking four different hue-magnitudes 
— R, Y, G, B — corresponding to the four phenomenologically basic hues, it is 
possible to classify superdeterminate colours depending on the proportion of these 
hue-magnitudes that they are perceived to contain. These hue-magnitudes can then 
in turn be used to type-identify reflectances, in such a way that the reflectances 
which cause the relevant hue-magnitude experiences constitute anthropocentrically 
defined kinds.
For instance, reflectances that affect the incident light such as to cause 
experiences in which objects are perceived as having a proportion of hue-magnitude 
Y greater than roughly 75% are yellow; a proportion of hue-magnitude R greater 
than roughly 75% red, and so on (although to allow for vagueness in our colour 
ascriptions we may not want to be too specific about these values). The similarity 
phenomena can then be explained in terms of the relative proportions of the hue- 
magnitudes that different objects are perceived to contain. If one colour sample is 
perceived as 75Y:25R (i.e. yellow-orange), another as 25R:75B (blue-purple) and 
another as 80B:20G (greeny-blue), then the second will look more like the third than 
the first because the second and third samples are perceived to contain 75% and 
80% (respectively) of the hue-magnitude B, the first and second samples are
40 Byrne 2003: 656-7, n33.
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perceived as containing only 25% of the hue-magnitude R, whilst the first and third 
samples are perceived as containing no common hue-magnitude.41
Common to both these proposals is the thought that the similarity 
phenomena are explained, not by the perception of similarity relations between 
colours, but by the perception of something else-, in the first case common properties, 
and in the second case hue-magnitudes. These proposals are therefore consistent 
with the claim that reflectance sets do not themselves genuinely stand in the 
similarity relations characteristic of the colours. Unfortunately, neither proposal 
works.
Generally speaking, there is a motivational problem. The default assumption 
is that we judge yellow to be more similar to orange than blue because we perceive 
yellow to be more similar to orange than blue: when presented with the relevant 
chips, the similarity simply forces itself upon us. It only really makes sense to say 
that we can explain colour similarity phenomena in terms of the perception of 
something other than similarity relations between colours if we suppose that we 
cannot perceive similarity relations in general. Unless there is a general problem with 
perceiving similarity relations, there is no independent motivation for the view that 
we do not perceive similarity relations between the colours: this would be nothing 
more than an ad hoc assumption, made in the face of the objection that the best 
physical candidates do not themselves stand in the relevant relations.
The question is therefore whether there are any good reasons to give up the 
default assumption that we perceive similarity relations between colours. Byrne 
himself offers two arguments for thinking that it could not be the perception of 
similarity relations that explains the similarity phenomena. The first is that 
perceiving similarity relations between properties presupposes that properties are 
themselves amongst the objects of perception. The second, more general problem, 
is that we can make judgements about similarity on the basis of successive visual 
experiences, but in successive visual experiences of, say, yellow, orange and blue 
Munsell chips, there is never any point at which we perceive that the yellow chip is 
more similar to the orange chip than the blue chip. Neither kind of consideration, 
however, is entirely persuasive.
41 Byrne and Hilbert 2003; Byrne 2003.
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Byrne’s reason for excluding properties from amongst the objects of 
perception turns on the idea that objects of perception must look a certain way, but 
that there is no way in which properties look:
how does the property orange look? Not orange, or any other colour!.. .And even if we 
suppose that the property orange does look F (for some filling for ‘F’), the question arises of 
whether we see Fness, and if so, how it looks. If we do see Fness, and it looks G, then the 
question arises of whether we see Gness, and this regress had better stop somewhere. The 
most natural place to stop it is at the very start. Persimmons are among the objects o f  
vision; the property orange is not.42
This, however, is not especially persuasive. Although Byrne is right to say that the 
regress must stop somewhere, it is not clear why it should stop with objects. In 
particular, it is not clear why there cannot be a way that properties look even though 
it cannot be further described in terms of properties of that property. What does 
yellow look like? Well, it looks like that (pointing at a sample of yellow). Why 
suppose that there should be some further thing that yellowness looks to be? 
Perhaps yellowness just is looking like that, and there is no other way of grasping 
what yellowness is other than by looking.43
Byrne’s second argument for thinking that we do not in general perceive 
similarity relation is similarly inconclusive. To say that when we successively 
perceive, for instance, differently coloured Munsell chips we do not perceive the 
similarity relations between them seems to assume that we cannot have dynamic, 
temporally extended, experiences. The assumption appears to be that we have one 
experience of a yellow chip, one experience of an orange chip and one of a blue 
chip, and our experience never extends beyond the presently presented chip. But 
this is an odd way of typing experiences. It is natural to suppose that we have 
temporally extended experiences: I can watch a football match, listen to a concert. 
Indeed, on reflection, it seems that very few of our experiences are static in the way 
that Byrne’s objection appears to require.
42 Byrne 2003: 655.
43 The view that properties are not amongst the objects o f perception is sometimes defended on the 
grounds that properties are ‘abstract objects’. But this seems to be little more than a dogma. Properties 
are not objects: they are properties, and properties are entities of a different ontological kind to objects. 
Nor are properties obviously abstract-, the brownness o f my table, for instance, seems no less particular 
than the table itself; both have a spatio-temporal location, both can be demonstratively identified and 
reidentified, and so on.
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Without independent motivation, the claim that we do not perceive similarity 
relations specifically between the colours is ad hoc. Setting this problem aside, there 
are more specific problems with the alternative explanations of the similarity 
phenomena that Byrne and Hilbert propose. In particular, neither proposal explains 
all the similarity phenomena that need to be explained. As we have already seen, 
colour space is asymmetrical. One of the ways in which this manifests itself is in the 
differing perceptual distances between the unique hues: unique blue and unique 
green, for instance, are more similar to each other than either is to the adjacent 
unique hue (§6.1). Neither of Byrne and Hilbert’s proposals are able to explain these 
similarity phenomena.
According to their original common property proposal, for instance, objects 
are relatively more similar the more common properties they instantiate. The unique 
hues, however, have only the superdeterminable property, colour; in common: there 
is no determinable property — reddish, yellowish, blueish, greenish, blackish or 
whiteish — that unique blue and unique green have in common, but that, say, unique 
blue and unique yellow lack. It therefore follows from the common property 
proposal that the unique hues should be maximally different. But they are not: green 
is more similar to blue than yellow and blue more similar to green than red.
The situation with respect to the magnitude proposal is no better. The idea 
of identifying colours with types of magnitude derives from the Swedish Natural 
Colour System (NCS), the system of colour classification most widely used in 
Scandinavia. The NCS categorises colours according to the proportion of the 
elemental colours identified by Hering — the unique hues, plus black and white — 
that they are perceived to contain. The result is that the hue circle is best 
understood, not as one continuous scale, but as four independent scales: red-yellow, 
yellow-green, green-blue and blue-red. As the co-founder of the NCS, Lars Sivik, 
remarks:
Conceptually and cognitively the bipolar relationship between yellow and red is different 
from the bipolar relationship between red and blue and therefore constitutes another 
scale.44
44 Sivik 1997: 173.
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But this makes direct comparison of the different scales stricdy speaking impossible. 
It is not, for instance, possible to compare hue samples that lie on different axes, like 
red, orange and blue. Moreover, neither is it possible to compare the unique hues 
themselves. Whatever the prospects for extending the NCS to inter-axis 
comparison, there is absolutely no way of extending this model to cover 
comparisons between the unique hues: unique blue and unique green, like unique 
yellow and unique red, are not perceived as containing any proportion of any other 
hue magnitude. Therefore the magnitude proposal also predicts, contrary to the 
empirical facts, that these colours are maximally different.
5. Selection-Physicalism
The attempts to identify colours with physical properties considered so far have 
assumed that the relation between objects and subjects is, so to speak, all one-way 
traffic: that colour perception is simply a matter of perceiving subjects detecting 
properties of objects in their environment. These views do not consider the 
possibility that facts about the perceiving subject may in the first place determine 
relevant facts about properties in the world that the visual system tracks.
According to the view developed by Hilbert and Kalderon, in contrast, it is 
facts about the visual system — which facts can for present purposes be left 
indeterminate — that in the first place determine the relations of similarity and 
difference in which colours are perceived to stand. These relations partly fix the 
character of our colour experiences, such that what makes an experience an 
experience of a particular colour is in part all the similarities and differences that the 
colour exhibits in relation to all the other colours. But this, it is claimed, does not 
mean that the world makes no contribution, as these experiences in turn determine 
which reflectance-types colours are identified with, fixing which sets of pre-existing 
similarity relations between objects “count as similarities with respect to colour”. 
Crucially, the similarity relations the visual system picks out in this way are 
themselves wholly objective. They are in no sense brought into being by being selected 
by a given visual system, they are just one of indefinitely many sets of similarity 
relation that supervene on the physical reflectance properties of objects. Because 
these similarity relations are themselves wholly objective relations, this means that
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they can still play a role in explaining the character of our colour experiences, even 
though it is the visual system which in the first place selects which relations are to 
count as relations of similarity with respect to colour: it is because the objects that are 
selected to be similar in respect of colour really are (in some respect) similar, that they 
are perceived to stand in precisely the similarity relations they are perceived to stand 
in.45
This proposal in effect combines a form internalism about colour experience 
with a form of externalism: it attempts to acknowledge a role for the visual system in 
fixing the relations of similarity and difference in which colours are perceived to 
stand whilst at the same time trying to square this with the thought that visual 
experience owes its distinctive character to that which it is experience of. The 
question is whether this combination of views is ultimately stable. Can we hold onto 
the insight that the visual system selects which properties are colours whilst at the 
same time respecting the Inheritance Thesis? In the end I will argue that we can, but 
this will only be at the expense of any reductive aspirations that we might have: 
objective similarity relations will be able to explain the perception of similarity only 
if the properties that we select are colours as such {suigeneris properties), and not type- 
identified reflectances.
Hilbert and Kalderon’s account of the perceived similarity relations between 
colours trades on the fact that similarity is cheap. Anything is similar to anything in 
at least some respect. Hilbert and Kalderon exploit this by allowing perceiving 
subjects to determine which of the indefinitely many similarity relations that hold 
between objects are to count as the similarity relations definitional of the colours. It 
is really this, however, that lies at the heart of their difficulties. Stated abstracdy, the 
problem is that in the end they just do not take the similarity relations that hold 
between the colours seriously enough: not just any set of similarity relations could 
count as the relations of similarity between the colours.
It is important to realise how weak the constraints on which properties a 
perceiving subject can select to be the colours according to Hilbert and Kalderon 
are. Because similarity is cheap, the same reflectance-types stand in indefinitely many 
different sets of similarity relations. On Hilbert and Kalderon’s account, this means 
that the very same reflectance-types can be selected to be as many different colours
45 2000: especially 196-9. For discussion, see Shoemaker 2003.
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as there are similarity orderings in which they stand: there is nothing about the 
reflectance-types as such that imposes any further constraints on which similarity 
orderings they can be selected to stand in. As the number of colours any given set of 
reflectances can be identified with multiplies, however, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to hold onto the idea that colour experiences simply inherit their qualitative 
character from those properties.
On the one hand, it follows from Hilbert and Kalderon’s view that two 
different sets of reflectances could be selected by different subjects to stand in 
structurally isomorphic property spaces. Because the character of a colour 
experience is partly determined by all the relations of similarity in which the 
perceived colour stands, the experiences of the these subjects are qualitatively 
identical. Because the character of their experiences is also partly determined by the 
external properties that their experiences are experiences of, it follows that their 
qualitatively identical experiences thereby inherit their identical qualitative characters 
from different sets of reflectances. Suppose that one subject’s colour perception is 
shifted relative to that of another: for instance, that objects Jack perceives as unique 
yellow Jill perceives as yellow-green, objects Jack perceives as yellow-green Jill 
perceives as unique green, objects Jack perceives as unique green Jill perceives as 
green-blue, and so on. Hilbert and Kalderon’s account predicts that Jack and Jill 
thereby veridically perceive different sets of reflectances as qualitatively identical.46
Conversely, it follows from Hilbert and Kalderon’s account that different 
perceivers could veridically perceive the same set of reflectances as qualitatively 
different. Two subjects could select the very same set of reflectances to feature in 
differently structured property spaces. Because the character of a colour experience 
is partly determined by all the relations of similarity in which the perceived colour 
stands, the experiences of these two subjects differ in their qualitative characters. 
Because the character of their experiences is also partly determined by the external 
properties that their experiences are experiences of, it follows that their qualitatively 
different experiences inherit their different qualitative characters from the very same 
set of reflectances.
46 Mark Kalderon tells me that selection-physicalism was originally formulated to solve the location 
problem for the unique hues. I have already suggested that there are independent problems with treating 
intra-species variations as fauldess disagreements (§5.1).
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To suppose that reflectance-types can genuinely confer their qualitative 
character onto myriad colour experiences in this way presupposes that reflectance- 
types have multiple qualitative characters: that the same set of reflectances can produce 
qualitatively different veridical experiences because reflectance-types really are all the 
ways they appear to be in these qualitatively different experiences.47 If nothing else, 
this makes for bad explanation. If an experience could have been an experience of 
the very same property and yet differed in its qualitative character, or else been an 
experience of a different property and had the very same qualitative character, then 
the property the experience is an experience of effectively just drops out of the 
explanation of why the experience is the experience that it is, and not some other. 
The fact that the experience is an experience of that very property, it seems, is 
irrelevant to its being the experience that it actually is.
This explanatory problem conceals a deeper metaphysical problem. The 
reason why the explanation seems unsatisfying is that the selected reflectance-types 
are not appropriately related. To suppose that the very same property can stand in 
many different sets of similarity relation trivialises the idea that the relations of 
similarity and difference in which colours stand are genuine internal relations. 
Internal relations are not just any old relations of similarity and difference. Internal 
relations necessarily supervene on properties because of the intrinsic nature of those 
properties. The problem is that there is nothing about reflectance-types which can 
explain their being such as to stand in the similarity relations that perceiving subjects 
can select.
It helps to get a firmer grip on this problem by considering how Hilbert and 
Kalderon deal with the limiting case of inter-personal variation: spectral inversion. 
Hilbert and Kalderon claim that the possibility of spectral inversion is something 
that their account of colour forecloses. According to Hilbert and Kalderon, the 
character of a colour experience is in part determined relationally, by all the relations 
of similarity and difference in which the colour is perceived to stand. If the character 
of an experience is determined relationally, then there could be no difference in the 
character of that experience if the psychological colour space were symmetrical: two 
experiences that stood in all the same relations would simply be the same 
experience. As it is a necessary condition of (at least undetectable) spectral inversion
47 Shoemaker 2003: 269.
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that colour space be symmetrical, Hilbert and Kalderon conclude that spectral 
inversion is impossible. The only way to avoid this conclusion, they argue, would be 
to posit intrinsic phenomenal features of experience that are “in no need of a 
relational characterisation in terms of phenomenal similarity”; features of experience 
like qualia that are in some sense distinct from the properties experienced, and 
therefore capable of individuating colour experiences independently of the similarity 
relations in which they stand. But, Hilbert and Kalderon object, that there are such 
properties of experience was supposed to be the conclusion of the Inverted 
Spectrum Argument, and not an assumption of it.48
There is, however, something deeply puzzling about the dialectical situation 
at this point. Although, as a matter of sociological fact, spectral inversion is generally 
used to argue for the existence of non-representational features of experience, or 
qualia, there is something very odd about this. If we accept the Inheritance Thesis, 
then perceptual experiences inherit their qualitative character from what they are 
experiences of. Consistent with the Inheritance Thesis, the inverted spectrum 
argument should therefore tell us less about the nature of conscious experience than 
the nature of the properties of material objects on which experience is directed.49 This, 
for instance, is perfectly consistent with the etymology of qualia, which comes from 
the Latin qualis, meaning just ‘of such a kind’. Etymologically, that is, there is no 
reason why qualia should refer to properties of experience rather than properties of 
material objects. Indeed, before the rot of expunging qualitative properties like 
colour from the material world set in, this is exactly how the word was used. In the 
middle of the seventeenth century, the Gassendist Walter Charleton, for instance, 
defines quality of a compound (non-atomic) material body as:
that kind of Appearance, or Representation, whereby the sense doth distinctly deprehend, or actually discern 
the same, in the capacity of its proper Object. An Appearance we term it, because the Quale or 
Suchness o f every sensible thing, receives its peculiar determination from the relation it 
holds to that sense, that peculiarly discerns it.50
To deny, as Hilbert and Kalderon do, the logical possibility of spectral 
inversion is in effect to make a strong metaphysical claim about the properties from 
which visual experience is supposed to inherit its qualitative character. It is to claim
48 2000: 208.
49 Compare the earlier aside on the knowledge argument in §3.3.
50 1654:128-9.
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that the perceived properties of material objects could not themselves be such as to realise a 
symmetrical property space. And this is just to fail to take similarity relations 
between the colours seriously. To deny that the properties experienced could realise 
a symmetrical property space is to deny that there is anything more to properties 
than the similarity relations in which they stand. It is to hold an essentially relational 
theory of properties: if there were something to the reflectance-types ‘over and 
above’ the similarity relations in which they stood, then this something extra would 
serve to distinguish between sets of structurally isomorphic properties; it would 
serve to individuate the properties non-relationally. Denying that there is anything 
more to properties over and above the similarity relations in which they stand is to 
deny that there are any facts on which the similarity relations supervene. But if there 
is nothing more to properties than their standing in certain sets of similarity relation 
then there are no intrinsic features from which these relations can ‘flow’.
Hilbert and Kalderon succeed in avoiding these problems only by politely 
shelving the externalist aspect of their account, as, for instance, when they claim 
that:
A complete, empirically adequate quality space is an exhaustive representation of the 
phenomenology associated with a given sensory modality. The phenomenal character of an 
experience aligned on a point o f that space is represented by its position in the quality 
space.51
To renounce externalism, however, is to give up any pretence of trying to respect 
the Inheritance Thesis. If the character of experience is wholly determined without 
any reference to the properties on which an experience is directed, then those 
properties simply play no role in explaining the nature of that experience after all: 
the very same experience could have occurred even if those properties had never 
existed. This is therefore to convict common sense of error.
The idea that we can think of the visual system as selecting the colour 
properties that it perceives is not, for all this, unattractive. We have already seen, in 
relation to inter-species variation in colour perception, for example, that this is a 
useful way of thinking about differences in colour perception across the animal 
kingdom (§4.5). The moral to draw from the discussion of selection-physicalism, 
however, is that we cannot think of the visual system as selecting just anything to be
51 HUbert and Kalderon 2000: 208.
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the colours. That which the visual system selects to be the colours have to able to 
explain in the right way the similarity relations that we perceive colours to stand in. 
The only properties capable of doing this are the colours as such. It is only the 
colours as such that have the qualitative characters necessary to ground the internal 
relations in which colours stand. The adequacy of our common sense conception of 
colour therefore requires that colours be suigeneris properties, distinct from the 
physical reflectance properties of objects.
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[7] Colour and its Place in Nature
Epiphenomenalism.. .supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no 
purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is 
kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
Alexander 1920 ii: 8.
I have argued that the truth of our common sense thought about colour requires 
that colours be suigeneris mind-independent properties. This finally brings us back to 
the problem with which we started, the problem of locating colours within the 
natural world. It was the problem of finding a place for sui generis mind-independent 
colours in the natural order than led mechanists like Descartes and Locke to accord 
colours secondary quality status in the first place. Although the details of physical 
theory have changed considerably since the seventeenth century, the idea that our 
ontological commitment is ultimately determined by our best physical theory has 
not. According to this way of thinking, what exists is just what physical theory tells 
us exists. Hence, if sui generis mind-independent colours have no place within 
physical theory, they have no place within the material world.1
To address this challenge, we need to show that the sui generis nature of 
colour is no bar to its existence. If nothing else, this requires securing an intelligible 
role for colours in explaining why it is that material objects appear the way they do. 
A popular reason for thinking that sui generis colours cannot explain why colours 
appear the way that they do — the causal exclusion argument— is set out in §7.1. A 
popular response to this argument — realisationism — is rejected in §7.2, where I argue 
that we can only avoid the force of the causal exclusion argument in this way if we 
sacrifice the claim that colours are genuinely distinct from an object’s physical 
properties. Instead, I suggest in §7.3 that the causal exclusion argument only shows 
colours to be causal epiphenomena if we fail to distinguish clearly between 
properties located at different ‘levels of nature’. The propriety of ‘levels of nature’ 
talk is defended in more detail in §7.4, where I argue that the emergence of sui generis 
properties at higher levels of functional organisation is as intelligible as we have 
reason to expect it must be. Finally, §7.5 draws some general conclusions from the 
thesis as a whole.
1 This pattern o f argument forms a common — albeit often implicit — background to many discussions of 
colour. For more or less explicit statements o f this argument, see, for example, Mackie 1976, Jackson 
1977, Boghossian and Velleman 1989, Johnston 1992.
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1. Supervenience
1 argued in Chapter 6 that colours are distinct from the physical reflectance 
properties of objects. But to say that colours are distinct from an object’s physical 
properties is to merely make a negative claim. It is to say something about how 
colours and reflectances are not related; namely that they are not identical. It would 
be nice if we could have a more positive account of this relationship.
In particular, the important question that we need to settle is whether there is 
any sense in which colours, though distinct from reflectances, nevertheless depend 
upon these properties. A common way of capturing this idea of dependency is via 
the notion of supervenience. One set of properties supervenes on another set of 
properties just in case there can be no difference in the supervenient properties 
without a corresponding difference in the properties on which they supervene. As 
G.E. Moore, discussing the relationship of sui generis moral properties to natural, 
non-normative properties, puts it:
if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must 
the same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything 
exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exacdy the same degree. Or, to put 
it in the corresponding negative form: it is not possible that of two exacdy similar things one 
should possess it and the other not, or that one should possess it in one degree, and the 
other in a different one.2
Supervenience relations come in a variety of strengths depending on whether 
they are defined within, or over possible worlds, and if they are defined over 
possible worlds, whether they defined over all possible worlds, or merely over some 
subset of these worlds, such as those worlds in which the actual laws of physics 
hold. To simplify matters, however, we will just consider the strongest kind of 
supervenience relation, a metaphysically (or logically) necessary supervenience relation, which 
entails there is no world exactly like ours in all physical respects that differs in any 
other respect.
It follows from necessary supervenience that supervenient properties like 
colour, or the psychological more generally, are fully determined by the physical: 
that the nature of the colour world is a consequence of the way the physical world
2 1919-20: 261.
200
is. If, in contrast, the necessary supervenience of colours on reflectances is false, 
then colours in some sense ‘float free’ from their reflectance bases; they lack any 
‘anchor’ in physical reality. There could, for instance, be a systematic permutation of 
colour with respect to reflectance, with the reflectances colours are associated with 
varying over, and perhaps even within, possible worlds. There could even be a world 
in which there are reflectances but no colours whatsoever: the chromatic equivalent 
of a zombie world, in which there are brains physically identical to ours but no 
consciousness.
At least some form of colour-reflectance variation certainly seems 
conceivable. It is perhaps more controversial whether we can conceive of a 
chromatic zombie world, given that this would involve conceiving of material 
objects without thinking of them as coloured, something that is often thought to be 
a notoriously difficult imaginative feat to accomplish.3 But these worries do not 
touch the conceivability of a straightforward permutation of colours and 
reflectances. Indeed, it follows from the argument of Chapter 6 that there is no 
straightforward conceptual bar to reflectances and colours coming apart in this way. 
If reflectances lack the structural features characteristic of perceived colours then it 
is at least conceptually consistent to suppose that any reflectance should be 
associated with any colour, or even that reflectances should be associated with no 
colours whatsoever. Had there been isomorphic structural features such as the 
distinction between unique and binary hues at the level of reflectances, this would 
have set constraints on which colour-reflectance combinations were permissible. As 
the structural features of colour have no analogues at the level of reflectances, 
however, the reflectances set no such constraints.
Still, even though colour-reflectance variation is conceivable, there is good 
reason to accept the claim that colours supervene of necessity on reflectances. At 
best, the conceivability considerations, for instance, show only that there is a 
conceptual distinction between colours and reflectances: that we can think of 
colours without thinking of reflectances and vice versa. But this conceptual claim does 
not of itself entail the metaphysical claim that colours and reflectances are capable of 
independent variation. Indeed, as we have already seen in §5.5, this kind of 
conceptual distinction does not even strictly speaking entail that the referents of
3 See the discussion of Cavendish and Berkeley in §1.4.
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these concepts are distinct, but co-extensive, properties: it would be consistent with 
the conceivability that they are just different aspects of the same property.
More to the point, the necessary supervene of colours on reflectances has 
already proved important in defending the mind-independence of colour in the face 
of the Argument from Perceptual Variation. In response to variations in perceived 
colour that are the result of differences in the illumination, for instance, the 
supervenience of colours on reflectances secures a correlation between those 
circumstances in which full and accurate information about an object’s reflectance 
reaches the eye and those situations in which its real colour is revealed, thereby 
grounding a non-arbitrary preference for natural daylight as the illumination that 
best reveals the real colours of objects (§3.4). Anything less than the necessary 
supervenience of colours on reflectances here, however, would be insufficient. If an 
object’s real colour is not necessarily determined by its reflectance, then facts about 
its reflectance do not guarantee the relevant facts about its colour. Whether the light 
reflected by an object to the eye carries full and accurate information about its 
colour would therefore be irrelevant to the question of whether its real colour is 
revealed in those circumstances.
More generally, denying the necessary supervenience of colours on 
reflectances is anyway inconsistent with a broadly naturalistic outlook. If the 
necessary supervenience of colours on reflectances is false, then there will be a 
possible world in which the physical world is the way that it is in the actual world, 
but in which the chromatic world differs. To deny supervenience is therefore to 
deny that the way things are in the macroscopic visible worlds depends on the way 
things are in the microphysical world. But then what does the way things are in the 
macroscopic world depend on? In virtue of what do colours stand in the relations 
that they stand in the actual world to reflectances? We seem consigned to think of 
the laws linking colours and reflectances as arbitrarily imposed from without: it 
would be as if God super-added colours to reflectances in whichever way it so 
pleased him to at the time. Yet we do not ordinarily think that the world is 
contingent in this way. Things do not just vary: there is always a difference that 
makes the difference.
At this point, it should be stressed that although this view of the relationship 
between colours and reflectances is naturalistic, it is not in any obvious sense
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physicalist. Physicalism is sometimes just defined as the acceptance of necessary 
supervenience: in his recent discussion of physicalism, for instance, Jackson defines 
as physicalist any theory that meets the ‘Entry by Entailmenf requirement, entailing 
the thesis that “Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a 
duplicate simpliciter of our world”.4 This, however, is a questionable terminological 
decision.
In particular, it is clear that most physicalists actually have something much 
stronger in mind by ‘physicalism’ than mere necessary supervenience. Jackson is 
himself a case in point. Jackson’s unofficial statements of physicalism clearly bring 
out the fact that the thesis he actually wants to establish is much stronger than the 
necessary supervenience thesis. According to Jackson, physicalists claim to have a 
“complete story about the nature of our world”, a world that is “entirely physical in 
nature”; it is for this reason that according to the physicalist, the properties and 
relations recognised in (micro-) physical theory are sufficient to “to account for 
everything”.5 Indeed, Jackson’s version of physicalism is so strong that he even 
refuses to identify colours with the reflectance-types discussed in Chapter 6. Jackson 
identifies colours instead with the woefully heterogeneous micro-structural grounds 
that realise these reflectances, because he thinks that even reflectances fall outside 
the narrowly circumscribed physical domain.
But the Entry by Entailment requirement does not support these 
reductionist glosses. Insofar as the Entry by Entailment requirement is merely a 
supervenience thesis that states patterns of co-variation, it is consistent with the 
view that colours are sui generis properties that supervene of metaphysical necessity 
on reflectances. The motivation for this view, however, is precisely the thought that 
physical theory cannot tell a complete story about the nature of the material world, 
that the world is not entirely physical in nature, and therefore that the properties and 
relations recognised in physical theory are not sufficient to account for everything. 
The reason for rejecting reflectance-physicalism, let alone the primary quality view 
of colour, is that we cannot adequately account for the phenomenology of colour
4 Jackson 1998: 12. Similarly according to Kim, supervenience “can be viewed as defining minimal 
physicalisni\ 1998: 15.
5 1998: 8-9. Compare Lewis’s claim that “a supervenience thesis is, in a broad sense, reductionist”, 1983: 
358.
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experience without mentioning colours, properties that are distinct from the 
microphysical properties described by physicists.6
Generally speaking, it is difficult to find any theory of colour that isn’t 
physicalist by Jackson’s definition. Physicalism about colour is physicalist trivially. In 
a different way, so is the eliminadvist view that colours don’t exist at all. If colours 
do not exist, then it follows trivially that there can be no difference in an object’s 
colour without a difference in its physical properties. Although they might not have 
thought about the matter in quite these terms, the British Emergentists at least 
didn’t deny the necessary supervenience of higher-level emergent properties on 
lower-level physical properties. According to Broad’s abstract statement of the 
difference between emergent and mechanistic theories, for instance, emergentism is 
the view the view that there are certain wholes, composed of constituents A, B, and 
C in a relation R to each other and that “all wholes composed of constituents of the 
same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain 
characteristic properties”.7 Although this falls short of quite endorsing the necessary 
supervenience of higher-levels on lower-levels, it certainly comes close.
Even relationists typically qualify as physicalists according to Jackson’s 
definition. Relationists deny that colours supervene locally on reflectances, as the 
same object can be differendy coloured depending on the relation it bears to 
different perceiving subjects and different environmental conditions. Still, 
relationists at least generally accept the global supervenience thesis that according to 
Jackson is a necessary commitment of physicalism. It is unusual to think of relations 
holding irrespective of their relata. As G.E. Moore remarks:
6 Jackson does consider the possibility that there might be necessary connection between distinct 
properties, but for some reason doesn’t discuss the possibility that there might be necessary ‘vertical’ 
connections, focussing instead on disjunctive properties like having mass or being made of ectoplasm that are 
mere “onlookers in the debate over physicalism”. Jackson concludes from this highly selective sample 
base that “None of the plausible examples o f necessary connections from physical properties to distinct 
properties that are not physical properties is an example of a connection from a physical to a [genuinely] 
non-physical property”, 1998: 17.
7 Broad 1925: 61, emphasis added. In the case o f the chemical compound silver-chloride, for instance, 
Broad is in no doubt that the “properties o f silver-chloride are completely determined by those o f silver and 
of chlorine”. Similarly, Broad claims that the emergence of life “is perfectly compatible with the view that 
the characteristic behaviour of a living body is completely determined by the nature and arrangement of 
the chemical compounds which compose it, in the sense that any whole which is composed of such 
compounds in such an arrangement will show vital behaviour and that nothing else will do so”, 1925: 67- 
8 .
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the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was father of George V, obviously 
does not simply consist in Edward, George and the relation of fatherhood; it is further 
necessary that the relation should relate Edward to George, and not only so, but also that it 
should relate them in the particular way which we express by saying that Edward was 
father of George, and not merely in the way which we should express by saying that 
George was father of Edward.8
Relationists therefore typically attribute differences in colour to differences in the 
perceiving subject: what is red-for-me is not red-for-you because of some relevant 
difference between us. So long as the relevant experiential facts to which the 
relationist appeals themselves supervene on the physical facts, relationists accept 
that fixing all the facts in a world fixes all the colour facts; that there could not be a 
world in which the same object is related to the same subject and the colour differ.
If nothing else, classing as physicalist any account of colour that meets the 
Entry by Entailment therefore grossly devalues the physicalist brand. Presumably 
the point of calling a position ‘physicalist* is to score a victory for the forward march 
of progress over the forces of superstition and obscurantism. Yet if by definition 
physicalism already occupies almost all of the logical space, then what progress is 
there to make?
Worse still, this highly ecumenical use of the term ‘physicalism* is potentially 
very misleading. In trying to establish the truth of ‘physicalism’, arguments for the 
weak conclusion that colours supervene of metaphysical necessity on reflectances 
can be illicitly taken to demonstrate the much stronger conclusion that colours are 
‘nothing over and above* these reflectances, or perhaps even the heterogeneous 
micro-structural properties that realise them. By using ‘physicalism’ in this way, we 
can therefore seem to establish much more than we actually do.
Having said this, however, the naturalistic claim that colours are distinct sui 
generis properties that supervene of necessity on the reflectance properties of objects 
is not unproblematic. If colours are not to be an expendable species of noblesse, it is 
important to secure some — however limited — causal role for them to play. The least 
that this would seem to require is that colours explain the way coloured objects 
appear. It is, for instance, because reflectance-types are inconsistent with the thesis 
that colour experience simply inherits its qualitative character from that of which it 
is an experience that we rejected physicalist theories of colour in Chapter 6. It would 
therefore be a disaster if it turned out that sui generis colours were themselves no
8 1919-20: 277-8.
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better placed to satisfy the Inheritance Thesis than physical reflectance-types. 
Guaranteeing the causal efficacy of colour at least with respect to our experiences of 
colour therefore represents a non-negotiable constraint on our theory of colour.
But the necessary supervenience of colours on reflectances is generally 
thought to pose a problem in this respect. The domain described by physical science 
has a claim to completeness that other domains of scientific enquiry lack: effects 
described by economic theories, for example, such as stock market crashes, 
depressions, inflation, are often caused by phenomena that fall without the scope of 
economic theory, like natural disasters and wars. Physicists, in contrast, do not go 
beyond the properties and relations described by physical theory to find the causes 
of events that fall within their domain of interest. Instead, all physical effects appear 
to be fully determined by prior physical causes. But if the world described by physics 
forms a causally closed domain, then what role remains for sui generis properties that 
supervene on the physical to play? If every physical event has a fully sufficient 
physical cause, then there appears to be no outlet for the causal powers of 
supervenient properties. Supervenient properties become spare cogs in the causal 
process, with all the causal work being done by the lower-level properties on which 
they supervene. At this point, we therefore appear to face a stark choice. We 
seemingly either have to admit that sui generis colours are causally inefficacious 
epiphenomena, and so no better placed to respect the Inheritance Thesis than the 
physical reflectance properties dismissed in Chapter 6, or else deny that colours are 
distinct from an object’s physical properties after all. Either way, our common sense 
conception of colour is in trouble.9
2. Realisation
A popular way in general of trying to secure an intelligible causal role for higher- 
level properties is to strengthen the relationship between higher-level properties and 
lower-level physical properties from mere supervenience to realisation.
The relationship between realisers and the properties that they realise can be 
modelled more or less strictly on the relationship between determinates and
9 Versions of the causal exclusion argument can be found in many places. Representative are Kim 1998 
and Papineau 2001.
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determinables. Determinates do not causally exclude the properties of which they 
are determinables. Rather, the causal powers associated with determinable properties 
are a proper subset of those associated with determinates of that determinable. 
Consider, for example, the relationship between the determinate property yellow, and 
the determinable coloured. Because being yellow is one way of being coloured, every 
effect that an object has in virtue of being coloured it could have in virtue of being 
yellow: it is therefore sufficient for something to be coloured, that it is yellow. The 
converse, however, is not true. There are causal powers associated with being yellow 
that are not associated with coloured things more generally: it is therefore not 
necessary that something be coloured that it be yellow. A referee’s yellow card has 
the power to caution a football player, but lacks this power if it is any other colour.
Generalising, the same relationship is said to hold between realiser properties 
and the higher-level properties that they realise: namely, the causal powers associated 
with the realised properties are said to be a proper subset of the causal powers 
associated with the realiser property. Suppose, switching to the standard example, 
pain is identified as the property in virtue of which individuals exhibit characteristic 
pain behaviour, such as crying, grimacing, and so on (it will become clear later why it 
is dialectically important to switch examples at this point). Now suppose further that 
the property that realises pain is the property of being in a brain state in which your 
C-fibres are firing. If being in a C-fibre-firing brain state is sufficient for being in 
pain, then there are no effects of being in pain that are not also effects of being in a 
C-fibre-firing brain state. The converse, however, is not true. Being in a C-fibre- 
firing brain state will have effects that being pain does not: for instance producing a 
certain reading on a cerebroscope. Therefore, the causal powers associated with 
being in pain will be a proper subset of those associated with being in a C-fibre- 
firing brain state. Just as being yellow is one way of being coloured, being in a C-fibre- 
firing brain state will be one way of being in pain.10
This account promises a tidy solution to the problem of causal exclusion. On 
the one hand, the dependence of the higher-level on the lower-level appears to
10 According to Yablo 1992, the realiser-realised relation just is the determinate-determinable relation. 
Others mostly claim just that there is some analogy between these relations: see, for example, Clapp 2001, 
Shoemaker 2001, and for a similar suggestion, Kim 1998. At least two recent proponents o f ‘naive’ 
theories of colour suggest this is a way of avoiding the problem of causal exclusion: Yablo 1995 and 
Watkins 2003. It should also be noted that ‘realisation’ is sometimes just used in a general way to express 
a commitment to necessary supervenience.
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follow from the fact that the causal powers associated with higher-level properties 
are a proper subset of the causal powers associated with the lower-level properties. 
At the same time, this account also appears to guarantee the efficacy of the higher- 
level properties, given that the higher-level properties are defined, at least in part, by 
the characteristic kinds of causal interaction into which their bearers enter.
The important question is whether the realisation response can actually 
deliver on both of these promises at the same time. And unfortunately, there is 
reason to suppose that it cannot. Sui generis higher-level properties either tend to be 
deflated entirely, or else conflated with the realiser properties from which they were 
supposed to be distinct.
On the one hand, there is strong pressure to simply deflate talk of the 
higher-level properties altogether. Consider again the example used to illustrate the 
approach. Although we might be happy to talk loosely about things having causal 
powers in virtue of being coloured, those of a parsimonious disposition will not 
want to take the ontological implications of this talk seriously: ‘Of course’, they will 
say, ‘there is a sense in which an object has causal powers in virtue of being 
coloured. More properly speaking, however, it seems preferable to say that it is not 
the determinable property coloured that has the causal powers at all, but the 
determinate properties yellow^  red, and so on. The determinable coloured is merely an 
abstraction. We don’t need to suppose it really exists.’
Kim’s version of realisationism is a case in point. According to Kim, higher- 
level properties are best understood as ‘second-order’ properties defined by their 
causal role. So, if F is a higher-order property, being F is the property of having a 
property with a specific causal role: being dormative, for instance, the property of 
having a property that causes people to sleep. In the limiting case where there is only 
one first-order property, P, with the relevant causal profile, C, F just is P: the 
property of having the property with causal profile C is nothing over and above 
having the property with causal profile C. Things are slightly more complicated if 
there is more than one property with the same causal profile: if F is multiply realised, 
or multiply realisable. Although in this case straightforward property identity is out 
of the question, there is still a sense in which being F amounts to nothing more than 
being realised by whichever property, P i.. .Pn, realises F: it is at least true of either 
Pi, or P2, or Pn, that on that occasion, F is not anything further. For this reason,
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Kim prefers to regard the predicate ‘F’ not as picking out a bone-fide property at all, 
but as functioning instead as a second-order description or designator that picks out 
a first-order base property.11
By regarding the predicate ‘F’ as merely a second-order description, Kim 
succumbs to the temptation to simply deflate the higher-level properties that lower- 
level properties realise. We are no longer left with genuine higher-level properties of 
objects, just ways of picking out lower-level physical properties using sui generis 
vocabulary. But this is not what the realisation account promised. What we were 
promised were robustly existent, causally efficacious higher-level properties.12
To the extent to which these deflationary tendencies can be resisted, 
realisationism has difficulties in the other direction, respecting the fact that higher- 
level properties are supposed to be genuinely distinct from their lower-level realisers. 
Realisationism is effectively a version of the type-identity theory, modified in 
response to Putnam’s multiple realisation argument. According to type-identity 
theorists, higher-level functionally defined properties are identical to their lower- 
level realisers: being in pain just is being in a C-fibre-firing state, being yellow just is 
having reflectance property r. Against type-identity theories, Putnam argued that the 
multiple realisation of higher-level properties rules out straightforward property 
identification. Realisationism appears to offer a way round this objection, without 
simply collapsing into Putnam’s preferred solution of treating functional properties 
as properties that are wholly distinct from their realisers, by regarding realiser 
properties as in some sense constituting the properties that they realise.13
Insofar as realisationism is just a version of an identity theory, any 
temptation to deflate talk of higher-level properties is misplaced. According to
11 1998: 98-106.
12 The realisation view is also sometimes claimed to effectively assimilate the relationship between 
realisers and the properties they realise to the relationship between parts and wholes, in the sense that the 
causal powers associated with lower-level properties constitute the causal powers associated with higher- 
level properties (e.g. Shoemaker 2001: 80). Leaving to one side worries that we might have about the 
sense of making constitution claims in relation to properties, the same deflationary problem arises. 
Although we are certainly happy to talk of parts independently of the wholes of which they are parts, 
those o f parsimonious disposition will be reluctant to take this talk seriously. So, for instance, whilst there 
is a sense in which it is my hands that are writing these words, I do not expect my hands to take the credit 
or disapprobation for what has been written. It is not really my hands, but only my hands qua part of the 
whole that they compose (i.e. me) that deserves the credit or blame.
13 Putnam 1975. This is especially clear in Clapp’s version of realisation, which type-identifies higher-level 
properties with disjunctive properties, exhaustively constituted by the properties named by the different 
disjuncts. It should be noted that Kim is not unaware o f this possibility, but chooses to reject it because 
o f qualms about disjunctive properties: Clapp’s exposition of realisationism takes the form o f rebuttals to 
Kim’s objections to the legitimacy of disjunctive properties.
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Leibniz’s Law, if x  andy  are identical then anything that is true of x  is also true ofy. 
In the limiting case in which there is just one realiser property, for instance, it 
follows that whatever is true of the realiser is also true of the property that it realises. 
In particular, if the realiser is associated with causal profile C, the property that is 
realised is also associated with the same causal profile. Therefore, the realised 
property is causally efficacious just in case the realiser property is.
This is fine as far as it goes. However, it does not go far enough. The 
deflationary temptation to which Kim succumbs is symptomatic of a fundamental 
problem with realisationism understood in this way. At least part of the reason why 
it is tempting to deflate higher-level properties is that even in this modified form, 
the type-identity view does not secure the causal efficacy of higher-level properties in 
the right way in the end, it may therefore seem better just to sweep these properties 
under the carpet. The problem with realisationism is that it attributes the wrong 
causal powers to the wrong properties. Consider the determinate-determinable 
analogy with reference to which realisationism is first introduced. Explicating the 
higher-level/lower-level relation with reference to the relationship between the 
determinable colour and the determinates yellow, red, etc. makes the realisationist view 
seem less reductive than it really is. The strictly analogous relationship to being 
coloured and being yellow in the case of pain, however, is not between being in pain 
and being in a C-fibre-firing mental state, but between being in pain and being in a 
pain state with a specific qualitative character: for instance, having a sharp stabbing 
pain, or a dull ache. Just as irreducible colour vocabulary does not drop out when we 
move from the level of determinables to determinates in the case of colour, for the 
sake of parity irreducible pain vocabulary should not drop out in the move from 
determinables to determinates in the pain case either.
If realisationism is true, then being yellow and being coloured cannot itself 
serve as model for the relationship between realiser and realised, because yellow, red 
etc will themselves be susceptible to reductive analysis. Yellowness, for example, will 
be realised by an indefinite number of token reflectance properties which together 
constitute an anthropocentrically defined reflectance-type. The causal powers that 
something has in virtue of being yellow will therefore be a subset of the causal 
powers that something has in virtue of having a certain reflectance property. The 
idea that the causal powers associated with colours could be a subset of the causal
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powers associated with reflectance properties, however, is precisely what led us to 
reject physicalism about colour in the first place. Amongst the causal powers 
associated with the reflectance property on this view would be the power to produce 
qualitatively different visual experiences in subjects with different visual apparatus. 
But how one and the same property (or set of properties) could produce qualitatively 
different veridical experiences in different subjects is precisely what we found to be 
mysterious. Consistent with the thesis that visual experiences simply inherit their 
qualitative character from that of which they are experiences, it would require 
reflectance-types to have multiple qualitative characters. And this is inconsistent 
with a sufficiently robust understanding of qualitative character (§6.5).
To say that the causal powers associated with a realised property are a proper 
subset of those associated with the property that realises it presupposes that realiser 
and realised property could have the very same causal powers. But this does not 
respect the motivation for saying that colours and reflectances are distinct properties 
in the first place. The initial reason for postulating sui generis colours was the thought 
that physical reflectances cannot, consistent with the Inheritance Thesis, causally 
explain our colour experiences. What we need are properties with causal powers that 
differ in kind to the causal powers associated with the properties on which they 
supervene. Colours, that is, need causal powers of their own.
3. The Causal Efficacy of Colour
Enshrining the right of colours to novel causal powers raises with renewed vigour 
the causal exclusion argument. On the one hand, the physical domain appears to be 
complete in a way that other areas of scientific endeavour are not: it seems, that is, 
that every physical event has a purely physical cause. At the same time, we want to hold 
onto the idea that sui generis properties can have causal effects, and, at least on the 
face of it, physical effects at that. But barring the causal overdetermination of these 
events by independent physical and sui generis causes, there doesn’t appear to be any 
causal work for the supervenient sui generis properties left to do. If every physical 
event has a purely physical cause, then there are no gaps in the causal process for the 
supervenient properties to fill. And now it seems that in order to avoid becoming
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causal epiphenomena, colours have to be identified with physical properties after all. 
But is this right?
In the first place, there is a problem about exactly what is meant by saying 
that ‘the physical domain is causally complete’. Clearly, the causal exclusion 
argument can only get going if we exclude from the physical domain sui generis 
properties like colour: if, in contrast, these properties themselves form part of the 
physical world, then there is no inconsistency in the joint assumptions that the 
physical domain is causally closed and that sui generis properties have physical effects. 
There are, however, well documented difficulties associated with the project of 
trying to give a non-trivial definition of ‘physical’ that includes everything the 
physicalist wants to include and excludes everything they want to exclude.
Purely a priori constraints on what counts as physical, for instance, typically 
fail to exclude sui generis colours from the physical domain. Snowdon, for example, 
suggests that physics can be identified as the discipline which aims to describe the 
most basic features of the things (tables, chairs etc) that we encounter in perception. 
But of itself — at least without a better understanding of ‘basic’ — this does not rule 
out the possibility that colours are amongst the things that an account of the basic 
features of the objects that we encounter in perception must describe. The objects 
that I encounter in perception certainly appear coloured, and this is a much more 
basic feature of them than many things that I could care to mention: for instance, 
where and by whom they were made, whether I like them or not, and so on.14
A  posteriori definitions of ‘physical’, on the other hand, run the risk of 
falsifying the crucial assumption that physics is complete. If ‘physical’ is understood 
in terms of what people in physics departments actually study, then it is almost 
certainly false that the physical domain is complete. It was once thought that the 
smallest entities were atoms. Then sub-atomic particles like electrons and protons 
were discovered. Eventually quantum mechanics was introduced to explain atomic 
phenomena, and more recently string theory has been developed in an attempt to 
explain quantum phenomena. It would be foolish to bet against the possibility that 
one day something yet more remote from our understanding will be introduced to
14 1989: 153. Snowdon himself acknowledges that these a priori constraints do not get us any closer to 
determining precisely what the content o f ‘physical’ is.
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explain string theory. If so, then the completeness of physics, understood with 
reference to the content of current physical theory, is false.
In light of these problems, it is sometimes suggested that it is not so 
important that we know what ‘physical theory’ includes, only that we know what 
‘physical theory’ excludes. According to Papineau, for instance, whose concern is with 
the causal efficacy of the mental:
provided we can be confident that the “physical” in this sense is complete, that is, that 
every nonmental effect is fully determined by nonmental antecedents (in the sense of 
antecedents that can be identified without using mental categories), then we can conclude 
that all mental states must be identical with something nonmental (otherwise mental states 
couldn’t have nonmental effects).15
We can well imagine someone making an analogous remark with respect to colour. 
Indeed most physicalists would probably be prepared to say the same of chemical 
and biological properties: in discussing the problem of causal exclusion most 
physicalists are more or less explicit that ‘physical’ is not just to be read as 
‘nonmental’, but as ‘microphysical’. The rationale for this is that whatever gaps 
current physical theory may contain, it seems improbable that high-level properties 
like sui generis colours will be needed to plug them. These gaps will be filled instead 
by properties of ever smaller entities.
Even so construed, however, it is not clear that the completeness of physics 
is true. The first thing to note is that the existence of sui generis colours with novel 
causal powers does not directly threaten the completeness of physics in the same 
way that the existence of sui generis mental properties does. Colours lack the wide 
cosmological role of mental states. They are not themselves plausibly thought of as 
affecting the purely physical properties of objects. Colours, for instance, play no role 
in the workings of the underlying mechanisms of colour perception. We do not 
suppose that they exert a causal influence on the sensory organs in the way required, 
for instance, by Scholastic theories of perception: the retinal receptors do not 
‘receive’ colours, transmitting their form into the mind for inspection. The proximal 
stimuli of the perceptual process is not colour as such, but electromagnetic light: 
facts about colour are recovered by the perceptual system from the information 
encoded in this light, given certain anchoring heuristics. Given that there is no
15 2001: 12. Compare Jackson 1998: 7.
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presumption that colours exert a direct causal influence over the physical, colours 
pose no direct threat to the completeness of physics. That is, colours are not 
themselves plausibly thought of as exerting any direct downwards causal influence.
The causal exclusion problem for colour instead piggybacks on the causal 
exclusion problem for the mental. The causal powers associated with being coloured 
make ineliminable reference to the mental states of perceiving subjects. Problems 
about causal exclusion therefore arise in relation to colours only insofar as the 
effects of colour on perceiving subjects have an impact upon events in the purely 
physical world. Consider, for example, an artist mixing paints on her palette. Her 
paint sample is too light to capture the foreboding rain clouds gathering overhead, 
so she moves her arm in order to mix in a darker colour. The colour of the original 
paint sample thereby indirectly brings about a chain of seemingly physical events.
But does even this violate the causal completeness of physics? On broadly 
Moorean grounds, for instance, we are surely more confident that the mental is 
causally efficacious than we are of the truth of any metaphysical principle that might 
be adduced to argue for a non-trivial claim about mental efficacy: either that the 
causal efficacy of the mental is secured only by the identity of mental and physical, 
or perhaps even that the mental is not efficacious at all. For instance, it is not just 
obvious that we could tell a complete causal story without reference to mental events 
and properties. Any account of the paint mixing episode that omitted reference to 
the artist’s experience of the paint, subsequent desire for the paint to appear darker 
and beliefs about how to achieve this, would seem to be essentially incomplete. 
Counterfactually speaking, for example, it seems false to say that if she hadn't had the 
experience, consequent desire and relevant background beliefs, the paint mixing 
would have occurred anyway. Paint does not mix itself. The experience, belief and 
desire set at least appear to make some difference to the subsequent course of 
events.16
So far, this is to do little more than maintain (banging our fist at the same 
time) that the mental does exert a causal influence. Clearly, leaving the matter here 
would be unsatisfactory. As Burge points out, the challenge of causal exclusion is 
best seen, not so much as an attempt to convince us that the mental is not causally 
efficacious, as to prompt us to give an account of how it exerts a causal influence.
16 For a similar ‘Moorean’ argument, see Burge 1993.
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Nothing that has yet been said goes any way towards meeting this further 
requirement.
To this end, it will therefore help to look in more detail at exactly what the 
problem of causal exclusion is supposed to be. Why should it be problematic that, 
for instance, my decision to move my arm ceteris paribus has the effect of my arm 
moving? The first thing to stress is that the causal exclusion problem does not turn 
on any distinctive features of particular sui generis properties. When Descartes 
claimed that sui generis colours could not play any intelligible part in the perceptual 
process, for instance, this is because he thought there are substantial a priori 
constraints on which properties can stand in genuine causal relations. The 
mechanistic causal likeness principles require effects to be proportional to their causes. 
Because colours are non-essential properties of material substance — we have seen, 
and can imagine seeing, objects that are so pellucid as to lack colour — colours 
cannot be thought to produce changes in the essential properties of matter, as they 
would have to if they impinged on our sensory organs: this would be a case of 
something less perfect producing an alteration in something more perfect (§1.1).
But it is not any assumption about the heterogeneity of mental and physical, 
coupled with a priori constraints on what counts as intelligible causal explanation, 
that is the source of the causal exclusion problem. So, for instance, there is nothing 
problematic from the perspective of causal exclusion about arm movements as such. 
Indeed, it seems entirely natural to suppose that my decision to move a part of me 
should cause a part of me to move. Intuitively cause and effect — my decision and my 
arm -  are both on the same level: they are both properties of a macroscopic entity, 
namely me.
This may be obscured by the fact that arm movements are at least in some 
sense ‘physical’ events. But is important to bear in mind that they are not ‘physical’ 
events in the sense relevant to the causal exclusion argument: they are not, for 
instance, ‘physical’ in the negative sense given to this term above. If we are 
confident that every physical effect is fully determined by antecedent causes that can 
be identified without using mental categories, then we are no less likely to think that 
every physical effect is fully determined by antecedent causes that can be identified 
using no macroscopic categories at all. Arms, macroscopic bodies in general, even
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chemical and biological properties, have no more place in physical theory than 
minds and colours.17
Rather, the causal exclusion problem arises when we suppose that 
supervenient properties at higher-levels exert a causal influence on lower-level 
properties; canonically when the higher-level properties are properties of macroscopic 
objects and the lower-level properties are properties of entities at the microscopic level. 
For instance, when Papineau asks us to imagine that the completeness of physics 
might be false, he asks us to suppose that “some physical effects (the movements of 
arms, perhaps, or the firing of the motor neurons that instigate those movements) 
were not determined by law by prior physical causes at all”.18 Clearly what Papineau 
is worried about are not sui generis mental properties causing the movement of arms 
as such, but sui generis mental properties — properties of macroscopic entities like 
persons — exerting a causal influence over the microscopic motor neurons that 
scientific theory tells us “instigate” (cause?) those arm movements.
A commitment to downwards causation is often thought to be a defining 
feature of views which assign higher-level properties causal powers that differ in 
kind to the causal powers associated with the microscopic properties on which they 
supervene: McLaughlin, for instance, even suggests that it was precisely this 
commitment to downwards causation that ultimately brought about the downfall of 
British Emergentism.19 It is certainly an impression that proponents of this view 
often do little to discourage. The British Emergentist C.L. Morgan, for instance, 
appears to state a commitment to downwards causation when he says that:
when some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level o f life), the way in 
which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue o f its 
presence -  different from what it would have been if life had been absent.20
17 Compare Sturgeon’s objection (1998) that the causal exclusion argument equivocates on the word 
‘physical’: in saying that physics is complete, ‘physical’ is meant in the sense of quantum physical, whereas 
in saying that the mental has physical effects ‘physical’ is used in a much looser way, akin just to 
‘macroscopic’.
18 Papineau 2001: 8-9.
19 McLaughlin 1992. According to Kim (1998: 42), the only way to reconcile the causal efficacy o f mental 
property M with respect to mental property M* and the supervenience of M* on physical property P*, is 
by accepting that M causes M* by causing P*. Crane 2001 also claims that downwards causation is 
essential to emergentism, and argues that the same is true of so-called ‘nonreductive physicalism’ more 
generally.
20 Morgan 1923: 16.
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It would, however, be odd if a commitment to downwards causation really 
were a consequence of the view that there are sui generis properties with novel causal 
powers. Admitting into your ontology sui generis properties that supervene on 
physical properties is effectively to deny the occurrence of upwards causation. No 
small part of the motivation for saying that there are sui generis properties with novel 
causal powers is the belief that the underlying physical properties are the wrong kind 
of properties to do the relevant causal work: in the case of colour, for example, the 
reason for saying that colours are sui generis properties is that the physical 
reflectances on which colours supervene cannot, consistent with the thesis that 
experiences inherit their qualitative character from the properties that they are 
experiences of, cause our colour experiences. Similarly for arm movements.
Papineau describes the firing of motor neurons as ‘instigating’ arm movements. But 
if by this he means that the firing of motor neurons causes arm movements, then it is 
something that the emergentist should want to reject. Taking seriously talk of levels 
of nature, microscopic motor neurons cannot cause changes in macroscopic objects 
like arms. Motor neurons may be able to cause changes in other entities of the same 
level — the microscopic entities that compose my arm. But this, according to the 
emergentist, is not the same thing as saying that they thereby cause changes at the 
macroscopic level. To suppose that they have macroscopic effects is to assume that 
arms are identical with the lower-level entities that constitute them. But this 
precisely what is denied in saying that sui generis properties with novel causal powers 
emerge at higher-levels of functional organisation.
To suppose now that there could be downwards causation in the absence of 
upwards causation, however, gives the higher-level an unfair privilege over the 
lower-level. If physical properties cannot causally affect sui generis supervenient 
properties then it hardly seems fair that these properties should enjoy this influence 
in the other direction. My decision to move my arm shouldn’t be able to cause the 
low-level entities — molecules, atoms, or whatever — that compose my arm to move 
any more than the firing of motor neurons can cause my (macroscopic) arm to 
move. The only way it could would be if my arm and the lower-level entities that 
compose my arm were identical. Yet it follows from the claim that my arm can have 
properties that differ in kind to properties of the entities that compose my arm that 
the two are not identical.
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O f course it is true that when I decide to move my arm and execute this 
decision successfully there is movement in the microscopic entities that compose my 
arm. But this not to say that my decision causes the microscopic constituents of my 
arm to move. If it were, then to avoid playing favourites we should have to say that 
an object’s affecting the incident electromagnetic light causes my subsequent colour 
experience. But this is precisely what we denied in claiming that colours are sui generis 
properties. In the case of colour, an object’s reflectance causes a change in the 
incident light. This in turn causes certain changes in our retinal receptors and 
processing mechanisms. But the object’s reflectance does not thereby cause the 
colour experience. Indeed, it is unusual even to say that the neuralprocessing causes 
the relevant experience. The relationship between subvenient and supervenient is 
not naturally thought of in causal terms at all: for one thing, subvenient and 
supervenient occur simultaneously, whereas causation is more usually thought of as 
a temporal relation in which causes precede their effects. The cause of the 
experience is therefore neither the reflectance nor the neural processing, but the sui 
generis colour that is non-causally determined by the reflectance. The lower-level 
non-causally determines the higher-level properties and it is the higher-level 
properties that then do the causal work.
The same applies in the opposite direction. My decision to move my arm is 
non-causally related to a property of the microscopic entities that constitute my 
brain, whilst my arm is non-causally related to the microscopic entities that compose 
my arm. My decision to move my arm causally affects my arm, but not the 
microphysical entities to which my arm is non-causally related. What causes the 
change in the lower-level entities that compose my arm are prior changes in entities 
of the same level, entities on which my sui generis mental state supervenes.21
We can put the same point in more general terms by focussing on the worry 
that distinguishing the physical from the supervenient leads to widespread 
‘overdetermination’. The widespread overdetermination of effects is typically 
considered to be at best improbable and at worst absurd. To start with, we are told 
to think of classic cases of causal overdetermination, as when a person is
21 In effect, what the emergentist denies is therefore that causation transmits across non-causal relations. 
If C causes E and E constitutes (or is in some other way non-causally related) to E*, then it does not 
follow that C causes E*. This, it seems, is just a commitment of the view that there are different 
properties at different levels of functional organisation, and that at least in part what this difference 
consists in is a difference in causal powers. See Sturgeon 1998.
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simultaneously shot by two bullets. In this case, the same event — the person’s death 
— has two fully sufficient causes: had either cause not been absent, the event would 
still have occurred. We are then told that something like this must be occurring all 
the same if properties in addition to the purely physical properties exert a causal 
influence.
No doubt part of the reason why the causal exclusion argument appears 
convincing is that it is implausible to suppose that this kind of overdetermination 
occurs anything other than infrequently. But the example only works because it is 
wholly misleading. The death of the person who is simultaneously shot twice is 
causally overdetermined. Given that the aim of the argument is to show that sui generis 
properties are causally excluded, it is important that we think of their effects are also 
causally overdetermined. But this was never the suggestion. According to the 
emergentist view, arm movements, for instance, are not causally overdetermined by 
mental and physical properties. Arm movements are doubly determined, but they 
are not thereby oven.letermined, because the determination on the part of the 
physical is non-causal. There is exactly as much determination as there needs to be, 
given that ex hypothesis sui generis properties with novel causal powers are supposed to 
supervene with metaphysical necessity (i.e. non-causally) on physical properties.
Another way of making essentially the same point is that the causal contexts 
in which we are interested are not causal contexts in which there is in fact just one 
event, as there clearly is in the case where someone’s death is causally 
overdetermined by two bullets. Arm movements are not, according to this way of 
thinking, purely physical events. Arm movements are complex events that have 
higher- and lower-level aspects. On the macroscopic level there is the moving of 
part of an agent’s body. On the microscopic level, there is the moving of the 
molecules that compose an arm, the moving of the atoms that compose the 
molecules that compose an arm, and so on. The conclusion that sui generis mental 
properties are causally inefficacious only follows if we assume that the different 
aspects of this event are identical. But this is just what we deny when we admit into 
our ontology sui generis properties at different levels of functional organisation in the 
first place.
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4. Levels of Nature
In securing the causal efficacy of colour, a lot of weight has been placed on the idea 
that there are distinct levels of functional organisation at which properties with 
novel causal powers emerge. More therefore needs to be said about this.
It is, for instance, resistance to the idea of sui generis properties with novel 
causal powers — causal powers different in kind to the powers associated with 
properties of lower-level physical entities — that lies at the heart of the original 
arguments offered by mechanists like Descartes and Locke for the secondary quality 
status of colour (§§1.1-2). When Descartes complains that sensory experience fails 
to yield a clear and distinct conception of colour, at least part of the problem lies in 
his failure to understand how the essential properties of matter — size, shape and 
motion — can produce something else whose nature is quite different from their 
own. Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as we have seen, 
is drawn on the same grounds, although he more explicidy expresses these worries 
in relation to the ‘thinking matter hypothesis’, the thesis that thinking substance is 
just “some certain System of Matter duly put together”. To suppose that thought is a 
property of material substance that emerges when substances reach a certain level of 
functional complexity is, Locke maintains, absurd:
unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to 
them, but a new relation of Position, which ‘tis impossible should give thought and 
knowledge to them.22
The possibility of macroscopic objects instantiating properties that differ in 
kind to the properties of the matter of which they are composed is foreclosed in 
corpuscularian science by the assumption of the ‘catholick’ nature of matter: that the 
determinable qualities of matter are all, and everywhere, the same. This assumption 
provides a way of forging the most direct possible tie between the macroscopic 
observable world and the microscopic unobservable world. The insensible 
corpuscles in virtue of which corpuscularianism explains all natural phenomena 
instantiate determinates of exacdy the same determinable properties as the 
macroscopic objects that we perceive in everyday life. Tying the unobservable realm
22 1690: IV.x.16.
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to the sensible in this way sweetens the pill of admitting into your ontology objects 
that have not been seen, and perhaps never will be seen. There is no mystery about 
what these extended, possibly solid, mobile corpuscles are: they are just like billiard 
balls, tennis balls and cannon balls, only on a much smaller scale. As Descartes 
assures those who are worried about the postulation of particles that cannot be 
perceived by the senses:
N o one who uses his reason will, I think, deny the advantage of using what happens in 
large bodies, as perceived by our senses, as a model for our ideas about what happens in 
tiny bodies which elude our senses merely because of their small size. This is much better 
than explaining matters by inventing all sorts o f strange objects which have no 
resemblance to what is perceived by the senses.23
One of the morals to draw from the breakdown of mechanistic science in 
writers like Locke is that this macro-micro model of explanation is unduly 
restrictive. As Newton’s Principia brought home, an empirically adequate science 
cannot be bound by substantial a priori explanatory constraints: it cannot be decided 
in advance what form intelligible explanation must take. Modern scientists therefore 
have no compunction about “inventing all sorts of strange objects which have no 
resemblance to what is perceived by the senses” in order to explain macroscopic 
phenomena. On the one hand, the catholick qualities of macroscopic entities 
identified by the corpuscularians as essential to material substance no longer go all 
the way down. Quarks, superstrings and singularities, for instance, have no obvious 
shape or size. Point masses are not extended. Gravitational fields are not solid. 
Unobserved quantum particles may even lack determinate spatio-temporal location. 
Instead, the microscopic world abounds with entities that have properties lacking 
from the macroscopic realm. The spin, charm and flavour of quarks, for example, 
are mere homonyms of the properties that we ascribe to macroscopic objects.
But if it does not contravene the practices of modern science to postulate 
properties that differ in kind at different levels of functional organisation, why 
should there be a special problem in the case of colour? Clearly most philosophers 
think that there is a special problem with respect to colour, otherwise physicalists 
wouldn’t identify colours with reflectances, and relationists and eliminativists
23 1644: IV.201.
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wouldn’t think it necessary to eliminate sui generis mind-independent colours from 
the material world altogether. But why?24
The problem is that in resisting the causal exclusion argument we 
presuppose the existence of metaphysically necessary non-causal relations between 
supervenient properties and the physical properties on which they supervene, 
relations whose obtaining cannot be explained in any other terms. The law between 
colours and the reflectances on which they supervene will, as Broad puts it, be 
“unique and ultimate".'23 This commitment to metaphysically basic ‘vertical’ laws 
linking properties at different levels on the macro-micro hierarchy is widely thought 
to be wholly implausible. Horgan, for instance, thinks that we need to eschew 
supervenience in favour of ‘superdupervenience’ if we are to avoid the ignominy of 
admitting these ‘unexplained explainers’ into our ontology: any metaphysically basic 
facts or laws must be facts or laws within physics itself, and preferably fundamental 
physics at that.26 In a similar vein, Tye protests against vertical laws linking colours 
and reflectances that “surely it cannot just be a brute fact that they obtain in the range 
of possible worlds that they do. Surely there must be some explanation”.27
But is the situation really that bad? On the one hand, we can go at least some 
way towards closing the gap between colours and reflectances by thinking about 
colours in terms of their wider causal context. Generally speaking, low-level 
explanations of high-level phenomena are never successful in isolation, but always 
need to take into account the causal nexus of which a property is a part. The 
explanation of temperature in gases in terms of the mean molecular kinetic energy of 
the molecules that compose the gas, for instance, depends upon taking into account 
the relationship of temperature to pressure and volume in the thermodynamic 
theory of gases. We cannot hope to just explain gas temperature in low-level terms, 
but have to simultaneously explain the whole macroscopic causal network that the 
thermodynamic theory describes.
If we similarly take into account facts about the perceiving subjects and their 
visual systems that lie at the heart of the causal network of which colours are a part,
24 Even eliminativists and relationists who offer other grounds for their views generally throw in for good 
measure the consideration that colours have no place within our best physical theory: see, for instance, 
Cook Wilson 1904: §526, McDowell 1985: 112, Johnston 1992:139.
25 Broad 1925: 65.
26 Horgan 1993.
27 Tye 2000: 149.
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continuities between the different levels soon start to appear. Facts about the 
physical realisation of the perceptual system, for instance, explain a host of facts 
about the precise form the consequent colour experience takes. We experience 
washing out when we stare at a colour for a prolonged period of time, for instance, 
because the retinal receptors become desensitised to light that is constantly present. 
Hue discrimination varies with brightness — the Be^old-Brucke effect— because the 
yellow-blue psychophysical channel is less sensitive than the red-green channel at 
low illumination levels. And so on.
More generally, we can use the colour experiences of normal subjects to 
determine a posteriori the physical correlates of colour, using knowledge of the way 
the visual system functions to determine of any given reflectance what colour an 
object with that property will instantiate. For instance, we can predict that objects 
which reflect a relatively high proportion of the incident light throughout the visible 
spectrum generally look white; objects that tend to reflect more light in the middle 
of the visible spectrum than in the long-wavelength part, and roughly the same 
amount of light in the short-wavelength part as in the middle and long-wavelength 
combined, look green; and so on. Indeed, combining generalisations of this kind 
with knowledge of the physical constitution of light, we can further determine the 
results of a body’s interaction with different kinds of light, predicting what colour 
objects will appear under different illuminations, as, in effect, we did in Chapter 3. It 
is this possibility of pairing colours and reflectances that colour physicalists exploit 
in trying to identify colours with physical properties. Their problem is that this 
procedure does not yield the requisite property identities. Colours have attributes 
that reflectances lack: there is no analogue of the distinction between unique and 
binary hues, or between elemental and binary colours more generally, at the level of 
reflectances; reflectances do not stand in the internal relations of similarity and 
difference characteristic of the colours; and so on.
Even though there remains this gulf between colours and reflectances, 
however, this still does not mean that colours are any worse off than other 
paradigmatically physical properties. For instance, it is often claimed that a 
distinctive feature of higher-level suigeneris properties is that their occurrence cannot 
be predicted in advance from knowledge of the properties of the parts of which the 
whole is composed. As Broad remarks in relation to smell:
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a mathematical archangel, gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic 
structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive haystacks... would be totally unable to 
predict that a substance with this structure [containing three atoms of Hydrogen to one of 
Nitrogen] must smell as ammonia does when it gets into the human nose.. .he could not 
possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in 
general or of the peculiar smell o f ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he 
had smelled it for himself.28
But in the brave new world of modern science, ‘predictability in advance’ does not 
serve to distinguish colour from any other higher-level physical phenomenon. It is a 
quite general point that being able to predict the occurrence of a higher-level 
phenomenon on the basis of a lower-level phenomenon requires that we have the 
vocabulary to describe the higher-level phenomenon. We cannot predict an event 
described using high-level vocabulary in terms of an event described in the 
vocabulary of lower-level processes without having some way of translating one 
vocabulary into the other; all that we can predict using low-level vocabulary are 
further events described using the same vocabulary. Any putative case in which a 
low-level explanation is offered of a high-level phenomena therefore requires 
Nagelian ‘bridge laws’ linking the vocabulary of the two theories: we need to know 
that the explanation of a phenomenon described using low-level vocabulary is eo ipso 
a description of the same phenomenon identified using high-level vocabulary. In this 
sense, no higher-level event can ever be predicted solely on the basis of a low-level 
theory.29
There may at least seem to be this difference between colours and other 
physical properties. In the case of colour I’ve argued that the vocabulary linked via 
bridge laws refers to distinct, though necessary co-extensive, properties. In other 
areas of scientific endeavour, however, the referents of terms linked by bridge laws 
are more usually thought to be identical. So, for instance, it is typically claimed that 
temperature in gases just is mean molecular kinetic energy, water just is H2O. But this 
too fails to withstand critical scrutiny.
First, it is important to stress that ‘smooth reductions’ of this kind are 
actually few and far between. It is rare to find higher-level properties that 
correspond so neatly with properties at a lower-level. Just consider the properties
28 Broad 1925: 71-2.
29 Crane 2001:215.
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that represent the physicalist’s best hope of finding a property with which to identify 
colours: surface reflectance properties, and light-affecting properties more generally. 
The phenomenon of metamerism means that there is no single reflectance property 
with which colours can identified. Any given colour can be realised by an indefinite 
number of reflectances. It is for this reason that physicalists themselves typically 
identify colours with reflectance-types: a collection of otherwise heterogeneous 
light-affecting properties that have in common just the fact that they are the 
correlates of perceived colour. The same is no less true of light-affecting properties 
and their microstructural grounds. There are many different ways in which any given 
way of affecting the light can itself be realised. Indeed, Nassau famously identifies 
no less than fifteen standard microphysical ‘causes of colour’.30
Even in the best case scenario where there is a strict correlation between the 
vocabulary of different theories, however, it still does not follow that we have 
anything more than necessary correlations between distinct properties. Consider a 
paradigmatdcally successful example of micro-explanation: water is H2O. If we’re 
already sceptical about whether properties of macroscopic phenomena can ever be 
identified with lower-level physical properties, then it manifestly begs the question 
to be told that they can, because, for instance, water just is H2O. If we are worried 
that facts about molecular bonding cannot explain the occurrence of macroscopic 
properties in general, then they cannot explain why water has the specific phenomenal 
properties of being tasteless, odourless, colourless and so on. ‘Water’ may yet rigidly 
designate that macroscopic stuff that is composed of two hydrogen atoms bound to 
one oxygen atom. But it does not follow that water is thereby identical with H2O: that 
water is ‘nothing over and above’ H2O. This is a further, reductive step, the 
legitimacy of which is precisely what is in question.
Note that in saying this we are in no sense contradicting physical theory, 
either. It is not part of physics that wholes are ‘nothing over and above’ their parts. As 
Mackie ruefully observes, denying the existence of properties over which physical 
theory does not quantify “is a further, philosophical, step”, usually taken on grounds 
of ontological parsimony.31 But considerations of ontological parsimony cut no ice
30 Nassau 1983, Hardin 1988: 1-7.
31 1976: 19. Similarly according to Jackson to suppose that temperature in gases is distinct from, but 
necessarily correlated with, mean molecular kinetic energy “would be to embrace...an ontologically 
extravagant option”, 1998: 58.
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against the emergentist view that wholes have properties that their parts lack. The 
reason for thinking that wholes have properties that their parts lack is that properties 
of the lower-level constituents are incapable of explaining the causal interactions of 
the whole. It is not ontologically extravagant to postulate the existence of properties 
that fulfil an indispensable explanatory function.
In saying this we might just seem to be compounding mystery with mystery: 
far from explaining why colours supervene of metaphysical necessity on 
reflectances, we have just made every other inter-level relationship in the natural 
world equally mysterious. But this does not follow either. The necessary 
supervenience of colours on reflectances is not unexplanatory. Saying that colours 
are suigeneris properties with novel causal powers that supervene of metaphysical 
necessity on a object’s reflectance just is to explain why objects instantiate the 
colours that they do. It is to say that objects appear they way they do because they 
instantiate properties that supervene of metaphysical necessity on their physical 
properties. For some, this will not be explanation enough. But then why suppose 
that any further explanation of the higher-level facts than this must be possible?
The only reason for requiring a more demanding explanation appears to be a 
prior conviction that the microscopic world described by physical theory is all that 
there is. The only further explanation of these facts that would seem to be even 
theoretically possible is one that says that higher-level phenomena are really just one 
and the same as the lower-level phenomena described in physical theory: as Kim 
remarks, “Identity takes away the logical space in which explanatory questions can 
be formulated”.32 But if in the end this is all the demand for further explanation 
amounts to, then it is simply unreasonable. If the only reason to think there are no 
metaphysically basic vertical laws is a prior commitment to the view that everything 
is physical, then this can hardly function as a premiss in the argument for the 
conclusion that everything is physical. Perhaps the necessary supervenience of 
colours on reflectances is just something that, to use Samuel Alexander’s phrase, we 
need to accept with “natural piety”.33
32 Kim 1998: 98.
33 1920 ii: 47.
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5. Conclusion
Descartes claimed that when someone says they see a colour this amounts to saying 
that they see something of whose nature they are wholly ignorant. Like coundess 
others since, Descartes thought that the mind-independence of colour cannot be 
squared with the way we have reason to believe the world is independent of our 
experience. The conception of colour that we form on the basis of this experience is 
therefore neither clear nor distinct: on the basis of visual experience we know 
neither what colours are, nor how they are related to the other properties of material 
objects.
This is usually presented just as the logical conclusion that any right thinking 
naturalist should draw. But in fact it is itself far from naturalistic. The Cartesian 
paradigm sets more store by a priori principles about the way the world must be than 
by the testimony of our natural mode of cognitive access to the world: sense 
perception. In calling this basic cognitive faculty into question, which phenomena 
must be further explicable is demarcated in advance: it is assumed on a priori 
grounds, for instance, that there will in fact be just a limited number of privileged 
properties that are fully sufficient to ‘account for everything’. But this assumption is 
not itself part of physical theory, and runs contrary to the methodology that many 
scientists — especially those working in the so-called special sciences — themselves 
employ. Scientists investigating higher-level phenomena generally prefer the 
vocabulary of their chosen discipline. They do not frame the laws governing higher- 
level phenomena in the language of base level physics, but do so wherever possible 
in the language proper to that domain of enquiry. It is difficult to understand why 
they should do this if the world really consisted just of the properties over which a 
narrowly circumscribed physical theory quantifies. If a limited number of properties 
really are sufficient to ‘account for everything’, why is it that scientists investigating 
higher-level phenomena do not themselves account for higher-level phenomena in 
these terms?
The natural explanation of why scientists investigating phenomena at higher- 
levels of nature work in the vocabulary of their chosen discipline is that there are 
distinct phenomena at these levels that constitute the subject matter of those 
disciplines. These properties cannot be adequately understood in any other terms
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because the underlying lower-level properties themselves lack the relevant attributes: 
in trying to understand these properties in terms of any other properties, salient 
features of the properties under consideration are therefore inevitably lost. Colour is 
a prime example. In claiming that colours are properties of whose nature we are 
ultimately ignorant, physicalists deny the existence of a phenomenon that forms the 
distinctive subject matter of legitimate and informative kinds of empirical 
investigation.
On the one hand, there are robust laws of colour appearance that we can 
only frame using exclusively chromatic vocabulary. Grassman’s Third Law of colour 
mixture, which is the basis of modern colorimetry, for example, states an invariant 
relationship between the hue and saturation of chromatic lights that is independent 
of the way in which these lights are physically realised. According to Grassman’s 
Third Law, any two coloured lights of identical hue and saturation appear identical 
in colour when they are mixed with any other light, and this is so regardless of their 
spectral composition. The salient features of the lights are not their physical 
characteristics, but their colours*
The phenomenon of metamerism means that it is slightly more difficult to 
frame robust chromatic laws governing the way light interacts with material objects, 
as objects that appear identical in colour under one illumination can appear different 
in colour under another illumination. But there are still at least some general 
relationships that we can describe. As we saw in Chapter 3, the interactions of 
achromatic objects with different kinds of light are largely invariant. White objects, 
for example, reflect light of any spectral colour equally and in good measure. As 
such, white objects assume the colour of the light with which they are illuminated: 
they look blue under blue light, red-orange in candle light, and so on.
The way in which chromatically coloured objects interact with the light is 
more complicated. But at least approximate generalisations are possible even here. 
One fairly safe generalisation, for instance, is that although they might not reflect 
light from their own part of the visible spectrum most copiously, chromatically 
coloured objects at least reflect light of their own colour well (§3.3, §6.3). More 
generally, robust object-illuminant relationships can be discovered if we at least stick
34 The discussion at this point draws in a number o f places on Westphal 1987: 70-6 and Broackes 1992: 
194-202.
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to the level of determinable colour: the properties that phenomenological, 
psychological and linguistic investigation suggests actually has cognitive significance 
for us (§5.3). Because of the problem of metamerism, Chevreul’s observation that, 
for instance, “Violet rays falling upon a Yellow stuff, make it appear Brown with an 
excessively pale tint of Red”, may not be universally true. But less specifically, at 
least illuminating a yellow object with a violet light will make it look to be some 
determinate of the determinable brown.35
Similarly robust laws using unapologetically chromatic vocabulary can be 
framed with respect to the affect on perceived colour of successive and 
simultaneous contrast. We know from examples like that represented in Figure 3.1 
that the background against which the achromatic colours are perceived greatly 
affects their perceived colour. Greys, for instance, appear lighter or darker as the 
background against which they are perceived is darker or lighter. Although less 
pronounced, similar effects occur with respect to the chromatic colours. Again, 
these effects conform to laws, described in detail by amongst others Goethe and 
Chevreul. Colours are more pronounced when seen against the background of their 
complementary colour, for monochromatic coloured lights, the colour that light it would 
need to mixed with to produce an achromatic stimulus. The yellow cross of the 
Swedish flag, for example, is made more intense by the blue background. The green 
foliage makes the red of the apple seem all the more red. The same principles apply 
in cases of successive contrast. If you stare intently at a chromatically coloured 
object and then look away, the after-image you experience will be the colour of its 
complement. A nice example of this is described by Goethe:
I had entered an inn towards evening, and, as a well-favoured girl, with a brilliantly fair 
complexion, black hair, and a scarlet bodice, came into the room, I looked attentively at 
her as she stood before me at some distance in half shadow. As she presently afterwards 
turned away, I saw on the white wall, which was now before me, a black face surrounded 
with a bright light, while the dress of the perfectly distinct figure appeared of a beautiful 
sea-green.36
Evidence for the existence of these laws of colour appearance is our ability 
to exploit them. The reason why projector screens tend to be white, for instance, is 
that white objects reflect equally and in good measure all kinds of light: as a result,
35 Chevreul 1839: §268, Broackes 1992: 201.
36 1810: §52. As Goethe puts it, in general “colours diametrically opposed to each other...reciprocally 
evoke each other in the eye”, 1810: §50.
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the colours that you perceive on the screen are determined by the colour of the light 
the projector emits, not the differences in the way the screen reflects this light (this 
is the converse of the point made in §3.4: if you want to know the real colours of 
material objects, you need white light, but if you want to know the real colours of 
lights, you need white material objects). The laws of colour appearance are also 
exploited by supermarkets, who apparendy enhance the green appearance of their 
fruit and vegetables, thereby making them seem fresher, by using illuminants whose 
spectral composition is skewed towards middle- and low-wavelength light (in the 
terminology of §3.5, illuminants with a relatively high colour temperature): this light 
accentuates the comparatively high reflectance of green objects in these regions of 
the visible spectrum. Painters are similarly able to manipulate perceived colour by 
altering background colour: Delacroix famously boasted that he could even recreate 
the ‘radiant flesh of Venus’ from mud given the choice of a suitable background. 
And designers can exploit more general relationships between colours and 
perceiving subjects. Up to a point, for instance, the colour coding of information in 
a display increases its visual impact: subjects are able to better discriminate different 
parts of the display, and the information contained therein. Use too many, or badly 
chosen, colours, however, and colour coding loses this function (§5.3).
A different, but no less legitimate and fruitful, subject of scientific enquiry is 
the investigation into the colours themselves. There are features of colours and 
colour space that can only be investigated in chromatic terms. Consider the 
distinction between unique and binary hues, or elemental and derivative colours 
more generally. As we have seen, there is no structurally isomorphic distinction at 
the level of physical reflectances. Therefore we can only state facts like ‘orange is a 
perceptual mixture of yellow and red’ and ‘there are yellows that are neither reddish 
nor greenish’ using irreducibly chromatic vocabulary. Similarly for the internal 
relations of similarity and difference in which colours stand: as I argued in Chapter 
6, the lower-level reflectances on which colours supervene do not stand in the same 
relations. Even though its subject matter is manifest, phenomenological 
investigation here, as elsewhere, is capable of offering genuine empirical insight. As 
we have seen, for example, studies into the structure of colour space tell us that the 
unique hues themselves stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference
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(§6.1). Even the unique-binary hue distinction is something that it took sustained 
attention to the phenomenology of experience to uncover.
The existence of this body of autonomous scientific knowledge is indicative 
of the fact that the colours themselves form a legitimate domain of enquiry. 
Although we can integrate the results of this enquiry into the results of enquiries 
into lower-level phenomena to at least some extent, when we inevitably reach facts 
that are not themselves further explicable in terms of lower-level processes we 
should not be surprised. Explanation has to come to an end somewhere. To 
conclude instead that we must be ignorant of the nature of colour just because a 
priori expectations about what should be further explicable are dashed seems fool­
hardy, even superstitious. We seem, to borrow a phrase from Locke, to do “much- 
what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he 
had no Wings to fly”.37
Careful investigation into the nature of colour at once improves our grasp of 
what colours are and vindicates in outline our ordinary thought about colour. The 
inquiry into colour as a distinct suigeneris phenomenon reveals that the naive view of 
colour is neither systematically mistaken nor essentially incomplete. Colours are, as 
we ordinarily suppose, mind-independent properties. Moreover, even though there 
may be some respects in which our grasp of these properties could be better, 
colours are at least mind-independent properties whose essential nature is not 
hidden from view. We do not need to go beyond sense-experience to fill any 
remaining gaps in our conception of them: it is by investigating colours as colours 
that we achieve a better understanding of these properties. When we say that we see 
a colour this therefore does not amount to saying that we see something of whose 
nature we are wholly ignorant. In essence, we already know what colours are before 
we inquire into their nature. Colours are what we ordinarily think they are. Our 
common sense conception of colours is of itself clear and distinct.
37 1690:1.i.5.
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